with whom FERREN and TERRY, Associate Judges, join, concurring:
This appeal involves a prosecutor’s attempt to impeach a defendant who had raised a self-defense claim by questioning him about his failure to preserve evidence at the scene of the crime. At trial “[s]pe-cifically, the prosecutor suggested that an innocent man would have kept the pistol, searched the car for clues, told his sister and brother-in-law about Manning’s death, attempted with their help to preserve the van and its contents, and requested Gerard to stay in touch.” See opinion of Judge Schwelb at 7. Such an inference cannot, in my view, be taken at face value, but requires a reasoned exercise of discretion by the trial judge in accordance with Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1979) (“determinations committed to the trial court’s discretion are rational acts of decision-making” and “the act of compiling and preserving a factual record enables the reviewing court to determine whether the decision-maker’s choice was both reasonable and proper in the specific factual context”) (citations omitted). While I would affirm the judgment, I reach this conclusion only after analyzing the nature of the consciousness-of-guilt interference; without such an analysis, appellate review becomes largely perfunctory,1 and is inconsistent with the teachings of Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 364-65.
I
Of concern to the en banc court is Allen’s contention that his cross-examination by the prosecutor and the prosecutor’s closing arguments improperly invited the jury to make missing witness and missing evidence inferences, and thereby shifted the burden of proof to him.2 In making a proffer to *1230the trial judge, the prosecutor acknowledged that what he sought to do would come very close to crossing the lines drawn by the missing witness and missing evidence rules.3 The government responded on appeal that, with the exception of one question on cross-examination, no missing witness or missing evidence inference was raised; that the trial judge could reasonably conclude there was sufficient inconsistency between Allen’s claim of self-defense and his actions after the shooting to render the cross-examination probative; and that the cross-examination and closing argument to the jury, about Allen’s failure to preserve evidence after the shooting, gave rise to a permissible inference of consciousness of guilt, and hence were proper.4
A.
Subject to constitutional limitations, it is beyond dispute that the trial judge has broad discretion in deciding whether to permit cross examination and how much. See Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 323 (D.C.1990); Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 854-55 (D.C.1978); see also Morrison v. United States, 547 A.2d 996, 998 (D.C.1988). Directly related to this exercise of discretion is the general question of the admissibility of evidence, namely, whether evidence is relevant and material, and more probative than prejudicial. This question is distinct, however, from the question of whether the evidence would prove an asserted fact, which, by contrast, is for the trier of fact to decide. Thus, in determining whether to permit cross-examination, the judge’s exercise of discretion is confined to considering the question of general admissibility. In the instant case, the question of general admissibility before the trial judge was whether a reasonable jury could reasonably find, based on the proffered cross-examination of Allen, that his failures to preserve evidence showed his consciousness of guilt.
The en banc court has examined for the first time whether the missing witness and missing evidence rules should apply to a prosecutor’s attempt to raise an inference that the defendant’s failure to preserve evidence and a witness at the scene of a crime demonstrate that he was conscious of his own guilt. Although the risks arising from the ambiguity of nonconduct may be similar whether the context is a defen*1231dant’s failure to act shortly after a crime or a failure to act at trial, the full en banc court has concluded, and I agree, that the missing witness and missing evidence rules should apply only to inferences about the defendant’s failure to present evidence or witnesses at trial.
The rationale for the missing witness and missing evidence rules focuses on the impact on the jury of the defendant’s nonpro-duction of evidence at trial. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 120-21, 14 S.Ct. 40, 41, 37 L.Ed. 1021 (1893) (closing argument raised improper missing witness inference when defendant was prevented from calling the witness due to the fact his wife, who was otherwise available, was not a competent witness against him); Brown v. United States, 555 A.2d 1034, 1036 (D.C.1989) (when inference is appropriate, “the trial court may instruct the jury that it may infer that the testimony of [the missing] witness could have been unfavorable to the party to whom the witness was available”). This rationale does not immunize the defendant who asserts a self-defense claim from the consequences of his failure to act in a manner consistent with his testimony at trial. Cf. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 420, 77 S.Ct. 963, 982, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957) (defendant’s credibility subject to impeachment “just like any other witness”).
