dissenting.
I remain unconvinced that the statute in question1 offends the protection afforded political speech by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
I.
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, we may presume that the General Assembly of the Commonwealth *51does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth.2 Further, statutes are to be construed whenever possible to uphold their constitutionality. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978). An act of the General Assembly may not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the Constitution. Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975).
The appeal before us is a facial challenge to the regulatory statute which requires adequate notice by registered mail to a political opponent when a candidate for public office places an advertisement referring to the political opponent with a television or radio broadcasting station, newspaper or periodical, to be broadcast or published within forty-eight hours immediately prior to an election or published in a weekly newspaper or periodical during the eight days immediately prior to the election. As was stated by our Superior Court in this case, Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 266 Pa.Super. 56, 403 A.2d 91 (1979):
The avowed purpose of this statute is to prevent media presentation of one candidate’s, or his party’s, views of the opponent, by way of advertisement, within that crucial period immediately before an election, without notice so that the opponent does not have time to respond. In this era of increased spending on political advertisements, the obvious goal is to remove the disadvantageous and unfair results possible through a last minute, one-sided “smear” campaign. In what might be referred to as a battle of media advertisements, under this statue the opposing candidate must be forewarned and given the chance to answer the ads of the other side. (Emphasis added)
The majority cites Pa.Legis.J. § 1328-30 (daily ed. May 9, 1972) for its finding that the “purpose of Section 1614 is to prevent misleading, false or scandalous campaign charges, published immediately prior to an election, from going unrebutted and thus improperly swaying the result of the election.” The majority fails to recognize that that articulation *52of purpose is but another way of stating the state’s interest in “preserving the integrity of the electoral process, preventing corruption, and ‘sustaining] the active, alert responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise conduct of government’ ”, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1422, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) quoting United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 570, 77 S.Ct. 529, 530, 1 L.Ed.2d 563 (1957), by protecting the process of choosing political leaders. Through inadequate analysis the majority arrives at the fallacious position at p. 131, n.13, that it is arguable that the primary purpose of Section 1614 lies in a desire to protect the reputational interests of candidates.
The majority today has chosen to ignore its duty3 to sustain the constitutionality of the statute by giving it a narrowing construction. The majority has also chosen to ignore the guidelines of the Supreme Court. In United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1404, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) the Court said:
“[w]hen the validity of an act of Congress is drawn into question, and ... a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932).
Although the general rule controlling standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes has some exceptions, one exception applicable in the area of free speech is over-breadth of the statute.4 The overbreadth doctrine should be *53applied with restraint, according to Mr. Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun, dissenting in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 907, 92 S.Ct. 2479, 2482, 33 L.Ed.2d 331 (1972) because 1) a judicial-legislative confrontation often results from application of the overbreadth doctrine, and 2) it is a departure from the normal method of judicial review. In 1973 the Supreme Court said in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, “Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute.” Also, the deterrent effect on legitimate expression must be both real and substantial. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2276, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975). Restated, it is not the Court’s task to strike down a statute if it can, but to construe it so as to comport with constitutional limitations. Cf. United States Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2893, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973). In Letter Carriers a federal and a state statute prohibiting political activities of government employees were upheld against challenges of overbreadth.
Overbreadth scrutiny should not be rigid when examining a statute that regulates conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment by doing so in a neutral, noncensorial manner, for facial overbreadth adjudication attenuates as the behavior involved moves from “pure speech” toward conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 614, 93 S.Ct. at 2917.
The majority opinion, ante at 42, n.10, finds that Section 1614 “is not concerned with the regulation of conduct ...” This important finding is preemptorily made without analysis of Section 1614 which is not addressed to speeches, per se. It is not a “pure speech” statute. It puts a condition precedent to the “plac[ing of] an advertisement referring to *54an opposing candidate.” This is a regulation of conduct in the shadow of the First Amendment. “Place an advertisement” are the significant words in the statute for the purposes of deciding whether the statute is concerned with the regulation of conduct. The statute in this case involves both conduct and speech. Therefore, the scrutiny should not be so rigid as to invalidate the entire statute, thereby prohibiting the Commonwealth from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 615, 93 S.Ct. at 2917.
II.
We recognize that a determination of a facial challenge is of no little difficulty. The majority concedes some speech is not constitutionally protected. Knowing and reckless falsity is accorded no greater constitutional immunity when made in a political campaign than when made under other circumstances. Section 1614 proscribes such speech if coupled with proscribed conduct; i. e., if placed in an advertisement and adequate notice is not given the besmirched opponent. Criminal sanctions are applied if the section is disregarded. The interest in deterring last-minute falsity so as not to deceive the voters and thereby aid the preservation of the integrity of the electoral process is an interest of highest importance. Cf. United States v. Automobile Workers, supra. Such deterrence is also a furtherance of the high interest of preserving public confidence in government by democratic process. Cf. United States Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, supra. “No institution is more central to the United States’ system of representative democracy than the election.” Developments in the Law, Elections, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1114 (1975). It transcends “the preferred position of freedom of speech”5 which in the *55area of the conduct of campaigns for public office serves the highest and primary purpose of preserving a democratic system of government. The ascendancy of the First Amendment does not place freedom of speech on a plane with the government’s obligation to preserve our democratic political process. According to the result of the majority’s decision, freedom of speech is a more compelling interest than the integrity of the election process, for its decision protects deceptive campaign speech in order to avoid the possibilities that 1) a candidate’s late discovery of material information about the opponent might be faced with severe restraints by media lead time if notice adequate for reply is required; 2) a chilling Hobson’s choice of foregoing publication or risking prosecution because of media lead time constraints is a real limitation; and, 3) a last-minute attack on an opponent’s political position might become censored in content to avoid the statute. A narrow reading of the statute eliminates the problems posed by the first two possibilities.6 However, if scrutiny is employed, the first two possibilities of deterrence, being minimal,7 are outweighed by the state’s compelling interest.
