State v. Dyer

WATHEN, C.J., with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins,

dissenting.

[¶ 13] I respectfully dissent. I am unable to make the leap from Tweedie’s general statement to “take care of my place for me” to an express grant of authority for Patterson or the defendant to order Dixon to leave the premises or risk a *878criminal trespass for making prank telephone calls. As a licensee, Dixon could only know that his license to remain on the premises was revoked if he heard Tweedie delegate that authority to the defendant. In the present case, the defendant’s understanding of Tweedie’s words is not determinative, rather it is the authority perceived by Dixon from the statement. Dixon committed a criminal trespass, thereby triggering the defendant’s right to defend the premises, only if Dixon knew that he was not licensed to remain. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(D). Tweed-ie’s general statement provides no basis for such knowledge.

[¶ 14] I would affirm the judgment of conviction.