In other contexts the court has recognized that the defendant’s post-offense conduct is relevant to the defendant’s state of mind to show consciousness of guilt. Gale v. United States, 391 A.2d 230, 235 (D.C.1978) (“evidence of restitution, like that of other post-crime conduct such as flight, concealment, or intimidation of a witness, is ordinarily admissible as relevant to and probative of consciousness of guilt”), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1057, 59 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979); Christian, supra note 4, 394 A.2d at 32 (defendant’s flight or concealment of evidence tends to show consciousness of guilt). Some instances of inaction are also recognized as probative of the defendant’s intent in light of the asserted defense. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2127, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980) (no Fifth Amendment violation when the defendant is impeached by his failure to report earlier his assertion of self-defense); see also Cain v. United States, 532 A.2d 1001, 1005-06 (D.C.1987) (proper to ask defense witness about his post-offense silence and failure to contact law enforcement officials); State v. Brown, 128 N.H. 606, 517 A.2d 831, 834 (1986) (proper to ask victim whether defendant visited or contacted victim, where defendant claimed shooting was accidental, since silence in such circumstances “has some tendency to indicate that there is no regret because the injury was intended”). Therefore, the consciousness of guilt inference based on the defendant’s failure to preserve evidence is, like impeachment by post-arrest silence, an example of a proper inference that may be raised without re-' course to the missing witness and missing evidence rules.
B.
Although the consciousness of guilt inference drawn from the defendant’s failure to preserve evidence may be analytically distinct from the classic “missing witness” inference, both are examples of inferences based on ambiguous conduct. In both, the fact-finder is being asked to draw an inference from the defendant’s inaction. In both, the validity of the inference turns on the defendant’s state of mind. The problem with drawing inferences from inaction is that in many cases there are plausible explanations for a defendant’s failure to act that do not indicate consciousness of guilt. See Walker v. United States, 402 A.2d 424, 427 (D.C.1979) (error to permit the use of the defendant’s failure to tell his parole officer that he ran away from the scene of the crime, because “there is equally convincing reasoning supporting [an innocent] inference”); cf. Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 415 (D.C.1986) (requiring the prosecutor to lay a foundation before making a missing witness argument to jury). Indeed, improper inferences of this type are likely to be over-valued by juries. See Burgess v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 206, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (1970) (noting the “fictitious weight” juries *1232may give to the absence of evidence). Consequently, the court has required the government to obtain prior approval of the trial judge before raising such inferences. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 404 A.2d 525, 531 (D.C.1979) (per curiam) (requiring the prosecutor, before impeaching a defendant with his post-arrest silence, to “apprise the trial court of the omitted facts to be relied upon as showing inconsistency”); cf. Price v. United States, 531 A.2d 984, 993-94 (D.C.1987) (requiring the prosecutor to seek permission from the trial judge before raising the missing witness inference in cross-examination); Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 57 (D.C.1982) (trial judge must determine existence of two preconditions before allowing prosecutor to ask jury to draw missing witness inference).
In such contexts, the court has established special standards to guide the trial court in deciding whether to permit the government to raise such an inference. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 487 A.2d 580, 585-87 (D.C.1984) (before allowing the prosecutor to impeach a defendant based on prior silence, the trial judge should consider whether the defendant “failed to mention a material circumstance ... which it would have been natural to mention in the prior statement,” citing McCormick, Evidence § 34 at 68 (2d ed. 1972)); cf. Arnold, supra, 511 A.2d at 415 (two-prong predicate to missing witness inference). For the same reasons, when the government seeks to raise a consciousness of guilt inference based on the defendant’s failure to preserve evidence relevant to a self-defense claim, there are factors that can provide guidance for the trial court in the difficult task of determining whether the inference would be reasonable with respect to specific nonconduct by the defendant, and provide this court with an adequate record to permit appellate review. See, e.g., Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 365 (in reviewing for abuse of discretion, appellate court must determine “whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, ... relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusions”) (citation omitted).
C.
