for the Majority:
We address, for the first time, the proper procedures that parole and probation officers must follow after they receive a tip from police officers under their statutory authority to search probationers.1 In this case, probation officers searched probationer-appellant Jeffery Culver’s home after police “tipped off’ probation officers that they suspected that he was involved in drug activity. On appeal, Culver contends that the probation officers violated 11 Del. C. § 4321, and Parole and Probation Procedure 7.19 promulgated under that statute, when they decided to search his home.2 Specifically he contends that 7.19 does not permit probation officers to search a probationer’s dwelling based solely on a request by police officers. Instead, he argues that 7.19 requires probation officers to assess independently the reliability of any information to determine whether that information, in the ordinary course and scope of the probation officer’s supervisory duties, would support a reasonable suspicion to search a probationer’s dwelling.
A majority agree that 7.19 requires probation officers to assess any “tip” relayed to them and independently determine if a reasonable suspicion exists that would, in the ordinary course of their duties, prompt a search of a probationer’s dwelling. In this case, the probation officers accepted, without conducting any independent analysis, and relied on information police received from an anonymous caller whose “tip” made it clear the caller had no personal information about Culver consistent with illicit drug activity. Had probation officers independently analyzed the information consistent with their own agency’s regulations, they would have concluded that no reasonable suspicion existed to search Culver or his dwelling. We therefore hold that probation officers unlawfully searched Culver’s dwelling and that the fruits of that unlawful search must be suppressed. To hold otherwise would render 11 Del. C. § 4321 and the regulations promulgated under it meaningless.3 The Superior Court’s denial of Culver’s motion to suppress is REVERSED, his conviction is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for action consistent with this Opinion.
FACTS
In October 2006, the Superior Court placed Culver on Level III probation fol*8lowing a September 2006 conviction on two counts of misdemeanor theft and one count of criminal mischief. Culver’s probationary conditions forbade him from possessing a weapon.
On October 16, 2006, Lt. Ogden of the Delaware State Police received an anonymous tip from an unknown caller with no past proven reliability. The tipster told Lt. Ogden that he suspected drug activity at Culver’s home at 3210 Sapphire Court. The caller also described Culver’s physical characteristics and stated that Culver drove a silver Mercedes Benz. According to Lt. Ogden’s suppression hearing testimony, the caller specifically said that “it was obvious that [Culver] was involved in drug activity based on the volume of vehicles that would come to his residence, stay there for a few minutes and leave.” It is clear from Lt. Ogden’s testimony about the tip that the informant did not, in fact, have any personal knowledge or contact with Culver to support any conclusion about Culver being engaged in “drug activity.” The caller provided Lt. Ogden with some easily observable information such as a physical description of Culver, an address (which turned out to be Culver’s dwelling), and claimed that a silver Mercedes Benz with a Pennsylvania license plate was being used for the drug activity. There is no evidence that the caller had offered any basis from which an objective person could conclude the caller had personal knowledge of Culver’s activities.4 Thus, at best, the caller’s “tip” could be viewed as conclusions the caller drew based solely on observations from the street.
Despite the tipster’s lack of personal knowledge, Lt. Ogden decided to follow up and went to Culver’s address that same day, October 16. Lt. Ogden noticed a silver Mercedes Benz with a Pennsylvania license plate parked directly in front of Culver’s house. Before Lt. Ogden left, he noticed that two black males got out of a car — which Lt. Ogden concluded was a rental based upon his training and experience — and entered Culver’s home. Approximately ten minutes later, the two men, Culver and a fourth person, left Cul-ver’s house and drove away in the silver Mercedes.
Lt. Ogden contacted Corporal Daniels of the Delaware State Police and requested his immediate assistance. Lt. Ogden remained in front of Culver’s dwelling and Daniels followed Culver’s car. After noticing that the Mercedes had tinted windows, Daniels requested and received authorization from Lt. Ogden to stop and search the Mercedes and the four occupants. The police officers used a K-9 to search the car and its occupants. The police found nothing incriminating.
