DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge PELLEGRINI.“This is like déjá vu all over again.” In my original dissent in this appeal, Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, Dist. Council 33, Local 934, *490900 A.2d 1043 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (Philadelphia Housing I), I dissented because the majority impermissibly expanded the then extant “core function” exception to the essence test to conduct what was not covered by that exception. On remand, even though the test has now been changed to the federal “public policy exception” by our Supreme Court, I believe the majority also impermissibly expands that standard by focusing on whether the conduct is against public policy, not on whether the outcome of the award is against public policy. Under that standard, while there is public policy against sexual harassment, there is no public policy that every harasser must be fired; therefore, I would affirm the trial court. Moreover, if that standard applies here, the majority does not order a remand to order a remedy not in conflict with a federal public policy. And, as in my original dissent, I again humbly urge our Supreme Court to supplant the federal court-created essence test applicable to private sector arbitration by adopting the judgment n.o.v. test, the prescribed statutory standard set forth in the- Uniform Arbitration Act of 1980(UAA) to review public sector arbitration awards.
I.
Courts review all public sector labor awards in Pennsylvania under the “essence test,” which has been explained as follows:
[A] reviewing court will apply a two-prong analysis. First, the court shall determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the arbitrator, the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the arbitrator’s interpretation can rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will only vacate an arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.
State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College and University Professional Association (PSEA-NEA), 560 Pa. 135, 150, 743 A.2d 405, 413 (1999). The essence test, then, is not a test that delves into the merits of the dispute or examines the propriety of the outcome, but is one that examines whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to consider the matter — a deference test.
As I stated in my original dissent, because the essence test is so highly deferential, our Supreme Court and this Court have been struggling for years with how to review arbitration cases under the essence test where the arbitrator’s award condones conduct that in some way does not make sense in the public sector context. The courts have gone through various iterations of formulations to address that concern,' all as exceptions to the essence test. The first was the “manifestly unreasonable” exception to the essence test which allowed courts to reverse an arbitrator’s award if the conduct engaged was so egregious — that the conduct was either criminal or akin to a breach of a fiduciary duty and such an award was considered irrational and manifestly unreasonable and could be set aside. The “manifestly unreasonable” test was repudiated in Cheyney which held that a standard based upon reasonableness (“reasonable interpretation” and “manifestly unreasonable”) was inappropriate to uphold the policy goals of binding arbitration. Our Supreme Court stated that “[a] mere reasonableness standard encourages a reviewing court to assert its own brand of labor relations philosophy. It emboldens a court to become a ‘superarbitrator’ and to vacate an award when it finds that the award is at odds *491with how the members of the court would have decided the case.” Cheyney, 560 Pa. at 149, 743 A.2d at 413.
Just after the manifestly unreasonable standard was abolished in Cheyney, in City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 447, 562 Pa. 438, 756 A.2d 1107 (2000), a new public policy exception was adopted, later named in Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America, 578 Pa. 347, 852 A.2d 299 (2004), as the “core function” exception. Under that standard, we interpreted in our original decision the issue on appeal as “whether the misconduct at issue interferes with the public employer’s ‘control over its enterprise’ or impedes the public employer’s powers, which are essential to its ability to accomplish its functions. In other words, if the employee’s misconduct interferes with the public employer’s ability to ensure proper operation of its organization, then it cannot bargain away the ability to terminate an employee for such misconduct.” Philadelphia Housing Authority, 900 A.2d at 1051.
Acknowledging that the core function exception has been met “with uncertainty and criticism,” in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association, 595 Pa. 648, 939 A.2d 855 (2007), our Supreme Court replaced the “core function” exception with the federal public policy exception to the essence test. Because it was not raised by any of the parties in that case, the Court did not explain what the test was or any parameters to be used in applying it, instead remanding that case and others, including this case, to apply and articulate the standard.
II.
The Supreme Court of the United States has addressed the extent and application of the public policy exception in the enforcement of arbitration awards, each time applying it narrowly and, in that narrow context, determining whether the remedy directly violated public policy. The first case in which the United States Supreme Court addressed the “public policy exception” was W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983), which involved an employee who had been denied a promotion contrary to seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) because a private employer had failed to comply with a conciliation agreement that W.R. Grace had entered into with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to settle claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The employee grieved the denial of promotion, and the arbitrator, finding that the denial of the promotion was in contravention of the CBA, ordered the employee to be promoted. On appeal, the employer argued that the award contravened the public policy against discrimination and should not be enforced.