A threshold decision for the trial judge was whether a reasonable jury could reasonably infer Allen’s consciousness of guilt from certain nonconduct by him at the scene of the offense and shortly thereafter. The government has suggested that the court should follow Hill, supra, 404 A.2d 525, where the court adopted the analysis in Hale v. United States, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975). In Hale, the Supreme Court pointed out that “[i]f the Government fails to establish a threshold inconsistency between silence at the police station and later exculpatory testimony at trial, proof of silence lacks any significant probative value and must therefore be excluded.” Hill, supra, 404 A.2d at 530 (quoting Hale, supra, 422 U.S. at 176, 95 S.Ct. at 2136).5 Thus, not all such nonconduct will provide a basis on which a reasonable jury could infer the defendant’s consciousness of guilt, and depending on the relevance and the probative as compared to the prejudicial effect of the evidence, the trial judge, in the exercise of reasoned discretion, may exclude the evidence. See note 5, supra. Accordingly, in Hill, supra, the court concluded that the prosecutor “must apprise the trial court of the omitted facts to be relied upon as showing inconsistency and the court must con*1233sider whether such facts are sufficiently material that the failure to have mentioned them amounts to inconsistency.” 404 A.2d at 531.
A similar inquiry is appropriate where the government seeks to show that the defendant’s failure to take certain actions shortly after the crime demonstrates his consciousness of guilt. To raise such an inference the government must show that the defendant did not act as an innocent person in the defendant’s situation would naturally have acted, but rather acted as would a guilty person under the circumstances. The inference rests on often un-articulated assumptions about what a reasonable person who is innocent of any crime would do. A three-factor approach generally identifies the circumstances in which it would be reasonable for the jury to infer that the defendant’s failure to preserve evidence demonstrates consciousness of guilt. The factors are based on three assumptions:
First, the defendant’s failure to preserve evidence that could corroborate a self-defense claim is probative only if an innocent person in the defendant’s position would have had reason to fear that the self-defense “story” would be challenged. Even people who are completely guiltless do not go through life gathering evidence to prove their innocence. Under the first factor, therefore, the trial judge should consider whether at the time when the defendant allegedly failed to preserve evidence, an innocent person in the defendant’s position would have feared prosecution for a crime.
Second, the consciousness of guilt inference is only appropriate if the importance of the evidence would have been apparent to an innocent person in the defendant’s position. Otherwise the defendant’s failure to preserve the evidence might have been due to ignorance or neglect, rather than a conscious recognition of guilt.
Third, the inference from the defendant's failure to take certain measures only makes sense if an innocent person in the defendant’s circumstances would have believed that taking those measures was necessary to preserve the evidence and was not a futile gesture. Many preservation measures would not immediately appear necessary to an innocent person. Similarly, “the law does not require the doing of a futile act.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2543, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). If an innocent person in the defendant’s circumstances would have good reason to believe that the purported measures would not have accomplished anything, the failure to take the measures is simply meaningless.
Accordingly, where the government seeks to introduce evidence of pretrial non-conduct of the defendant in order to show the inconsistency with a claim of self-defense, the trial judge, upon a proffer by the government and an opportunity for the defense to respond, should examine whether a reasonable jury could reasonably find that the evidence of inaction by the defendant would be inconsistent with the conduct of an innocent person, and thereby give rise to an inference of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. To determine whether there is such a threshold inconsistency, the trial judge should consider whether a reasonable jury could find that an innocent person in the defendant’s position would reasonably have (1) feared prosecution for a crime, (2) realized that the evidence would be important to his or her defense, and (3) believed that taking these measures would be necessary to preserve the evidence and would not be futile. Upon finding a threshold inconsistency, the trial judge must still address relevance, materiality and the probative/prejudicial effect. Whether the introduction of non-action by the defendant would be more prejudicial than probative may depend on the extent to which the defendant is afforded the opportunity to present, and is not prevented by law from presenting, an explanation to the jury for his nonconduct.6 *1234Cf. Graves, supra, 150 U.S. at 120-21, 14 S.Ct. at 41 (missing witness closing argument unanswerable by the defendant).