Undeterred by an evidently flimsy and unreliable tip followed by an utterly fruitless search, Lt. Ogden contacted Patrick Cronin, Culver’s probation supervisor, and informed Cronin that the State Police had received an anonymous tip. Cronin testified that Lt. Ogden “advised me that [Lt. Ogden] had received a tip that an individual at 3210 Sapphire was involved in drug activity, that he was doing surveillance there, and observed something that he had found to be suspicious, a car stop and identified [sic] one of the participants in the suspicious activity was on Level III probation, and identified him to me as Jeffrey Culver, the defendant.” At this point, (1) Lt. Ogden had only received an uncorroborated anonymous tip, not alleged to be based on personal knowledge, and (2) the police had searched (with the assistance of a K9) Culver’s Mercedes, which was reportedly “involved in drug activi*9ty” — but that search yielded absolutely no evidence of drugs. While Cronin evidently knew of a “car stop,” the record does not reveal whether Lt. Ogden told him State Police had searched Culver’s car and found no incriminating evidence.
Shortly after Lt. Ogden contacted Cronin, Cronin contacted Melissa Roberts, the probation officer responsible for Culver’s supervision. At this point, Cronin and Roberts decided to conduct an administrative search of Culver’s home under Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19. Cronin testified they decided to conduct the search for three reasons: (1) Culver had failed drug tests during probation; (2) Cul-ver had missed one curfew; and (3) Cronin had received information from a “reliable source ”5 that Culver possessed contraband. Cronin also explained the basis for those three reasons to search Culver’s home.
First, Cronin testified that Culver’s failed drug test occurred in September 2006, shortly after Culver entered probation. According to Roberts, by the time of Culver’s third drug test, the levels of marijuana in Culver’s system had been coming down, and by his fourth drug test, he tested negative. To Roberts, this showed that Culver had stopped or at least decreased his use of marijuana. Nevertheless, Roberts considered it a factor in the analysis of whether to search Culver’s dwelling. Second, Cronin testified that Culver had recently called in for his curfew about 20 minutes late. Third and finally, Cronin testified that Lt. Ogden “is my reliable source” and “he also gave me the characterization of the information that he had initially received in the form of the tip and his observations following the tip.... ”6 However, neither Cronin nor Roberts identified any known fact before Lt. Ogden’s call that would have, in the ordinary course of business, triggered an administrative search.
Lt. Ogden testified that either he or another police officer remained in front of Culver’s home until the probation officers searched it. Lt. Ogden testified that “I had had some conversations with Probation and was pretty certain that he going to be violated_” Lt. Ogden “decided to stay [at Culver’s house] so that in case, you know, any phone calls were made, somebody could come and take something out of the house, that kind of thing, so I just kind of stayed there until [probation officers] got there to secure it.”
When the probation officers searched Culver’s home, they found a loaded .357 Magnum revolver, hidden in a heating vent, and a detoxification kit commonly used to attempt to circumvent or defeat urine screening for drug use. Probation officers did not find any drugs or evidence of drug dealing.
Probation officers took Culver into custody for violating his probation. While he was in custody at the YOP Center, an arrest warrant issued for possession of a weapon by a person prohibited. Detective David Kline went to the VOP Center to arrest Culver on the weapons charge. In response to being handed the arrest warrant, Culver stated: “I know why you’re here. They found my gun. I’m a rap promoter, and I have a lot of money, and the gun is for protection.”
*10Before trial, Culver moved to suppress (1)the evidence found at his home as the product of an unlawful warrantless search and (2) his statement to Detective Kline as a violation of his Miranda rights. A Superior Court judge denied the suppression motion.7 In April 2007, a Superior Court jury convicted Culver on the weapons charge.8
DISCUSSION
We first address whether the Superior Court judge erred by denying Culver’s motion to suppress the gun seized and his oral statement after probation officers searched his dwelling. The Superior Court judge concluded that the probation officers had reasonable suspicion to search Culver’s dwelling and that reasonable suspicion alone made the search lawful. We review a denial of a motion to suppress evidence after an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.9 To the extent the claim of error implicates questions of law, we review de novo.10
Culver contends that the search of his house was an improper administrative search under 11 Del. C. § 4321.11 That section provides:
Probation and parole officers shall exercise the same powers as constables under the laws of this State and may conduct searches of individuals under probation and parole supervision in accordance with Department procedures while in the performance of the lawful duties of their employment and shall execute lawful orders, warrants and other process as directed to the officer by any court, judge or Board of Parole of this State.
