Intervenors-appellants appeal the district court’s orders sealing the affidavits of probable cause, closing partially *342a hearing on a motion to suppress and further prohibiting all law enforcement officers and all attorneys associated with defendant’s case from making any public statements about this criminal case. Intervenors are the publishers of daily newspapers in Vermont. They argue that the orders violate the First Amendment rights of the public to obtain information about the operation of the courts. We agree and reverse.
Defendant Gary Schaefer was arraigned on the charge of second-degree murder on May 10, 1984. He pled not guilty, and upon the request of his attorney, the court issued an order sealing the affidavit of probable cause to preserve defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights. The court’s order also prohibited all law enforcement officers and all attorneys associated with the case from making any statements “either at public meetings or proceedings intended for public reporting or dissemination” concerning the merits of the case, the evidence in the case, or any other matters that were not of record in the court.
On May 22,1984, appellants filed a “Motion to Intervene” and a “Motion for Relief from Order,” seeking access to the affidavit of probable cause. The trial court denied the motions without prejudice because appellants lacked any legal status within the pending criminal prosecution and because the motion to intervene was not supported by a memorandum of law as required by V.R.Cr.P. 47(a). Appellants then filed a motion for reconsideration, and an evidentiary hearing was held on this motion. The witnesses consisted of editors of appellant newspapers. Also admitted were newspaper stories about another murder prosecution against defendant for which he was convicted in December of 1983. The court refused to admit surveys taken by reporters for appellants based on random interviews of newspaper readers. In the interview, the reporter asked each person to answer the question: “Who is Gary Schaefer?”
Based on the evidence, the court made findings and denied the motion to reconsider. The court found that reporters for appellants had no familiarity with the standards established by the American Bar Association which prohibit the dissemination of pretrial criminal information if such release would pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial. The newspapers themselves have no standards or policy concerning what *343to print from pretrial proceedings except that they will not print libelous news. Essentially, the court found, the newspapers’ “guidelines are to go out and cover the story and whatever information is found becomes fair to report,” including the prior criminal record of the accused, the content of a defendant’s confession or admissions and the content of a defendant’s testimony during a suppression hearing. Furthermore, appellants have published such information in the past and would not withhold such information from publication if requested to do so. The court specifically noted that one of the newspapers had published defendant’s confession in the prior murder case “before trial of the case and even before the defendant was charged” and all of the newspapers, and the local television station, reported on the confession despite the pendency of a motion to suppress it. The court further found that these newspapers have widespread circulation and readership throughout Vermont, and, as a result, “[i]t is fair to say such a case as this would be almost totally published throughout the entire State.”
Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that “Defendant has demonstrated by clear necessity the need for the affidavit to remain sealed and that no reasonable alternatives exist to protect his right to a fair trial and an untainted jury pool.”2 The court relied on its finding that appellants would print the content of the affidavits of probable cause regardless of the effect of that publicity on defendant’s right to a fair trial and that there would be “wide spread, general publicity of the contents of the Affidavits” right up to the date of the trial. The court rejected the alternatives, concluding that a continuance was not possible, that change of venue would be of “little practical benefit” in the face of the statewide publicity and that no amount of voir dire would be effective where a juror knew of a suppressed statement by defendant.
As to the restrictive order, the court found that defendant had shown a “clear necessity” for such an order in light of the *344publicity. The court upheld the restrictive order, concluding it justified by the same facts that justified the sealing order.
Following the ruling on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court considered a motion to suppress statements made by defendant to the police. Defendant sought closure of the hearing on the motion, and appellants objected. Based on its findings in connection with the sealing order, the court ruled that closure was needed as to “questions and answers of an interrogatory interview with the Defendant.” The court’s ruling indicated that the content of that interview was set forth in the affidavit of probable cause so that partial closure necessarily followed from the sealing of the affidavit. The court added that a change of venue would require jury selection from persons that “don’t know anything about current events” and that intensive voir dire would not work because potential jurors are not always “totally frank about what they know about a case” and because they may recall what they read only after the start of the trial.
Following the hearing, the court granted the motion to suppress. The prosecutor dismissed the case in April of 1985.
