Opinion by
Me. Justice Eobeets,This appeal involves the validity of charitable bequests contained in a will executed less than 30 days before death. Testatrix died on May 2, 1958, without heirs or next of kin, nine days after executing her last will dated April 23, 1958. In that will, as in her immediately preceding will of September 27, 1955, she bequeathed her residuary estate in equal shares to three designated charities. Both wills were drawn by the same attorney and contained charitable gifts of identical shares of the residue to the same named charitable beneficiaries for the same purpose.
Immediately upon the execution of her will of April 23, 1958, testatrix requested her attorney-scrivener to tear up the signed copy of her earlier 1955 will. This her attorney did, in her presence and in the presence of another person who had witnessed the new will. However, an identical carbon of her 1955 will which had been prepared simultaneously with the revoked signed copy was retained by the attorney.
The Commonwealth, asserting its right as statutory heir under Section 3(6) of the Intestate Act,1 claimed the entire residuary estate for itself, contending that the gifts to the charities contained in testatrix’s last will were of no effect because made within 30 days of testatrix’s death.2
*407The court below held that the undisputed record facts placed the case within the exceptions to the 30-day rule contained in Section 7(1) of the Wills Act,3 *408and established the validity of the charitable gifts. From this determination the Commonwealth appeals.
Section 7(1) of the Wills Act of 1947 creates two methods by which charitable gifts contained in a will executed within thirty days of death may be validated.4 One method permits such charitable gifts if all who would benefit by the invalidity of the charitable bequests agree that they shall be valid. The second method permits such gifts if (a) the probated will revokes a prior will executed at least thirty days before death, (b) “the original of which can be produced in legible condition”, and (c) the prior instrument contains identical gifts for substantially the same charitable purposes. It is undisputed that conditions (a) and (c) have been fulfilled in this case. The crucial issue is whether the carbon sheets of the prior will qualify as an “original” under requirement (b) above or whether, as the Commonwealth contends, only the now-*409destroyed, executed ribbon copy of the prior will can be admitted to prove pre-existing charitable intent.
It is unquestioned that the carbon sheets of the prior will, which, in this case, were retained by testatrix’s attorney and offered to prove the continuing charitable intention of testatrix, were made at the same time, by the same typewriter and by the same strokes as made the now-destroyed ribbon sheets of that will. In John Wanamaker v. Chase, 81 Pa. Superior Ct. 201, 203 (1923), the court said: “Where several copies of a writing are made at the same time by the same mechanical operation each is to be regarded as an original and is admissible as such [Citing cases and other authority.].” (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, in Werner v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 300 Pa. 256, 264, 150 Atl. 471, 473-74 (1930), involving the question whether certain typewritten papers were copies or originals, the Court quoted with approval a statement in Harmon v. Territory, 15 Okla. 147, 164, 79 Pac. 765, 770 (1905). The quoted passage explained that the Oklahoma court did not believe that “a carbon copy of any longhand transcript of a stenographer’s official notes, made by the stenographer himself at the time he makes the transcript and as a part of that transaction, is a copy in the sense that the word copy is ordinarily used, any more than several books or newspapers printed upon the same press at the same time and from the same type are copies of each other.”
The concept is summarized in Words and Phrases5 which, under the heading “Original Writing”, cites Lewis v. Phillips-Body Pub. Co., 18 Ga. App. 181, 89 S.E. 177 (1916), and Savannah Bank & Trust Co. v. Purvis, 6 Ga. App. 275, 65 S.E. 35 (1809), for the proposition that: “All papers executed by the same stroke upon a typewriter — those written by carbon im*410pressions, as well as the sheet which receives the stroke of the letter from the typewriter — are alike originals, and after the identity of the stroke of the typewriter has been established, any of the manifold copies may be introduced as the original writing in the case.” (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, in U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. L.C. Adam Mercantile Co., 117 Okla. 73, 245 Pac. 885 (1926), the syllabus by the court stated: “A carbon impression of a letter written on a typewriter, made by the same stroke of the keys as the companion impression, is an original.” See also Brenner v. Lesher, 332 Pa. 522, 526, 2 A. 2d 731, 733 (1938); Commonwealth, v. Olitsky, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. 144, 154-55, 133 A. 2d 238, 243-44 (1957).
Although we recognize that what is or is not an “original” may vary according to the situation, it is apparent, nevertheless, that a carbon may qualify, in appropriate circumstances, as an “original”. The fact is that the word “original” is subject to and capable of such varied definitional treatment, see Annot. 65 A.L.R. 2d 342 (1959), that it is utterly impossible to properly determine its meaning in a vacuum. Reference must be made to its legislative context and the purpose and policy which the statutory provision seeks to accomplish.
The purpose of the general thirty day provision of our statute has been stated with consistency. “It was to make reasonably sure that testamentary gifts to religion or charity were the result of deliberate intent of the testator, and were not coerced from him while in weakened physical condition under the influence of the doubts and terrors of impending death.” Paxson’s Estate, 221 Pa. 98, 111, 70 Atl. 280, 285 (1908). Prior to 1947, the Wills Act of 19176 made no provision whatever for validating charitable bequests made within *411thirty days of death. It was held to be unbending in its prohibition of such gifts, even where it was clear that the testamentary intent to make such bequests had existed for more than the thirty day period. See, e.g., Hartman’s Estate (No. 1), 320 Pa. 321, 182 A. 234 (1936) . It is graphically clear that the exceptions set out in Section 7(1) of the Wills Act of 1947 were intended to remedy that situation and to remove from the operation of our thirty day prohibition those cases which did not, in reason, fall within the purpose of the thirty day rule. See McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 131 A. 2d 124 (1957); Comments of the Joint State Government Commission,7 Comment to §7(1), 20 P.S. §180.7, pp. 267, 268.