Depending on the facts of an individual case, of course, other factors may be appropriate for consideration. The description of the consciousness of guilt factors here is neither exclusive nor exhaustive, and does not establish a rigid rule or a litany of complex findings to be made on the record by the trial judge. Rather, the en banc court, having determined that the missing evidence rules should not apply, cannot ignore that judicial discretion is not unlimited discretion, and that reasonableness has contours which the appellate court must be able to find in order to sustain an exercise of discretion; appellate review, like the exercise of trial court discretion, must be meaningful. See Morrison, supra, 547 A.2d at 998; Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 365.7 As in Hill, supra, the trial judge, upon hearing the proffer of the defendant’s inaction, may conclude, in the exercise of reasoned discretion upon considering the relevant factors, that “[pjroof of the omission of [conduct by the defendant] that would be crucial to a claim of self-defense does not lack significant probative value and therefore [is] admissible.” 404 A.2d at 532. Appellate review of whether there has been an exercise or reasoned discretion is assisted when the trial court addresses the factors relevant to the consciousness of guilt inference that take cognizance of the unusual, and potentially ambiguous, nature of nonbehavior.
II
Upon examining the factors underlying the consciousness of guilt inference sought by the government, I am satisfied that the trial judge, for the most part, did not erroneously exercise his discretion by allowing the prosecutor to question Allen about his failure to preserve evidence or to take other actions consistent with his self-defense claim.8 The judge could reasonably have concluded that most of the proffered cross-examination about Allen’s failure to preserve evidence at the scene of the crime related to nonconduct that was inconsistent with Allen’s claim of self-defense, and that a reasonable jury could reasonably infer therefrom Allen’s consciousness of guilt. With respect to those aspects of the proffer which showed no such inconsistency and, hence, provided no basis for a consciousness-of-guilt inference, I am satisfied that the erroneous exercise of discretion does not require reversal. My analysis is the same with respect to the prosecutor’s closing argument to the jury.
A.
The prosecutor advised the judge that he wished to show that Allen had acted inconsistently with his claim of self-defense by asking whether Allen had taken measures after the shooting to preserve the van and the gun he had used, and to look for the shell casing and for Gerard, who Allen claimed had driven with him in the van to and from the scene of the shooting. The prosecutor commendably alerted the trial judge to the possible prejudice of his proposed cross-examination by pointing out that it came very close to raising the missing witness and missing evidence inference. The trial judge ruled that the prosecutor *1235could attempt to discredit Allen’s self-defense claim by asking if he had tried to find the other person who was with him at the time of the shooting, as distinct from the witness’ absence at trial, and by questioning Allen about what he did after the shooting; an instruction to the jury, the judge stated, would make it clear that Allen had no burden of proof.
Thereafter the prosecutor cross-examined Allen about whether he ever looked for Gerard after the shooting, whether he asked his sister to keep the van, whether he attempted to preserve a shell casing that may have popped out after he fired the bullets, whether he had asked Gerard to preserve the gun that he had used, and whether he and Gerard, on the night of the shooting, had looked in the van to see if there was anything that could help prove that Allen acted in self-defense.9 When the prosecutor asked Allen, “That night, did you and Gerard look inside the van to see if there was anything in the van that could help prove that — ,” defense counsel objected but the prosecutor continued asking the question before the judge could rule: “ — you acted in seir-defense? ” The judge stated, “He doesn’t have to prove it.” When defense counsel asked to come to the bench, the judge refused to let counsel do so, stating that he had overruled the objection. The judge denied Allen’s request for a mistrial. While conceding that the question was “probably, notably, unartfully phrased,” the judge observed that the prosecutor had rephrased the question in proper form, the answer was interrupted when the objection was made, and the final jury instruction would make clear that Allen had no such burden.10
In rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor told the jury, again over defense objections, that if Allen had truly acted in self-defense he would have “scoured that van to get that shell casing and to preserve the gun” and would have “tried to keep Gerard ... or know his last name.” Further, he argued that Allen’s self-defense claim should be disbelieved because “he did nothing, nothing to preserve what would support him.” The same arguments were *1236made by the prosecutor in his initial closing argument to the jury.11
B.
Upon considering the factors underlying the consciousness of guilt inference, most of the cross-examination was clearly proper. With the exception of one question regarding whether Allen and Gerard looked for evidence to “help prove that ... [Allen] acted in self-defense,” which the government concedes was improper, the prosecutor observed the distinction between Allen’s failure to act immediately after the shooting and Allen’s failure to offer evidence at trial. The rest of the questioning and argument was limited to Allen’s inaction at the time of the shooting and shortly thereafter.