The third possibility advanced is also unsubstantial. An attack upon an ideological or political position involving the opponent does not necessitate such last-minute decision making as to find the notice requirement heavily burdensome because of media lead time restraints. Employment of correct statutory interpretation procedure, acceptance of the Supreme Court’s guidelines in facial challenges, recognition of the true purpose of Section 1614, and the primacy of the state’s interest in preservation of the integrity of the election process in maintaining a democratic system of government obviates the spurious abridgments set forth by the majority.
*56III.
This case, involving freedom of speech rather than freedom of the press, is not controlled by Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966), nor by Miami Publishing Company v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974). Both Mills and Tornillo were classified freedom of the press cases concerned with the liberty to disseminate expression broadly. The Speech Clause “may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to express ideas and beliefs.” First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1428, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). While Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Bellotti, says the Press Clause is not confined to newspapers and periodicals, Id. at 801, 98 S.Ct. at 1428, the Press Clause is not redundant. It refers to a liberty “complementary to and a natural extension of the Speech Clause liberty”, Id. at 800, 98 S.Ct. at 1428. In the instant case protection of the Press Clause was not argued nor invoked as the constitutional right being abridged. Obviously, a facial challenge to a statute charging overbreadth in violation of the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech cannot be sustained or controlled by cases turning on issues arising from the protection afforded freedom of the press, a different if not greater or lesser liberty.
Finally, we turn to Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Avoiding the cautioned pitfall of mechanical jurisprudence, we believe the state’s subordinating compelling interest in deterring campaign falsity so as to preserve the integrity of the election process in order to maintain a democratic government overrides such limitations of speech as may incidentally occur through sustaining Section 1614 assuming arguendo, the statute did limit protected speech and require scrutiny. Buckley struck down provisions of the federal election laws which limited expenditures “relative to a clearly defined candidate” and limited candidates’ individual spending because the limitations impermissibly restricted the right of individuals to speak their *57minds and make their views known. The limitations, in that case held to be unconstitutional, were found to be so substantial (because “virtually every means of communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money”, Buckley, supra, at 19, 96 S.Ct. at 634) as to override the government’s interests. In Buckley at 17, 96 S.Ct. at 633, the court held that even if the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates to introduce a non-speech element causing the expenditure of money to be categorized as conduct, the government interest in support of the act under scrutiny in Buckley involved suppressing communication rather than regulating the non-speech element.
The limitations of speech and advertisement here are not so substantial as to be suppressive. The condition precedent of adequate notice to the opponent in this case, like the limitations upon political contributions in Buckley, entail (if any) a much lesser restriction upon the individual’s ability to engage in free communication than expenditure limitations. Buckley, supra, at 20-23, 96 S.Ct. at 635-36. Last-minute campaign speeches are not proscribed nor limited incidentally. Only the conduct of placing an advertisement is regulated to require giving notice to the opponent.
I dissent.
. Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, Art. XVI, § 1614, added, Act of December 28, 1972, P.L. 1658, No. 353 § 1, 25 P.S. 3234 (repealed, Act of October 4, 1978) (current version 26 P.S. § 3258(b) Supp.1980-1981).
. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(3) (Supp. 1977-1978).
. See note 2, supra; In re William L., supra; and Singer v. Sheppard, supra.
. A succinct statement of the overbreadth doctrine is set forth in an annotation, Supreme Court’s Views As To Overbreadth of Legislation In Connection With First Amendment Rights, 45 L.Ed.2d 725, 731 (1975):
“... the general rule [controlling] standing of a party to challenge the constitutionality of legislation is that a litigant to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to chai*53lenge the statute on the ground it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in situations not before the court; a closely related principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously. However, the court has recognized some limited exceptions to this rule, but only in the presence of the most ‘weighty countervailing policies.’ ... One of the exceptions, in the area of the First Amendment, to the traditional rules of standing permits attacks on overly broad statutes.”
. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 96, 69 S.Ct. 448, 458, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), objected to the phrase “the preferred position of freedom of speech” as a deceptive formula that makes for mechanical jurisprudence. Quoting Mr. Justice Holmes’ Collected Legal Papers at 306, Justice Frankfurter cau*55tioned, “To rest upon a formula is a slumber that prolonged, means death.”
. There is no protected right to false speech or the placing of false advertisements.
. The alleged media lead time deterrent is raised in argument, but not supported by evidence.