In light of this clear legislative history and purpose, it is obvious that what was sought to be accomplished by the validation requirements involved in this case was a form of proof which would satisfactorily show that the charitable intention of the testatrix existed for more than thirty days. Since the section we are considering is remedial in nature, we have held that it must be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose. McGuigen Estate, 388 Pa. 475, 481, 131 A. 2d 124, 128 (1957). “There are times when uncertain words are to be wrought into consistency and unity with a legislative policy . . . .” Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342, 351, 57 S. Ct. 452, 456 (1937) ( Cardozo, J.). This is such a time and “original”, as used in this statute, is such a word.
Construing the word “original” as used in the present statutory context, reason and reality compel us to conclude that it was not the legislative intention to require for proof of pre-existing charitable intent only the revoked, executed ribbon copy of the prior will. This is particularly so in light of the more usual and rea*412sonable standards of proof by which the execution, revocation, operation and interpretation of wills are permitted to be established. It would be unrealistic to attribute to the Legislature an intention to require, in this instance, a higher and more rigid standard of proof than is required by any other provision of the Wills Act relating to probate of wills or administration of decedents’estates.
We hold, therefore, that if the carbon sheets can be properly authenticated, then they will qualify as “originals” for the purpose of Section 7(1) of the Wills Act. There is no question on this record that the carbon sheets of testatrix’s 1955 will, introduced to prove her prior charitable intentions, were satisfactorily proved to have been made at the exact time and with the same strokes as the ribbon copy of that will. No doubt exists in anyone’s mind that the contents of this document showed the requisite pre-existing charitable intention. The 1958 will was, in all pertinent respects, a reaffirmance of testatrix’s previously announced testamentary charitable intention, an intention manifested continuously since September 27, 1955. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the carbon sheets introduced in this case satisfied the statutory requirement and that the charitable bequests contained in testatrix’s last will are valid. The residuary estate should be distributed to the charities as directed by the decree below.
Decree affirmed. Costs to be paid by the estate.
Act of April 24, 1947, P. 1¡. 80, §3(6), as amended, 20 P.S. §1.3(6).
It is disheartening indeed to discover the Commonwealth asserting an interest contrary to the welfare of the charities in this *407ease, particularly in light of the long-existing charitable intention manifested by this testatrix.
American philanthropy during the year 1963 exceeded ten billion dollars. These contributions came from individuals, business enterprises and testamentary bequests, and approximately half the contributed sum was used for public causes such as health, education and welfare. Giving U.S.A. (1964 ed), pp. 7, 10; published by the American Ass’n of Fund-Raising Counsel, Inc., N.Y. There appears little doubt that the ratio of Pennsylvania contributions to the national total exceeded the population ratio. The important fact is that this giving makes substantial funds available in relief of the Commonwealth’s governmental obligations in areas of social concern. Surely, at this stage of society’s dedication to human welfare, we need not pause to recall the Commonwealth’s strong, consistent and very broad policy of assistance to charities and its long manifested encouragement to its citizens and businesses to make charitable contributions. It is difficult to conceive of a Commonwealth public policy that is more fundamental or more meaningful than its frequently restated policy of encouragement to charities and charitable giving in the public interest.
With this public charitable policy in mind, it is disappointing to find the Commonwealth in a posture antithetical to its espoused principles. Had the Commonwealth supported, instead of opposed, the charitable gifts, it would have given, by commendable example, added vitality and substantial reality to the advancement of its own desirable policy, a policy which quite properly it constantly seeks to encourage. It is regrettable indeed that instead the Commonwealth, in this instance, chose a less admirable objective. In addition, a choice on the part of the Commonwealth to support the charities would have been in complete harmony with the purpose of Section 7(1) of the Wills Act. Underlying the policy of the thirty day provision was the desire to protect kin and natural heirs. See, e.g., Hartman’s Estate (No. 1), 320 Pa. 321, 330, 182 Atl. 234, 238 (1936). It would appear that the statute was not intended to benefit or protect an artificially created statutory heir such as Ihe Commonwealth.
Act of April 24, 1947, P. U. 89, §7(1), 20 P.S. §180.7(1). Unfortunately the section can scarcely be designated a model of legislative draftsmanship. “Wills shall be modified upon the occurrence *408of any of the following circumstances, among others: (1) Death Within Thirty Days; Religious and Charitable Gifts. Any bequest or devise for religious or charitable purposes included in a will or codicil executed within thirty days of the death of the testator shall be invalid unless all who would benefit by its invalidity agree that it shall be valid. The thirty-day period shall be so computed as to include the day on which the will or codicil is written and to exclude the day of death. Unless the testator directs otherwise, if such a will or codicil shall revoke or supersede a prior will or codicil executed at least thirty days before the testator’s death, and not theretofore revoked or superseded and the original of which can be produced in legible condition, and if each instrument shall contain an identical gift for substantially the same religious or charitable purpose, the gift in the later will or codicil shall be valid; or if each instrument shall give for substantially the same religious or charitable purpose a cash legacy or share of the residuary estate or a share of the same asset, payable immediately or subject to identical prior estates and conditions, the later gift shall be valid to the extent to which it shall not exceed the prior gift.”
See note 3, supra.
30 Words and Phrases 325 (perm. ed. 1940).
Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 403, §6,
The Commission which drafted the provision.