The Supreme Court first concluded that the threshold question of whether a public policy existed was ultimately to be determined by the courts. The Court indicated that a public policy could only be said to exist if it was “well defined” and “dominant” and had to be ascertained by “reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177. The Court identified two important public policies that were potentially jeopardized by the arbitration award: obedience to judicial orders and compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. After identifying those policies, the Court held that the enforcement of the award would not compromise either of the public *492policies identified because promotions were governed by collective bargaining and nothing required placing the burden to remedy discrimination on male employees who were not responsible for the discrimination.
The Court again addressed the public policy exception in United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). In that case, a machine operator was discovered alone in the backseat of a car parked in the company’s parking lot with a marijuana cigarette burning in the ash tray in the car’s front seat. The employer discharged the worker for using drugs on company property, but that worker was later reinstated by the arbitrator (in either his former position or another for which he was qualified) because the arbitrator found that the employer lacked “just cause” for his dismissal. The employer appealed, arguing that reinstatement violated public policy because it would allow a drug-impaired individual to operate a dangerous piece of machinery.
Upholding the arbitrator’s decision, the Supreme Court rejected the formulation of a public policy against the operation of dangerous machinery while under the influence of drugs, stating that while “such a judgment is firmly rooted in common sense, ... a formulation of public policy based only on ‘general considerations of supposed public interests’ is not the sort that permits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was entered in accordance with a valid collective-bargaining agreement.” Id., 484 U.S. at 44, 108 S.Ct. 364. The Supreme Court further stated that while its decision in W.R. Grace allowed for a public policy exception to the enforcement of an arbitration award, that decision did not “sanction a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy.” Id., 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S.Ct. 364. The Court clarified that its holding in W.R. Grace turned on whether the award caused a conflict with other laws and legal precedents and did not depend on general considerations of supposed public interests. It also stated that a review did not permit a court to interject its inferences as to the facts as found by the arbitrator because the parties had never bargained for the facts to be found by a court, but rather by the arbitrator chosen by the parties.
Because the federal circuits were taking an expansive view of the public policy exception, such as in Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.1992), and Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.1990), in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers of America, District 17, 531 U.S. 57, 121 S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000), the Court made clear that a public policy exception was extremely narrow and went to the legality of the remedy. That case involved a truck driver who had tested positive twice in random drug tests conducted pursuant to Department of Transportation regulations. After the employee was discharged, the arbitrator ordered his reinstatement with the conditions that he serve a three-month suspension, reimburse the company and the union for the cost of arbitration and participate in a drug rehabilitation program and submit to random drug testing. On appeal, Eastern Associated argued that reinstating a truck driver who tested positive for drugs violated public policy. It cited the federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991 and the Department of Transportation’s regulations to support its position. The Court was unpersuaded.
Reiterating its earlier holdings, the Court first explained that parties to a CBA had bargained for the arbitrator’s inter*493pretation of what the agreement meant, and the fact that a court might be convinced that the arbitrator had committed a serious error did not suffice to overturn the decision. In examining the facts of the Eastern Associated case, the Court stressed that in applying the public policy exception, the question was not whether the employee’s drug use itself violated public policy — the focus had to be on whether the agreement to reinstate the employee violated public policy.1
Under such a narrow focus, the Court found that the award violated no specific provision of any law or regulation — it did require rehabilitation for the employee and did not prevent the employer from reassigning him to a non-safety sensitive position until the treatment program was completed. The Court also noted that even though the employee had failed a drug test previously, it was improper to punish the employee more severely for his second lapse when all the Department of Transportation’s regulations required was a driving prohibition period for a controlled substances violation, the completion of rehabilitation requirements, and a test with a negative result before a return-to-duty was appropriate. While the Court admitted that reasonable people could certainly differ as to whether discharge was the more appropriate remedy, ultimately, the parties had agreed to entrust the decision to an arbitrator, and the Court could not find any explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy that was violated by the award.
Under the federal public policy exception, then, for a court to refuse to enforce an arbitration award, the remedy that the arbitrator orders must require the employer or the union to take some other action that would violate the law or be against clear public policy. However, if the award simply does not punish an illegal act, it does not fall within the exception and a federal court would enforce the award. This exception does not go to the correctness of the resolution of the underlying merits, to which the federal courts still defer, but only to the legality of the remedy. See Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Federation of State, County and Mun. Employees, Dist. Council 47, Local 2187, AFL-CIO, 945 A.2d 796 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008).