Specifically, Culver argues that the probation officers’ search violated Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19, promulgated under the authority granted by 11 Del. C. § 4321. That Procedure requires:
The officer and supervisor will hold a case conference using the Search Checklist as a guideline. During the case conference the supervisor will review the ‘Tes” or “No” responses of the officer to the following search decision factors:
(1) Sufficient reason to believe the offender possesses contraband.
(2) Sufficient reason to believe the offender is in violation of probation/parole.
(3) Information from a reliable informant, indicating offender possesses contraband or is violating the law.
(4) Information from the informant is corroborated.
Moreover, that Procedure requires that probation officers assess the reliability of their informants. Specifically, it requires:
In evaluating reliability of information, was the information detailed, consistent, was the informant reliable in the past, and consider the reason why the informant is supplying information.
Finally, the Procedure cautions probation officers:
Keep in mind that an administrative search is an authority assigned to Pro*11bation and Parole Officers and only Probation and Parole Officers may search the scene. If the police get involved in the actual searching; the court has viewed this as probation and parole collaborating with the police and have thrown the evidence out of court.
In addition to the Probation and Parole Procedures, Delaware case law provides:
[t]his Court has held that administrative searches of probationer homes require only reasonable grounds, even if the probation officers do not satisfy each technical requirement of the search and seizure regulations of the Department of Correction. The special nature of probationary supervision justifies a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements for searches, but a search of a probationer’s home must be reasonable.12
A. Reliability of the Anonymous Tip
Culver contends that the anonymous caller’s tip was entirely speculative, lacked any corroboration, and that, in fact, the later search of Culver’s car tended to discount the reliability of the anonymous caller’s tip. We must decide whether the anonymous tip relayed to probation officers by Lt. Ogden, together with Lt. Ogden’s personal observations while in front of Culver’s home, provided the probation officers with reasonable suspicion to search Culver’s home. We find that it did not.
In this circumstance, it was especially important for probation officers, pursuant to Procedure 7.19, to assess independently the reliability of the information provided to them. Although we have not strictly held probation officers to the official probation procedures,13 we now hold that Procedure 7.19 makes it plain that probation officers must rationally assess the facts made known to them before reaching the critical conclusion that there is a reasonable basis to search a probationer’s dwelling. Procedure 7.19 specifically requires:
In evaluating reliability of information, was [1] the information detailed, [2] consistent, [3] was the informant rehable in the past, and [4] consider the reason why the informant is supplying information.14
The tip provided in this case fails all four parts of the test.
First, we find that the information supplied by Lt. Ogden lacked detail. The tip Cronin received was not “first hand.” The tipster had eonclusorily surmised that Cul-ver was involved with drug related activity because people were coming to and going from Culver’s dwelling. Lt. Ogden did not relay, because he could not, that the tipster personally saw Culver or his guests with drugs. Nor could Lt. Ogden reasonably infer from the tip that the caller had any firsthand personal knowledge that Culver possessed or dealt drugs. In short, the unknown caller provided Lt. Ogden with nothing more than his speculative analysis of traffic patterns in front of Cul-ver’s home and the caller’s conclusion that those patterns established that drug activity was afoot. So conclusory and devoid of any detail about criminal activity was the anonymous caller’s analysis that it cannot provide any basis for determining that it was reliable.15
*12Lt. Ogden’s surveillance added no additional information that corroborated a conclusion that there was drug activity. Lt. Ogden’s surveillance demonstrated solely that, in his estimation, one of Culver’s guests drove a rental car and that guest came to Culver’s house to get a ride in Culver’s Mercedes. Lt. Ogden suggested that, in his experience, people involved in drug activity typically use a rental car. That, however, without more, cannot create a reasonable suspicion of drug activity. To hold otherwise would allow probation officers to search a probationer’s dwelling frequented by visitors anytime someone arrives for a visit in a rental car. Therefore, we find that Lt. Ogden’s communicating the tipster’s conclusory opinion that Culver was involved in drug activity, did not provide sufficient detail to support a conclusion that there was a reasonable basis to suspect that Culver was involved in drug activity.