Appellants make four arguments on appeal: (1) the proper standard for any restriction on qualified First Amendment access rights is a demonstration of a substantial probability of irreparable damage to defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights; (2) the court’s closure and sealing orders do not meet this standard because they are based upon presumed damage and not actual damage of defendant’s rights; (3) the court inadequately considered reasonable alternatives to closure and sealing; and (4) the restriction on extra-judicial statements (the “gag order”) is unjustified by the record and is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Although no party has contested the issue, we first look briefly at our jurisdiction in this case. We have held that the media may directly intervene in a criminal proceeding for purposes of seeking access to proceedings or papers. State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 468, 537 A.2d 422, 424 (1987). Once representatives of the media intervene, as they have here, they have standing to appeal to this Court from orders denying them access to papers or proceedings.
When the issues reach this Court, however, there is rarely a live controversy. This criminal case has been dismissed, *345and the reasons for sealing the papers or closing the proceedings have long passed. Nevertheless, we have held in a similar case that the circumstances fit an exception to the mootness doctrine for issues capable of repetition yet evading review. Id. at 469, 537 A.2d at 424-25. We agree that this case also fits the exception to the mootness doctrine although we caution that this is not a holding that all media access cases so fit. As discussed below, this appeal raises general questions about the proper standard to apply in balancing the right of access to criminal proceedings and documents against the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial. As the general questions are answered, however, these cases will become more fact specific, and the exact questions are less likely to recur in the future. Further, the lengthy delay between the trial court ruling and the action in this Court means that the trial courts often do not have the benefit of the latest decisions in this Court although there is no reason to believe that they would fail to follow them. See Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Morton, 862 F.2d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 1988). These considerations may warrant a conclusion that particular press access cases are moot when presented to this Court.
An understanding of appellants’ first argument requires a revisiting of our two decisions in the area of press access to judicial proceedings and records in criminal cases, State v. Tallman, supra, and Greenwood v. Wolchik, 149 Vt. 441, 544 A.2d 1156 (1988). A case similar to this one, Tallman involved access to an affidavit of probable cause and a pretrial suppression hearing. The significance of Tallman is very much in issue, however, because only a four-member Court rendered the decision and it split 2-to-2 on the major issues within it. The decision in State v. Tallman is really two opinions, agreeing on the result, but disagreeing on parts of the requisite analysis.
The opinions do agree on a general policy statement:
[W]e start with the presumption that pretrial proceedings and documents are open to the public, closure being the exception rather than the rule. This is because “[o]penness . . . enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.”
*346Tallman, 148 Vt. at 474, 537 A.2d at 427 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I)) (citation omitted). Hence, both opinions recognize that the press and public have a qualified right of access to pretrial suppression hearings and affidavits of probable cause, which must be balanced with defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Having recognized this qualified right of access, the Tallman Court split on the proper standard by which to evaluate sealing and closure orders. The opinion for the Court concluded that the proper standard should be derived from Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II). That standard is phrased as follows:
“If the interest asserted is the right of the accused to a fair trial, the preliminary hearing shall be closed [or document sealed] only if specific findings are made demonstrating that first, there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights.”
Tallman, 148 Vt. at 474, 537 A.2d at 428 (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14). The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Allen disagreed that the Press-Enterprise II standard was appropriate with respect to the closure of the suppression hearing and apparently with respect to the sealing of the probable cause affidavit. In his view, the difference lies in the nature of the suppression hearing and the probable cause affidavit in the criminal justice system and the risk of harm to the defendant’s fair trial rights. He concluded that a defendant seeking closure must only demonstrate that the right to a fair trial would likely be prejudiced by publicity generated by the suppression hearing. Id. at 476, 537 A.2d at 429. (Allen, C.J., concurring). He agreed with the opinion of the Court that the trial court must draw its order narrowly to preserve the competing interests, id. at 478, 537 A.2d at 430 (Allen, C.J., concurring), and agreed with the conclusion that the trial court failed to do so in the Tallman case.
Greenwood involved a challenge to the trial court’s allowance of press access to an affidavit of probable cause. The defendant *347requested that this Court limit its Tollman holding that the press has a qualified First Amendment right of access to the affidavit, drawing analogy to the secrecy of grand jury action where the case is started by indictment. We declined to modify the Tallman holding. 149 Vt. at 445, 544 A.2d at 1158. Because of the limited issue before us, we did not have to reach the standard for resolving the competing interests.