After Eastern Associated, the federal public policy exception application to sexual harassment was addressed in Weber Aircraft, Inc. v. General Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local 767, 253 F.3d 821, 823 (Fifth Cir.2001). In that case, a grievant was accused of sexually harassing a female co-worker, and during the investigation of the complaint, two additional female co-workers also accused the grievant of sexually harassing them. Based on its investigation, the employer discharged the grievant, and his union sought arbitration seeking reinstatement with backpay. The arbitrator found that the grievant’s conduct constituted sexual harassment, but was not just cause for termination and ordered that he be reinstated but without backpay. In reversing the District Court’s vacating of the arbitration award, after reviewing Supreme Court precedent set forth above, the Fifth Circuit stated:
The question to be answered is not whether [grievant’s] sexual harassment of female co-workers itself violates pub-*494lie policy, but whether the CBA, which (as interpreted by the arbitrator) provides for his reinstatement, does so. See id. “To put the question more specifically, does a [collective bargaining] agreement to reinstate [a discharged employee] with specified conditions ... run contrary to an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy, as ascertained by reference to positive law and not from general considerations of supposed public interests?” [Eastern Assoc. Coal ] (citing Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286.)
The Supreme Court, in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, “agree[d], in principle, that courts’ authority to invoke the public policy exception is not limited solely to instances where the arbitration award itself violates positive law.” 121 S.Ct. at 467. “Nevertheless, the public policy exception is narrow and must satisfy the principles set forth in W.R. Grace and Misco.” FN2 Id.; see also Id., 121 S.Ct. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is hard to imagine how an arbitration award could violate a public policy, identified in this fashion, without actually conflicting with positive law.”).
Applying the foregoing precepts, we, like the Supreme Court in Eastern Associated Coal Corp., “cannot find in the [laws], the regulations, or any other law or legal precedent an ‘explicit,’ “well defined,’ ‘dominant’ public policy to which the arbitrator’s decision ‘runs contrary.’ ” Id. at 469 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298).FN3 We conclude, therefore, that Weber’s public policy claim must be rejected.
At footnote 3 of that opinion, the Fifth Circuit reviews other Circuits’ application of the federal public policy exception to harassment, including the federal cases relied upon by the majority, stating:
Our conclusion is in accord with the decisions of the other Circuits that have addressed the issue of whether there is a clear public policy against reinstating sexual harassers. See Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 171 F.3d 971, 977 (4th Cir.1999); Communication Workers v. S.E. Elec. Co-op., 882 F.2d 467 (10th Cir.1989); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.1992). In Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers International Union, the Fourth Circuit noted that “while it is certainly true that there is a public policy against sexual harassment, ... [t]here is no public policy that every harasser must be fired. Instead, a company must ‘exercise [ ] reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior.’ ” 171 F.3d at 977 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, “because misconduct often differs in degree, there is no universal punishment that fits every case.” Id. Decisions in the Seventh and Tenth circuits support the conclusion of the Westvaco court. See Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d at 687-88 (finding that a less severe punishment than discharge was an appropriate alternative remedy for a sexual harasser and did not violate public policy); S.E. Elec. Co-op., 882 F.2d at 469 (examining an arbitrator’s reinstatement award and finding that it did not violate public policy against sexual harassment).
The Fifth Circuit then went on to address the cases relied on by the majority, Newsday and Stroehmann, stating:
Contrary to [employer’s] argument, the Second and Third circuits have not squarely addressed the issue. In News-*495day, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.1990), the Second Circuit determined that there is a clear public policy in favor of eliminating sexual harassment from the workplace. However, the court came to no conclusion as to whether there is a clear public policy against reinstatement of sexual harassers who have been otherwise sanctioned for their behavior. Rather, in light of the fact that the employee in that case had been disciplined for previous acts of sexual harassment and informed that further sexual harassment would lead to his discharge, the Second Circuit found that the public policy in favor of eliminating sexual harassment from the workplace justified vacating the arbitrator’s award reinstating the employee in that particular case. See St. Mary Home, Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir.1997) (noting the limited scope of Newsday’s holding). In Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.1992), the Third Circuit found that there is a clear public policy in favor of employer sanctions against employees who commit sexual harassment. Id. at 1442. Because the arbitrator there awarded full reinstatement to the employee without determining whether harassment occurred, the court found that the reinstatement violated the public policy in favor of sanctioning sexual harassers. Id. However, the court did not reach the question of whether a clear public policy required discharge as the only appropriate sanction. In fact, the Stroehmann court recognized that when an arbitrator addressed the merits of the sexual harassment claims against the discharged employee and then made the determination that a sanction less severe than discharge was the appropriate remedy, the arbitrator would not violate public policy by reinstating a sexual harasser without backpay. Id. at 1443.