Second, Procedure 7.19 also requires that the probation officers consider whether the provided information is consistent. Again, the caller’s tip was neither internally consistent with its own inferred conclusion nor with the later independent investigation undertaken in an attempt to corroborate it. Although the caller did provide verified information about Cul-ver’s address and a personal description of the car, that information was readily available by simply observing Culver from the street. That information did not verify Culver’s involvement in any illicit activity, however. In LeGrande v. State, we held that an anonymous caller’s tip was not sufficiently corroborated where:
the police only corroborated the accused’s identity, the location of his locked apartment, his probationary status, and that his neighbor was wanted. Confirmations of these facts, which could be used to identify LeGrande, “[did] not show that the tipster [had] knowledge of concealed criminal activity.”16
Likewise, in this case we find that the caller’s description of Culver, and activity observable from the street, were not enough to provide a basis to find that the tip provided reason to believe that Culver was engaged in illicit drug activity. The tip was based upon readily observable facts that demonstrated no special insight into illegal activity.
Even more importantly, the specific information purporting to form a basis to believe that Culver was involved with drugs was inconsistent with the further, follow up investigation. The caller specifically told Lt. Ogden that Culver used the silver Mercedes in connection with illegal drug activity, yet the K-9 search during the traffic stop yielded no drugs, paraphernalia or any incriminating evidence. If anything, the results of this search should have allayed suspicion that Culver was involved in drug activity.
Third, the State concedes that the informant was not past proven reliable. Although probation officers may typically rely on the information furnished them by police officers, Probation Procedure 7.19 Section VL(E)(2) and (3) requires that the probation officers independently assess the reliability of the police officer’s information. We recognize that, under Procedure 7.19 VL(E)(2), probation officers could rely on representations based on a police officer’s personal observations where the police officer has past experience with the probationer. However, probation officers *13cannot rely on police officers vouching for anonymous callers with no proven track record for supplying credible, reliable information. Rather, police officers must provide probation officers sufficient facts so that the probation officers can independently and objectively assess the reasonableness of the inferences to be drawn from the caller’s tip. If probation officers do not engage in an independent analysis of the reliability of facts supporting an “informant’s” tip, they would contravene Procedure 7.19 Section VT(F)(3). The probation officers would thereby become essentially surrogates for the police, conveniently used when the police had no lawful authority to act on their own.
In this case, Lt. Ogden provided no evidence to probation officers that either he or the informant had any personal knowledge about Culver that would support a reasonable suspicion that Culver was currently involved with drug activity. The only evidence that Lt. Ogden provided to probation officers about Culver was a speculative hunch. The probation officers should have recognized that that information was deficient. Nothing about the tip demonstrated any personal connection between the caller and Culver and, thus, no credible opportunity for the tipster to have personal knowledge of illicit activity.17 Instead, the probation officers should have concluded that this tip was entirely speculative, and should have recognized that Lt. Ogden had no independent basis to determine that Culver was involved in drug activity. Lt. Ogden had no regular contact with Culver that would have afforded him knowledge of Culver’s personal habits. Nor did Lt. Ogden’s personal observations demonstrate that Culver was involved with drugs. Indeed, the fruitless police search of Culver’s Mercedes produced facts inconsistent with drug activity and plainly contradicted the caller’s original information.18 Had the probation officers engaged in the independent inquiry required by Procedure 7.19, they would have recognized these flaws in the caller’s tip and Lt. Ogden’s information.