Applying the “consciousness of guilt” factors to the remaining questioning and closing arguments, the trial judge would not have abused his discretion by allowing most of the questioning. First, the record indicates that the trial judge could reasonably have concluded that someone in Allen’s position would naturally fear prosecution for a crime. Under the circumstances, even if Allen had shot in self-defense, he would understand the strong likelihood that he would be suspected of committing a homicide. The judge also could reasonably have concluded that the second and third factors were also satisfied with respect to many of the questions. In particular, Allen’s failure either to ask Gerard to preserve the gun, or thereafter to find out Gerard’s last name or attempt to contact him, could demonstrate Allen’s consciousness of his own guilt; an innocent man would have had no reason to want to get rid of the gun, and would have sought to find Gerard to back up his version of what had happened. In each case, Allen’s failures to act could reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with the actions of an innocent person, who would naturally realize that taking those measures would be necessary in order to preserve evidence important to establishing his innocence to the police, the prosecutor, and if all else failed, to the jury-
More problematic is the cross-examination about Allen’s failure to tell Gerard on the night of the shooting “to stay close so that he would say what really happened in the van.” On the one hand, Allen must have realized, as would an innocent man, that Gerard might not be willing to come forward since he might implicate himself in the shooting. As Allen maintains on appeal, asking Gerard to “stay close so that he could say what happened” might well have been a futile gesture.
On the other hand, unlike a case in which a defendant is unable to explain a witness’ absence, see, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 26, 31, 439 F.2d 536, 541 (1970) (en banc) (defense counsel properly required to “refrain from any mention of the decision made by [an absent witness] to invoke the Fifth Amendment”), Allen could respond to these questions regardless of whether Gerard would assert his Fifth Amendment privilege at trial. Of course, it *1237would be for the trial judge, in the first instance, to consider whether the inference that Gerard would, in fact, have been willing to support Allen’s self-defense claim was so prejudicial that the probative value of the question was extremely limited in view of a Fifth Amendment claim by Gerard. But it would not have been beyond the “permissible alternatives” available to the trial judge in the exercise of reasoned discretion, Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 365, to conclude that an innocent person in Allen’s position would have attempted to locate Gerard to ask him to support Allen’s story.
Had the trial judge so concluded, the appellate court would not find an abuse of discretion by the judge in allowing the prosecutor’s cross-examination and closing arguments that focused on what Allen failed to do on the night of the shooting and shortly thereafter before he left for Miami, particularly since Allen was afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct. Thus, the prosecutor could properly have questioned Allen about whether he had (1) seen Gerard after the shooting and before he (Allen) went to Miami, (2) looked for Gerard, (3) asked his (Allen’s) sister or brother-in-law about Gerard, (4) tried to find out Gerard’s last name, and (5) asked Gerard if he would be willing to tell what had happened in the van.
Some of the prosecutor's other questions, however, when examined in terms of the factors underlying the consciousness of guilt inference, were improper. As Allen maintains, no consciousness of guilt inference could reasonably be based on his failure to look for the shell casing or to “scour” the van. Even one wholly innocent of crime would be unlikely to recognize the importance of looking for a shell casing or of preserving the van. Indeed, if Allen had preserved the van and the shell casing, their presence at trial would have been irrelevant. Neither the government witnesses nor Allen claimed that the decedent had fired into the van or damaged it. Moreover, it was undisputed that Allen had used a gun to shoot the decedent; finding a shell casing would have proved little in and of itself since it was the location of the casing that was important, to show where the shooting took place. Cf. Hale, supra, 422 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. at 2138 (post-arrest silence inherently ambiguous and potentially prejudicial; cannot be used for impeachment); Sampson v. United States, supra note 5, 407 A.2d at 576 (D.C.1979) (defendant’s omission of material fact may not be used to impeach him, unless it is omitted from defendant’s prior statement where “it would have been natural to mention” the material fact, and later testified to by defendant at trial); Walker, supra, 402 A.2d at 427 (failure to tell parole officer of reason for flight insufficiently probative to permit cross-examination); Beale, supra note 5, 465 A.2d at 805; see also Hill, supra, 404 A.2d at 531. Thus, consideration of the consciousness of guilt factors demonstrates that the trial judge erred by allowing cross-examination and argument about Allen’s failures to look for the shell casing and to search the van.
