concurring.
I am compelled to agree with the majority that under the circumstances of the instant case, Ernst & Young’s report was not subject to disclosure under the Right to Know Act because of the work product doctrine. See Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5; 65 P.S. § 66.1(2) (excluding from the definition of a public record any report to which access is prohibited by statute, law, or order); Maleski v. Corp. Life Ins. Co., 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 36, 641 A.2d 1 (1994). I write separately to note that had the Senators challenged PennDOT’s and OGC’s assertion that Ernst & Young’s report only contained Ernst & Young’s mental impressions, opinions, and conclusions about PennDOT’s defense for the Envirotest litigation,11 believe the Senators may have been able to establish that the report also contained information, such as factual data depicting Envirotest’s damages and expenses, which is not privileged under the work product doctrine for an attorney’s representative. See Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3. However, as the majority notes, because the Senators failed to seek an in camera review of the report, there is simply no way for this Court to determine whether the report contained solely work product, as alleged by OGC and Penn-DOT, or whether it contained information not protected under *503the work product doctrine and therefore, properly subject to review under the Act.
. The Senators had the burden to show that the report was both outside the work product privilege, see Gould v. City of Aliquippa, 750 A.2d 934, 937 (2000), and a public record under the Act. See North Hills News Record v. Town of McCandless, 555 Pa. 51, 56, 722 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1999).