Fourth and finally, the Procedure instructs probation officers to consider the intent of the caller when he provided the information. Here, we do not know why the anonymous caller provided the information. It could just as reasonably have been a hoax, the offshoot of a personal vendetta, or random harassment. We do not imply that this would be a fatal flaw in different circumstances. However, absent any evidence that the tip was reliable based on the first three factors, the inability to assess the tipster’s intent adds nothing to the equation. Lt. Ogden’s19 intent, on the other hand, was obvious. He wished the probation officers to search under circumstances where he and the State Police had no basis to undertake a search on their own. In effect, Lt. Ogden’s unanalyzed request, no doubt well intentioned, flatly contradicted Probation and Parole’s policies.
*14After considering the four factors in Procedure 7.19, we conclude that the probation officers should have conducted an independent assessment of the caller’s and of Lt. Ogden’s information. Instead, probation officer Cronin pronounced that Lt. Ogden was “my reliable source” and never examined the available information independently. We therefore find that the probation officers improperly relied on conclusory, inconsistent, and unreliable information that cannot sustain a reasonable suspicion to search Culver’s home.
B. Other Grounds for Reasonable Suspicion
Although Lt. Ogden’s tip may have provided the impetus for the probation officers to search Culver’s home according to the probation officer’s testimony, it was not the only reason for the search. Probation officer Cronin testified the probation officers decided to conduct the search of Culver’s home for three reasons: (1) Culver had failed drug tests during probation; (2) Culver missed one curfew; and, (3) Cronin received information from Lt. Ogden that Culver possessed contraband. Thus, the second question for us to decide is whether the probation officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct, and would in the ordinary course have concluded, that carrying out their duties properly required an administrative search of Culver’s dwelling.
The State concedes that Lt. Ogden’s tip catalyzed the immediate search of Culver’s dwelling on October 16th. It, in effect, brought Culver up on their “radar screen.” But, the State also contends that, even if probation officers could not search Culver based on Lt. Ogden’s tip, probation officers still had independent and reasonable grounds to search Culver’s home. The missed curfew and the failed drug tests were known to probation officers well before October 16, however, yet in the ordinary course of business had provoked no administrative search. Probation officers saw no need to depart from routine and search Culver’s dwelling before they heard from Lt. Ogden. It is readily apparent that the probation officers did not believe that their regulations governing the supervision of probationers, given those two factors alone, would warrant an administrative search of Culver’s dwelling. Only after the introduction of Lt. Ogden’s unfounded tip did probation officers decide to depart from routine and conduct an administrative search. Because probation officers apparently concluded, in the ordinary course of business, that there was no basis to search Culver’s dwelling by reason of a single episode twenty minute delay in calling in from curfew and for improving drug test results, those two additional reasons failed to provide the reasonable suspicion needed to justify an administrative search of Cul-ver’s home.20
When examining whether the failed drug test and the missed curfew, without more, could support reasonable suspicion that would justify an administrative search, it is important to remember that both incidents had already occurred without probation officers ever considering a search of Culver’s person or home before October 16. Nor is there any evidence of record that probation officers in fact intended to search Culver in the foreseeable future, much less on or before October 16. That leads us inescapably to the conclusion *15that the probation officers did not consider the failed drug test and the missed curfew to be sufficient reasons under their protocols to search Culver’s home on October 16.
The question with which we are presented is not whether probation officers may have, hypothetically, at some time in the past or in the future concluded that reasonable suspicion existed to search Cul-ver’s home based on those two factors alone. Instead, the question is whether probation officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct this search on October 16. Without Lt. Ogden’s call, we must conclude that the probation officers making this inquiry under the Department of Corrections mandated framework for analysis, would not have concluded there was a reasonable basis to conduct this search. Knowing that but for Lt. Ogden’s call, the probation officers would not have searched on October 16, we find that Lt. Ogden’s call, not an independent objective assessment of the information as required by Procedure 7.19 is what precipitated the search. Because we have concluded that Lt. Ogden’s information did not form a basis for reasonable suspicion, we conclude that the probation officers had no basis under their mandated framework for analysis to believe there was reasonable suspicion to search Culver’s home on October 16.