C.
The question, therefore, is whether the question suggesting that Allen had a burden to prove that he acted in self-defense and the cross-examination and closing argument about Allen’s failure to look for the shell casing or to search the van were so prejudicial as to require reversal of his convictions. The answer turns on whether, in view of Allen’s opportunity to provide an explanation for his failures to preserve evidence and his flight, the errors would have influenced the result reached by the jury. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).
The single question on cross-examination suggesting that Allen had a burden to show he acted in self-defense was satisfactorily addressed in the judge’s instructions to the jury. The instructions included the admonition to the jury that “[t]he law does not require the defendant to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence at all.” Referring specifically to Allen’s self-defense claim, the judge instructed the jury that Allen was “not required to prove that he acted in self-defense,” and that the *1238government “must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.”12 The judge gave the standard instructions on the credibility of witnesses and arguments of counsel. He also instructed the jury that:
Flight or concealment by a person after a crime has been committed or after he’s been accused of a crime may be motivated by a variety of factors which are fully consistent with innocence. Flight does not create a presumption of guilt nor does a person’s flight or concealment necessarily reflect feelings of guilt. Furthermore, since innocent persons sometimes have feelings of guilt, such feelings do not necessarily reflect actual guilt.
While you may consider flight or concealment as one circumstance tending to show feelings of guilt, and you may also consider feelings of guilt as evidence tending to show actual guilt, you are not required to do so. Under no circumstances may you presume a defendant’s guilt from his flight or concealment alone. You should consider and weigh any evidence of flight or concealment by the Defendant in connection with all the other evidence in the case and give it such weight as in your judgment it is fairly entitled to receive.
Viewed in their totality, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971-72, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985), the instructions made clear the limited use of inferences arising from Allen’s flight, and although not specifically addressing the cross-examination regarding Allen’s failure to preserve evidence, this instruction was probably sufficiently broad to cover Allen’s inaction as well. The evidence presented the jury with two conflicting interpretations, the government’s version of events and Allen’s explanation of why he did not look for Gerard or inside of the van. Admittedly, the reference in the instruction to “concealment” might have been interpreted by the jury to refer to Allen’s failure to surrender himself to the police. But if an affirmative act like flight could not be the basis for finding Allen guilty, then a reasonable jury also would likely conclude from the instruction that ambiguous non-conduct, like the failure to ask about Gerard and to ask his relatives to keep the van, also could not be the basis for finding guilt. Furthermore, the judge instructed the jury that motivations depend on “a variety of factors which are fully consistent with innocence.” See McCowan v. United States, supra note 12, 458 A.2d at 1197 (the jury is presumed to understand and follow instructions). In addition, the judge’s immediate response — that Allen “doesn’t have to prove” his innocence — after the prosecutor made the isolated comment mitigated the prejudicial effect on the jury of the improper questioning and argument. Cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (a court should not “lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning”).
Likewise, the prejudice from the improper cross-examination about the shell casing and van was mitigated, in part, by defense counsel’s closing argument, which stressed the weakness and unpersuasiveness of the consciousness-of-guilt inference. Defense counsel suggested that the jury should consider the fact that the police could not find *1239the second shell casing, and that the shell casing they found was under a piece of newspaper and no one claimed Allen or the decedent had newspaper in their hands. In other words, the shell casing could have been anywhere, and finding it would not have helped Allen’s self-defense claim one way or the other.
Accordingly, in view of the proper impeachment by cross-examination (including that relating to Allen’s flight and attempt to create a new identity), Allen’s testimony offering an explanation for his failure to preserve evidence, and the strength of the government’s evidence,13 I conclude, “with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the errors],” Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. at 1248, and I join in voting to affirm the judgment of convictions for manslaughter while armed and carrying a pistol without a license.
. The majority concludes that the trial judge “acted reasonably" by allowing the cross-examination about Allen’s failures to act. Majority opinion at 1222.
. I adopt the views stated by the division majority in finding neither inadmissible hearsay nor abuse of discretion by the trial judge in concluding that the jury could follow the limiting instruction. Allen v. United States, 579 A.2d 225, 228-30 (D.C.1990).
