concurring.
I concur in the result. This record is devoid of support for the chancellor’s determination that the parties “did plan to marry.” Indeed, although appellee William Banko testified that he had hoped that he and appellant Gail Malanecki would eventually marry, it was appellee’s own testimony that appellant “didn’t want to get married.” Thus, it cannot be concluded that the proceeds from the sale of the former Banko residence were in any respect applied by appellee “in anticipation of . .. marriage.” DiFloridio v. DiFloridio 459 Pa. 641, 651, 331 A.2d 174, 180 (1975).*
*99As to appellee’s claim that he shared a “confidential relationship” with appellant, appellee’s own evidence established that his application of the proceeds was not pursuant to the plan or direction of appellant, but rather in accordance with his hope that his unilateral desire for marriage would more readily be shared by appellant. Because appellee’s own evidence affirmatively establishes that the transactions were unaffected by the claimed confidential relationship, see, e.g., Kees v. Green, 365 Pa. 368, 375, 75 A.2d 602, 605 (1950), appellee’s effort to set aside the transactions on a theory of confidential relationship is defeated. See 9 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 58:43 (1982).
Although the majority does not specifically address whether appellee is entitled to relief with respect to his satisfaction of appellant’s car loan and house mortgage, it is clear that the Superior Court properly denied appellee relief on these claims.