In the present case, the arbitrator found Grievant repeatedly sexually harassed a female co-worker, but found two circumstances mitigated against Grievant’s termination. First, management at the central warehouse facility was aware of and condoned horseplay of a sexual nature. Second, after Grievant received a verbal warning from one of the Authority’s lower-level supervisors, his sexually harassing misconduct ceased.2 Applying the exception to this case, the remedy here does not require Employer to violate any public policy by reinstating him. Because there is no public policy that every person must be fired, I dissent.
Even if the majority application of the federal public policy exception was correct, I would still dissent because the majority vacates the arbitration award and reinstates the dismissal. Under the federal public policy exception, even if the federal public policy exception is violated, the remedy is not to reinstate the employer’s discipline but to remand to the arbitrator to fashion an award — a remedy that would not violate or advance public policy. In Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 510-511, 121 S.Ct. *4961724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001), the Supreme Court stated:
But again, established law ordinarily precludes a court from resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision. Misco, supra, at 40, n. 10, 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286; see also American Mfg. Co., supra, at 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403. Even when the arbitrator’s award may properly be vacated, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case for further arbitration proceedings. Misco, supra, at 40, n. 10, 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286. The dissent suggests that the remedy described in Misco is limited to cases where the arbitrator’s errors are procedural. Post this page and 1730 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Misco did involve procedural issues, but our discussion regarding the appropriate remedy was not so limited. If a remand is appropriate even when the arbitrator’s award has been set aside for “procedural aberrations” that constitute “affirmative misconduct,” it follows that a remand ordinarily will be appropriate when the arbitrator simply made factual findings that the reviewing court perceives as “irrational.” The Court of Appeals usurped the arbitrator’s role by resolving the dispute and barring further proceedings, a result at odds with this governing law.
III.
In my dissent in Philadelphia I, I humbly suggested that the “essence test” taken from federal labor law involving the enforcement of private sector collective bargaining in federal courts is simply inapplicable in public sector labor relations. I pointed out that arbitration of grievances, unlike in Pennsylvania,3 was not required by federal law, but was only required if contractually provided. The essence test was an affirmative defense to an action for specific performance of an arbitration award, while in Pennsylvania, it is the scope of review of an appeal limiting what the court may review. Most important, the “essence test” is not the scope of review mandated by the General Assembly in the UAA to review public sector labor arbitrations. Because I suggested replacing the existing regime of reviewing public sector arbitration awards, I explained how that scope of review came to be. Rather than repeating it here, I will only reiterate the analysis urging the adoptions of the UAA standard. I reasoned:
If the ‘essence test’ is not the proper scope of review, then what is? This is the easiest part of the analysis because the General Assembly has statutorily provided one — The Uniform Arbitration Act of 1980(UAA). 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301-7362. The UAA explicitly sets forth the scope of judicial review of public sector agreements, including grievance-arbitration under collective bargaining agreements entered pursuant to PERA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302 provides how the UAA is to apply to all arbitrations that are entered into by a governmental agency. Quoted in full, it provides:
*497§ 7302. Scope of subchapter
(a) General rule. — An agreement to arbitrate a controversy on a nonjudicial basis shall be conclusively presumed to be an agreement to arbitrate pursuant to Subchapter B (relating to common law arbitration) unless the agreement to arbitrate is in writing and expressly provides for arbitration pursuant to this subchapter or any other similar statute, in which case the arbitration shall be governed by this subchapter.
(b) Collective bargaining agreements. — This subchapter shall apply to a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate controversies between employers and employees or their respective representatives only where the arbitration pursuant to this subchapter is consistent with any statute regulating labor and management relations.
(c) Government contracts. — This sub-chapter shall apply to any written contract to which a government unit of this Commonwealth is a party to the same extent as if the government unit were a private person, except that where a contract to which the Commonwealth government is a party provides for arbitration of controversies but does not provide for arbitration pursuant to any specified statutory provision, the arbitration shall be governed by this sub-chapter.