. The prosecutor conceded that his proposed cross examination regarding Allen’s efforts to locate his companion Gerard “does get very close to the line about missing witness, that his circumstances were such that he should have, he should have gotten a hold of Gerard, he should have found him, and he should have looked for that shell casing, it must have remained in there, so that he could establish his self-defense.”
. Judge Schwelb maintains that although the evidence of Allen’s inaction was offered by the government for the purposes of showing his consciousness of guilt, the en banc court is precluded from examining the nature of that inference in the context of this case. See opinion of Judge Schwelb at 1228 n. 20. Yet the government’s consistent position has been that evidence of Allen’s failure to act was admissible to show inconsistency with his claim of self-defense, and that post-crime failure to act was relevant to show his state of mind. It analogized the circumstances of the instant case to our decisions regarding flight and concealment of evidence. In citing in its brief Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 32-33 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979), the government pointed directly to the court’s statement that ”[i]t is generally accepted that the flight of an accused is a fact which tends to prove his consciousness of guilt and thus guilt itself' (citations omitted), and ”[t]he inferences which a jury may properly draw from such concealment are almost identical to those of flight.” It is an extraordinary proposition that an appellate court may not examine the premise underlying a party’s assertion in providing a reasoned analysis for the decision on appeal.
In its petition for rehearing en banc, the government told the en banc court that "What the [division] majority fails to apprehend is that the failure to take such actions may constitute evidence of a defendant’s consciousness of guilt just as much as his affirmative acts of flight and concealment, which the majority concedes are admissible.” The government further told the en banc court that ”[i]n the instant case, ... it is clear that the inference sought to be drawn from [Allen’s] failure to attempt to preserve evidence and witnesses is the inference of consciousness of guilt, not the missing witness inference." This is the position that must be examined, and articulating what underlies the inference facilitates the exercise of reasoned discretion and appellate review.
. See 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 1042 (Chadbourne Rev.1970) ("a failure to assert a fact, when it would have been natural to assert it, amounts in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact” and constitutes a ‘prima facie’ inconsistency.”); McCormick, Evidence § 835 at 68 (2d ed. 1972); see also Sampson v. United States, 407 A.2d 574, 576 (D.C.1979) (defendant’s omission of material fact may not be used to impeach him, unless it is omitted from defendant's prior statement where "it would have been natural to mention” the material fact and later testified to by defendant at trial); Walker, supra, 402 A.2d at 427 (failure to tell parole officer of reason for flight insufficiently probative to permit cross-examination); Beale v. United States, 465 A.2d 796, 805 (D.C.1983) (“the prosecutor’s impeachment and closing argument were improper" because there was no “‘threshold inconsistency’ between [the defendant’s] testimony and his statement to the police ...”), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1293, 79 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
. For example, in Givens v. United States, 385 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1978), the court found non-harmful error where the defendant, who asserted a claim of self-defense, "was never given an opportunity ... to prove to the trial court that the evidence before the jury relating to [a witness’] absence was incomplete and misleading,” and the evidence that the defendant did the *1234killing was abundant but the proof that defendant did not act in self-defense was entirely circumstantial and hardly overwhelming. Id. at 28.
The court has previously observed that
“We must not invite the exercise of judicial impressionism. Discretion there may be, but ‘methodized by analogy, disciplined by system.’ Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 139, 141 (1921). Discretion without criteria for its exercise is authorization of arbitariness." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496, 73 S.Ct. 397, 441, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953).
Johnson, supra, 398 A.2d at 365.
. Were this a majority opinion, I would remand the case to the trial judge to exercise his discretion in light of the proper factors. In view of the majority disposition, however, I will review the record as though the trial judge had purported to apply the proper factors, in order to demonstrate how, on this record, they should be analyzed on review, and thereby also demonstrate the importance of having the trial court undertake an analysis of the appropriate factors in determining the general admissibility of evidence of nonconduct as the basis for suggesting the defendant’s consciousness of guilt.
. The prosecutor asked the following series of questions during his cross-examination of Allen: [Prosecutor]: Between November 13th and the time that you left for Florida did you see Gerard again?
