dissenting:
Although the majority has carefully reviewed the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that such facts do not unerringly lead to the conclusion that the relationship between Best Western International, Inc. and Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc. was that of owner and independent contractor. On the contrary, there is present here an issue of fact for a jury to determine. That issue is whether Best Western International, Inc. reserved a sufficient right of control over the manner in which Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc. operated the Best Western Pocono Inn to give rise to a master and servant relationship and render Best Western International, Inc. vicariously liable for the negligence, if any, .of Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc. in the operation of the Best Western Pocono Inn. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Best Western International, Inc.
*331Christine Myszkowski was sexually assaulted while using the ladies’ restroom at the Best Western Pocono Inn, in Stroudsburg, Monroe County. She filed suit against Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., which owned the inn, and also against Best Western International, Inc., on grounds that inadequate security had been provided. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Best Western, and Myszkowski appealed.
On April 25,1987, Myszkowski was working as a disc jockey at a social function being conducted at the inn by a local college ministry group. The campus organization had leased a banquet room at the inn and had independently hired Myszkowski and her partner to provide music and entertainment. During the course of the evening, Myszkowski had occasion to use the ladies’ restroom, where she was surprised and assaulted by John Kenneth Spahr.1
In 1980 or 1981, Penn Stroud Hotel was approved as a member of the Best Western organization. This enabled the hotel to use the “Best Western” name for advertising and promotional purposes and to participate in the Best Western reservation network. Best Western, a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of Arizona and registered to do business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, contends that it does not control the operation of Penn Stroud’s hotel business. It describes itself as a “marketing organization which benefits its member properties through the use of a cooperative reservation system, joint advertising, volume discounts, quality assurance standards, and other income generating services.” It denies that there is a franchisor-franchisee relationship.
In her complaint, Myszkowski alleged that Best Western had been negligent for failing to require better security and was vicariously liable for Penn Stroud’s failure to provide adequate security. Best Western denied these claims and moved for the entry of summary judgment.
*332A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In passing upon a motion for summary judgment, a court must examine the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts against the moving party. Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 601, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984); Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa.Super. 135, 140-141, 476 A.2d 928, 930-931 (1984). “It is not the court’s function to decide issues of fact but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried.” Id. at 141, 476 A.2d at 931.
Although an employer may be liable for negligent acts of his or her servants or employees, there is no vicarious liability for harm caused by independent contractors. Lutz v. Cybularz, 414 Pa.Super. 579, 583, 607 A.2d 1089, 1091 (1992). See: Hader v. Coplay Cement Manufacturing Co., 410 Pa. 139, 189 A.2d 271 (1963).
‘The hallmark of an employee-employer relationship is that the employer not only controls the result of the work but has the right to direct the manner in which the work shall be accomplished; the hallmark of an independent eontractee-contractor relationship is that the person engaged in the work has the exclusive control of the manner of performing it, being responsible only for the result.’
George v. Nemeth, 426 Pa. 551, 553-554, 233 A.2d 231, 232 (1967), quoting Green v. Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 484, 201 A.2d 207, 210 (1964). See also: Moon Area School District v. Garzony, 522 Pa. 178, 560 A.2d 1361 (1989). Broadly stated, if the agent is under the control of the employer, he is a servant; if he is not under such control, he is an independent contractor. Feller v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 363 Pa. 483, 486, 70 A.2d 299, 300 (1950). The actual control exercised by an employer over the manner of work, however, is not determinative of the relationship; rather, it is the employer’s right or authority to control which renders one an employee or servant and not an independent contractor. See: Lutz v. Cybularz, supra 414 Pa.Super. at 583, 607 A.2d *333at 1091. “It is the exclusive function of the jury to determine, from the evidence, the precise nature of the relationship, except where the facts are not in dispute, in which latter event the question becomes one for determination by the court.” Melmed v. Motts, 341 Pa.Super. 427, 430-431, 491 A.2d 892, 893 (1985) (citations omitted).
In Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 428 F.Supp. 663 (E.D.Pa.1977), decedent’s wife brought a claim against Union Prescription Centers, Inc. (UPC) to recover for the injuries and resulting death of her decedent, all of which had occurred as a result of an improperly filled prescription. UPC moved for summary judgment, averring that it owed no duty to the plaintiff because the drugstore was an independent contractor and UPC was not the “owner, operator, possessor or in control” of the drugstore at the time of the alleged negligence. The district court granted the motion and entered summary judgment in favor of UPC. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It held that it could not be determined as a matter of law that UPC did not have the right to control the operations of the drugstore. See: Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir.1978). In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that although the parties’ franchise agreement denied the existence of an agency relationship, this was not in itself determinative of the relationship. Id. at 786. Accord: George v. Nemeth, supra 426 Pa. at 554, 233 A.2d at 233. Moreover, although there was no evidence that UPC had exercised actual control over the manner in which the drugstore operated, the parties’ agreement contained many provisions according UPC the right to do so. The agreement required that the franchisee operate under the name of UPC, grant UPC the right of inspection, remain open for business a minimum number of hours per week, maintain the exterior and interior of the premises in UPC’s standard colors, purchase and maintain specific types of insurance policies and name UPC as an insured, utilize insignia, equipment, decals, uniforms and colors required by UPC, and operate “as part of a national organization securing its strength through adherence to *334UPC’s uniformly high standards of service, appearance, quality of equipment and proved methods of operation.” UPC had the right to terminate the relationship if the franchisee breached any provision of the parties’ agreement. Because “reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not UPC had the right to control [the franchisee’s] physical conduct and the manner in which he operated the store,” the Court held that a genuine issue of fact remained to be decided. Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., supra, 582 F.2d at 789.
Similarly, in Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F.Supp. 29 (E.D.Pa.1980), Verna Drummond brought an action against the Hilton Hotel Corporation (Hilton) to recover damages for injuries which she had sustained in a fall in a Hilton Inn (Inn). Hilton moved for summary judgment, averring that it did not own, maintain, control or operate the Inn and that an agreement between Hilton and the Inn specifically disavowed any agency relationship. The agreement did provide, however, that Hilton had the right to consult with the owners of the Inn and the right to inspect the hotel to maintain the standards of the Hilton system. The agreement also required that the Hilton name be used in all advertising and promotional material. Relying on Drexel, supra, the court denied the motion for summary judgment, reserving the issue of Hilton’s right to control the hotel’s operations for determination by a jury. Id. 501 F.Supp. at 31. See also: Clem v. Steveco, Inc., 450 N.E.2d 550 (Ind.App.1983); Chargois v. Trip-L-Quik, 441 So.2d 45 (La.App.1983); Billops v. Magness Construction Co., 391 A.2d 196 (Del.1978); Singleton v. International Dairy Queen, Inc., 332 A.2d 160 (Del.Super.Ct.1975). But see contra: Ortega v. General Motors Corp., 392 So.2d 40 (Fla.App. 1980); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 216 Va. 490, 219 S.E.2d 874 (1975).
In the instant case, the owners of the Pocono Inn managed the day-to-day business of the inn and made the decisions incidental thereto. They recruited and paid hotel personnel, maintained the property, and provided for security, accounting and supervisory services. The hotel’s agreement with Best Western disavowed any agency relationship and provided that *335the Penn Stroud Hotel should be an independent contractor. It provided, specifically, as follows:
Applicant [Penn Stroud Hotel] acknowledges that the relationship of Best Western to its members is one of independent contractor, that neither party to this Agreement has the power to obligate or bind the other in any way, and that no relationship of partners, joint venturers or agents is created by this Application and Agreement. It is understood that Best Western has no responsibility for the use, condition or operation of the subject property, no control of or responsibility for the safety of the premises or the safety of the design of any structure or product, and that Best Western has no control over or responsibility for any decision affecting the employment or supervision of any person employed in connection with the subject property.
On the other hand, all members of the Best Western organization were subject to a quality control biannual inspection, as a result of which the members were scored according to the conditions of their properties and the amenities provided. The failure to obtain a minimum score, pre-determined by Best Western, could result in sanctions ranging from probation to termination of membership. Even where sanctions were not imposed, members were obligated to correct, replace, repair or renovate those areas where repairs or renovations were deemed necessary by Best Western. Rules and regulations applicable to members required that they incorporate the Best Western name and logo into all property signage and that the telephone be answered by using the words, “Best Western.” Other regulations pertained to the keeping of the grounds, the attire of and utensils used by maids, and the furnishing of rooms. From all of this it would appear that Best Western may well have reserved some right of control over the manner in which the Pocono Inn was operated by its owners.
Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, it cannot be determined as a matter of law that a master-servant relationship did not exist between the parties. Whether Best Western reserved a right to control the manner in which the *336Pocono Inn was operated by Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., so as to render Best Western vicariously liable for the inn’s negligence, if any, is a question which must be decided by a jury.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
. Spahr was subsequently convicted criminally for his conduct and was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment in a state correctional institution.