The Probation and Parole Procedures, which empower and specify the duties of probation officers, do not specifically address whether the police may call upon probation officers to perform searches for which the police lack probable cause. The Court today divides, not because of constitutional debate, but instead over the conduct the Procedures authorize. The Procedures, or their enabling statute, 11 Del. C. § 4321, may, of course, be revised and amended to reflect the desired administrative or legislative policy if the result here does not align with the policymakers’ views. At the very least, however, if the duly selected social policy choice is that probation officers are to use their probationary supervisory authority to search a probationer’s dwelling where the police lack a reasonable basis to search, then that policy should be clearly, consciously, and openly adopted.
Without reasonable suspicion determined in compliance with their duties under Procedure 7.19, the unlawfully seized evidence and the gun and Culver’s oral statement inextricably linked to the seizure of the gun should have been suppressed.21
CONCLUSION
Now, therefore, it is ordered that the judgment of the Superior Court is REVERSED, Culver’s conviction is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is not retained.
.We address any statutory violation before reaching questions under the United States and Delaware Constitutions. See Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906, 908 (Del.2002). Because we find that probation officers violated their clear statutory mandate, we do not reach any constitutional questions. Downs v. Jacobs, 272 A.2d 706, 707 (Del.1970).
. See McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1123 (Del.2002).
. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 41(a) and (f) ("The procedure governing search and seizure shall be as provided by 11 Del. C., c. 23 or other applicable law."); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242, 253 (Del.1987).
. See LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d 1103 (Del.2008).
. We assume the "reliable source” to be Lt. Ogden, who directed the unsuccessful search of Culver’s Mercedes. Nothing in the record indicates tmy attempt by Cronin to seek information about the "tipster” that would confirm his or her reliability.
. Cronin's “reliable source” evidently did not tell him that the State Police pretextual stop and search of Culver’s Mercedes produced nothing consistent with the "tip" — or at least the record is silent in that regard.
. One Superior Court judge decided Culver's suppression motion. A different judge presided at trial.
. Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited. 11 Del. C. § 1448.
. McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Del.2002).
. Id.
. Culver also contends that the search violated both the U.S. and Delaware Constitutions. However, we do not address those contentions here. See Williams, 818 A.2d at 908; Downs, 272 A.2d at 707.
. Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 319 (Del.2006).
. Id.
. Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19(VI)(E) (3 )(b).
. Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 870 (Del.1999).
. LeGrande v. State, 947 A.2d at 1111 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)).
. See Jones, 745 A.2d at 870.
. We find it troublesome that Cronin testified that he knew of a "car stop,” but did not testify that he knew the State Police had searched Culver’s car, alleged by the tipster to be used in the drug trade, but found nothing incriminating. The promulgators of the four part test for determining reliability of an anonymous tip might well have found that fact to be significant.
.Fundamentally, it is obvious to all but the most naive of objective observers, that Cronin and Roberts considered Ogden, and not Ogden’s information the source, to be the "reliable informant.” Unfortunately, their "reliable” source of information neglected to tell them about the fruitless search of the Mercedes — an important fact in testing the consistency and reliability of the original tip.
. See Jones, 745 A.2d at 870 ("Our finding that the 911 complaint alone did not suffice to establish reasonable and articulable suspicion requires us to search the record for any other evidence the police might have possessed to support a finding of reasonable and articula-ble suspicion sufficient to detain Jones”).
. See Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1051 (Del.2001) ("Any evidence recovered or derived from an illegal search and seizure must be excluded from evidence. The exclusionary prohibition extends to the indirect as well as the direct products of such invasions.”). Here, Culver’s post-arrest statement was an indirect product of the illegally seized gun and must also be excluded.