(dissenting).
I must register strong disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the United States is an indispensible party for this action before the Board of Property.
Compulsory joinder of parties is governed by Pa.R. Civ.P. 2227(a), which provides:
“Persons having only a joint interest in the subject matter of an action must be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.”
In this case, the United States purports to be the sole owner of the mineral rights and a reversionary interest in the tract. The Pennsylvania Game Commission claims to be the sole owner of the fee interest subject to the mineral rights and reversionary interest of the United States. It is clear to me that neither the United States nor the Pennsylvania Game Commission can possibly be held to be “[pjersons having only a joint interest in the subject matter . . . .” Therefore, Rule 2227(a) does not require the joinder of the United States.
The majority apparently decides this case without considering Rule 2227(a). It relies instead on a standard *24apart from the rule that provides that “a party is indispensible where his rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made between them without impairing such rights.” Powell v. Shepard, 381 Pa. 405, 412, 113 A.2d 261, 265 (1955); see Tigue v. Basalyga, 451 Pa. 436, 439, 304 A.2d 119, 120 (1973).
Assuming that it is proper to create a standard of indispensibility apart from Rule 2227(a), the majority grievously misapplies that standard. It is perfectly clear that the Board of Property could adjudicate the claim of appellee Pocono Pines and enter an appropriate decree without impairing any rights of the United States. All appellee is requesting is that the Board decide whether appellee or the Game Commission has a superior right to the interest that the Commission claims to own. Should it be determined that appellee has the superior right, the appropriate relief would be a decree awarding to appellee such interest as the Commission purports to have, subject to the rights of the United States. Complete justice could be administered between the parties before the Board, while the rights of the United States would remain to be determined at another time and in another forum. ' Surely, therefore, a decree can be framed that does not impair the rights of the United States. Accordingly, the United States is not an indispensible party.
The effect of the majority’s holding that the United States is indispensible is to deprive appellee and others in its position of any forum in which their claims may be heard. Actions to try title to real property claimed by the Commonwealth may be brought only before the Board of Property. The United States may be sued concerning title to real property in which it claims an interest, if at all, in the federal courts. Thus, there is no judicial or administrative forum in which both the United States and the Game Commission can be joined for the adjudication of appellee’s claims. That result, though *25harsh, would be the proper one if the United States were strictly indispensible, but surely we should strive to avoid such a result unless absolutely necessary for the protection of the rights of a non-party. Here it is not necessary, for it is possible for the Board and the courts to frame an appropriate decree protecting the rights of the United States.
The majority’s alternate holding that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction when this action was instituted is simply incorrect. The statutes cited by the majority which were in effect at the commencement of this action provided only that the United States had not consented to be made a party to such an action. They obviously have nothing to do with the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Board when the United States is not sought to be made a party.
The merits of this dispute are extremely complex, and I see no need to consider them here when the majority fails to reach them. Accordingly, because the majority erroneously fails to consider the merits of this appeal, I dissent.
JONES, C. J., joins in this dissent.