(d) Special application.—
(1) Paragraph (2) shall be applicable where:
(i) The Commonwealth government submits a controversy to arbitration.
(ii) A political subdivision submits a controversy with an employee or a representative of employees to arbitration.
(iii) Any person has been required by law to submit or to agree to submit a controversy to arbitration pursuant to this subchapter.
(2) Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to this subchap-ter shall, notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, modify or correct the award where the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
As can be seen, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(c), in essence, provides that the statutory arbitration standard set forth in the UAA should apply to any written contract to which a governmental unit is a party. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(1) provides that this standard of judicial review should apply where paragraph (2), 42 Pa.C.S. 7302(d)(2), applies where the Commonwealth submits a controversy to arbitration; a political subdivision submits a controversy with an employee or a representative of employees to arbitration; or any person has been required by law to submit or to agree to submit a controversy to arbitration pursuant to the statutory arbitration provisions. As to the scope of review, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) allows a reviewing court to modify or correct an award when “the award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”
Although the judgment n.o.v./error of law was mandated, our Supreme Court, in Community College of Beaver County, the case which adopted the federal essence test, also considered whether the judgment n.o.v./error of law test applied to public sector labor contracts under PERA. Finding that the judgment n.o.v. standard applied, it stated:
*498Both parties assume, with some support in our case law, that the statutory standard [Arbitration Act of 1927, 5 P.S. 170, 17] is substantially different from the Enterprise Wheel and Car standard and provides for much closer scrutiny of arbitration awards than does the federal standard when vacation or enforcement of the award is sought in Pennsylvania courts.... As will be shown in part III, infra, however, we perceive no conflict between the standard of review contained in the Arbitration Act of 1927 and that recognized by federal decisional law in the field of labor relations. The two are not significantly different. (Footnote omitted.)
Community College of Beaver County, 473 Pa. at 586-587, 375 A.2d at 1272.
It then went on to compare those tests concluding that “the ‘n.o.v.’ concept ... is hardly a radical change, nor does it dictate that a much closer or different scrutiny of an arbitration award will be available than under the [essence test].” Id., 473 Pa. at 589, 375 A.2d at 1273. In other words, the essence test and the judgment n.o.v. scope of review are the same.
I respectfully suggest that the “essence test” is not the same as a judgment n.o.v. scope of review. Under the judgment n.o.v. standard, a court can review a judgment to determine whether, as a matter of law, the verdict is incorrect or the evidence was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394, 604 A.2d 1003 (1992). While the essence test is a deference test only concerned with whether the arbitrator derives his decision not from the words of the agreement but from the gist of the words of the agreement, the judgment n.o.v. test is concerned with the outcome — the justness of the result.
A judgment n.o.v. scope of review would allow courts to set aside arbitration awards that come to a manifestly unreasonable outcome thereby protecting the public employer, the union and, most importantly, the public. Because this area is unsettled, I humbly urge the Supreme Court to reexamine what is the proper scope of review of public sector labor arbitrations and adopt the public sector arbitration scope of review contained in the Uniform Arbitration Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302.
In this case, though, we are still governed by the federal public policy exception to the essence test. Because the arbitrator’s award in putting the grievant back to work did not violate any federal public policy, I would affirm the order of the trial court upholding the arbitrator’s award. Moreover, even if the federal public policy exception applies, the majority fails to remand as required by federal law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
President Judge LEAJDBETTER and Judge McGINLEY join as to Part III only of this dissenting opinion.
. Specifically, the Court stated that the question must be "does a contractual agreement to reinstate Smith with specified conditions ... run contrary to an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy, as ascertained by reference to positive law and not from general considerations of supposed public interest?” Eastern Associated, 531 U.S. at 63, 121 S.Ct. 462.
. Grievant was warned about his inappropriate conduct on June 29, 2002. Shortly thereafter, the Authority undertook a formal investigation into the sexual harassment charges against Grievant. During the investigation, the Authority allowed Grievant to continue to work in the central warehouse facility. Following the completion of the investigation on October 23, 2002, the Authority fired Griev-ant. The arbitrator determined that between the time he was warned and the date of his termination, Grievant worked without any reported incidents of sexual misconduct.
. 43 P.S. § 1101.903 of the Public Employe Relations Act provides: “Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. The procedure to be adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of arbitrators as the parties may agree. Any decisions of the arbitrator or arbitrators requiring legislation will only be effective if such legislation is enacted ...