Spears v. Spears

LALLY-GREEN, J.,

concurring:

¶ 1 I join in the Majority’s Opinion. I write separately a Concurring Opinion to make clear that, in Pennsylvania, a coten-ant can claim adverse possession against another cotenant where the cotenant asserting the defense has ousted the latter cotenant by taking sole possession and performing acts of exclusive ownership of an unequivocal nature.

¶ 2 In this case, after the parties were divorced, they owned the Property as tenants in common with a right of partition. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3507. As tenants in common, each party holds an undivided one-half ownership interest in the Property. See, In re Sale of Property of Dalessio, 657 A.2d 1386, 1387 (Pa.Commw.1995).5 Each *528party also has the full and equal right to possess the Property. Id.

¶ 3 Pennsylvania law is clear that one co-tenant may divest another co-tenant of his or her ownership interest and posses-sory interest in the property by ouster and adverse possession:

It is well established that cotenants are presumed to occupy or hold permissively, and therefore one cotenant cannot claim adverse possession against another cotenant unless there is an ouster of the latter. To constitute an ouster, one cotenant must take sole possession and perform acts of exclusive ownership of an unequivocal nature. The character of acts necessary to give one cotenant notice of the other cotenant’s claim to ownership of the whole must be positive and unequivocal, and similar in nature to where a grantor in a deed attempts to claim adverse possession against his or her grantee.

Summ Pa. Jur.3d, Property § 13:24, citing, Conneaut Lake Park v. Klingensmith, 362 Pa. 592, 66 A.2d 828, 829 (1949), and Nevling v. Natoli, 290 Pa.Super. 174, 434 A.2d 187, 190 (1981). Similarly, in Hanley v. Stewart, 155 Pa.Super. 535, 39 A.2d 323 (1944), this Court explained these principles as follows:

The rule is established in this Commonwealth beyond preadventure [sic] that in order for an heir to obtain title by adverse possession as against his or her co-heirs and co-tenants, it is necessary to prove adverse possession (a) by an actual ouster of his or her co-heirs and co-tenants twenty-one or more years before, and uninterruptedly maintained, or (b) by positive and unequivocal acts, amounting to a claim of the whole property as exclusively his or hers, brought home to the co-heirs and co-tenants twenty-one or more years before, and likewise maintained without interruption. Otherwise the possession of one co-heir and co-tenant is rightly held to be the possession of all. The possession of one tenant in common does not necessarily amount to adverse possession as against a co-tenant. Prima facie such possession is presumed to be for the benefit of both. The original entry of the one -tenant in common not being adverse, every presumption is in favor of the continuance of such possession in subordination to the title of the other, and the burden is on him to show by clear and positive proof the time and circumstances under which his possession began to be adverse and that such adverse possession was brought to the knowledge of his co-tenant.

Id. at 326 (citation omitted); see also, Beers v. Pusey, 389 Pa. 117, 132 A.2d 346, 349 (1957) (“A tenant in common cannot acquire complete title to the property held in common by a mere delay in the assertion of claims against him, unless the delay amounts to adverse possession for 21 years”). For these reasons, adverse possession is an available affirmative defense to a co-tenant’s partition action. See, Hanley, 39 A.2d at 326-328 (discussing the merits of an adverse possession defense to a partition action).

¶ 4 Again, the parties own the property as tenants in common. See, 23 Pa.C.S.A. *529§ 3507. This statute simply describes the ownership status of property which was previously held by a married couple as tenants in common. The statute does not appear to grant such parties any greater immunity to adverse possession than any other tenants in common. Thus, in the absence of any legal authority to the contrary, Husband should be able to assert a common-law adverse possession defense to Wife’s partition action.

¶ 5 As the Majority properly notes, no Pennsylvania case or statute affirmatively bars the use of an adverse possession defense in a case such as this. Thus, the Majority correctly holds that the trial court erred by precluding Husband from attempting to mount such a defense as a matter of law. Like the Majority, I express no opinion on whether Husband will be able to establish all of the elements of ouster and adverse possession.

. As the Dalessio Court explained:

A tenancy in common is an estate in which there is a unity of possession but separate and distinct titles. While an estate by the entirety consists of the five unities of time, *528title, interest, possession and marriage, a tenancy in common need only contain the unity of possession. A tenant in common may, without the consent of his cotenant, sell, convey, or dispose of his undivided interest in the property, but in so doing he must not interfere with the rights of his cotenant. Furthermore, a tenant in common may maintain an action at law to recover monetary damages for injuries done to his interest in the property. See Werner v. Quality Service Oil Co., Inc., 337 Pa.Super. 264, 486 A.2d 1009 (1984).

Dalessio, 657 A.2d at 1387.