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[Q]: You didn’t look for him, did you? ******
[Q]: Between the night of the shooting and January of 1984, did you ask your sister or your brother-in-law to hold onto the van? ******
[Q]: You never asked them, did you to take a look in the van and see if they could find a shell casing?
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[Q]: That night, did you and Gerard look inside the van to see if there was anything in the van that could help prove that [defense objection] ... you acted in self defense?
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[Q]: Did you ask Gerard to hold onto the gun?
[Q]: Did Gerard ask you, what do you want me to do with the gun?
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[Q]: Between ... November 13, 1983, and the time that you left for Florida, did you ask your sister or brother-in-law about Gerard?
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[Q]: Did you tell Gerard on the night of November 13th, that you wanted him to stay close so that he could say what really happened in the van?
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[Q]: I’m just asking you, did you ask Gerard, that night, after you shot [Manning], did you ask him to stay in touch with me because you know what happened?
. Defense counsel protested that the judge had not instructed the jury but simply "said that comment in a low tone of voice as if you were just talking to [the prosecutor]. There’s no evidence that the jury heard it at all.” The judge disagreed with the characterization of his tone of voice, stating “I barked it out," and declined the defense request for an instruction to be given to the jury at this time. The judge also overruled defense counsel’s two objections to the question "Did you tell Gerard on the night of November 13th, that you wanted him to stay close so that he could say what really happened in the van?”
. In his initial argument to the jury, the prosecutor referred to Allen’s flight, his failures to look in the van for the cartridge case to see if it might still be there, to try to keep the gun, to try to keep hold of Gerard, but noted that "he split for Miami and started a new life."
In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s argument that Allen’s testimony, and that of other defense witnesses, supported his claim that he acted in self defense. The prosecutor, reminding the jury that the government, and not Allen, had the burden of proof, argued that there was "plenty of evidence” to show that Allen had not acted in self-defense, namely Allen's testimony and explanation for the events on the night of the shooting. He pointed out that the shell casing was found by the police on the sidewalk in front of the apartment house, where a government witness claimed that the shooting had occurred, and not near the van as Allen claimed. He argued that Allen did not check the van because there was no reason to check it since the shooting had not occurred where Allen said it had. He also questioned Allen’s explanation of his flight out of fear of the decedent’s friends, when Allen had stayed in the same place for two and one half months after the shooting, suggesting instead that Allen fled because he was afraid of not being believed. Further, the prosecutor argued, Allen had done "nothing to preserve what would support him,” such as looking in the van for the shell casing, preserving the gun, and keeping in contact with Gerard or at least learning his last name.
. Allen’s contention that the prosecutor’s cross-examination and closing argument shifted the burden of proof on self-defense to Allen is unpersuasive. See McCowan v. United States, 458 A.2d 1191, 1197 (D.C.1983) (distinguishing between closing argument pointing to the defendant’s unreasonable limited attempts to ascertain where he was on the date at issue and a claim that the defendant had the burden to prove his whereabouts) (citing Whalen v. United States, 379 A.2d 1152, 1165 (D.C.1977) (prosecutor’s argument, referring to defendant's pretrial inability to explain where a co-worker was, was proper as rebuttal to the defense argument, and not a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify), rev’d on other grounds, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980)). Here, the prosecutor was focusing on the unreasonableness of Allen’s claim that he acted in self-defense. Furthermore, in rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated that he agreed with the defense counsel’s statement during closing argument that the government had the burden of proof. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions, and there is no evidence that it did not do so. See Smith v. United States, 315 A.2d 163, 167 (D.C.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896, 95 S.Ct. 174, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974).
. The government’s evidence showed, in part, that after Allen and the decedent left Annie Johnson’s apartment, a gunshot was heard. Annie Johnson saw Allen push the decedent but did not see anything in Allen’s hands. However, when she heard a second shot she saw fire coming from Allen's hand and the decedent staggering. Felicia Baldwin saw Allen fire the second shot at the decedent and watched the decedent stagger into the apartment building, where he collapsed on the second floor. The decedent fell into George Davis’ apartment door; Davis did not see a gun in the decedent’s hands. Allen followed the decedent to the front steps of the apartment building, and prepared to shoot again, but then turned and ran. Allen and an unidentified man (Gerard) got into the van and drove away.