The first issue raised here seeks to define the proper standard that must be met before a court can seal an affidavit of probable cause or close a hearing where the contents of that affidavit will be disclosed. This is the issue that split the four-Justice Court in Tallman. In analyzing this question, we must be explicit on the source of the public’s access right to the probable cause affidavit. The Court in Tallman relied upon the common law right of access to court documents set forth in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978), although it later referred to a First Amendment right of access. Tallman, 148 Vt. at 472-73, 537 A.2d at 426-27. The decision by the Chief Justice in Greenwood referred to the “‘constitutional and common law right of access to court records and proceedings.’” 149 Vt. at 442, 544 A.2d at 1157 (quoting State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. at 472, 537 A.2d at 427). Most courts that have confronted the issue of access to judicial documents in criminal cases have held that the First Amendment creates a qualified right of access to most pretrial documents as well as to pretrial court proceedings. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1112 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Peters, 754 F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area—Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988); Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for W.D. of Wash., 845 F.2d 1513, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988). We read Tallman and Greenwood as adopting that holding at least with respect to affidavits of probable cause.
We have carefully examined the numerous opinions that have been handed down by state and federal courts since Tallman. Every court that has recognized a qualified First Amendment right of access to judicial records has held that sealing *348orders are valid only on a showing of “substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity” as required by Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, and the opinion for the Court in Tallman, 148 Vt. at 474, 537 A.2d at 428. See, e.g., In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1990); Oregonian Pub. Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990); Russell v. Miami Herald Pub. Co., 570 So. 2d 979, 982 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Similarly, every court that has found a qualified First Amendment right to attend a particular pretrial event has also found that closure of the event to the public can be done only where the Press-Enterprise II standard has been met. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 510 N.E.2d 313, 316-17, 517 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447-48 (1987); State ex rel. The Repository v. Unger, 28 Ohio St. 3d 418, 422, 504 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1986).3
Once we clearly ground the public right of access in the First Amendment, we find no relevant distinction between this case and Press-Enterprise II for purposes of establishing a standard for sealing or closure. The threat to defendant’s fair trial right is identical whether probable cause is determined based on an affidavit or based on an evidentiary hearing. We are persuaded by both this reasoning and the unanimity of authority from other courts that the Press-Enterprise II standard applies to the sealing of the probable cause affidavit and closing of the suppression hearing in this case.
*349Establishing the proper standard does not decide this case. There is no relevant difference between the standard used by the trial court and that set forth in the Court’s opinion in Tall-man. Although Tallman had not been decided when the trial court acted here, it clearly was aware that it had to find an overriding defendant interest and prejudice to that interest to seal the affidavit. Its “clear necessity” standard, although not phrased in the language of Tallman and Press-Enterprise II, makes clear that it found the necessary prejudice to warrant sealing of the affidavit. It would be an exercise of form over substance to require the trial court to reevaluate its conclusion in light of the specific Tallman standard.
Thus, we must reach appellants’ next argument that the sealing and closure orders cannot be upheld under the Tallman balancing standard. We start with appellants’ argument that defendant has failed to show a substantial probability of prejudice as a result of public access to the affidavit of probable cause.
If sealing the affidavit and closing the pretrial hearing were the only method available to protect defendant’s fair trial right from the effects of publicity, we would probably affirm the sealing and closure orders in this case. The probable cause affidavit contains information — that is, admissions by defendant to the police — that defendant sought to suppress. If the information were suppressed, it would be critical that potential jurors not know of the information. See Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d at 38, 510 N.E.2d at 316, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 447. There is no doubt that appellants would publish this information. There has been widespread publication of the fact that defendant has been convicted of murder of a young woman and has admitted to having committed a second murder of a young woman before this prosecution was commenced. The events arose in a relatively small town. See Newspapers of New England v. Clerk-Magistrate, 403 Mass. 628, 633, 531 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989) (fact that murder occurred in small rural community significant factor in support of closure).
There are also countervailing factors. The probable cause affidavit is filed at the very beginning of a case. It is likely to be many months before the case comes to trial. See Seattle Times v. United States Dist. Ct. for W.D. of Wash., 845 F.2d at 1518 *350(two months would elapse before trial). The press coverage up to the time of the hearing had been factual and not inflammatory. See id. at 1517 (pervasive pretrial publicity is not conclusive; publicity must create pattern of deep and bitter prejudice in community). However, the press regularly reported defendant’s earlier conviction and the events surrounding it. Defendant’s right to a fair trial would be threatened by jurors’ knowledge of his history. Thus, the added information contained in the probable cause affidavit may not be significant since any potential juror who read the earlier stories anyway could not sit. While the trial court was offered evidence to show the readership of the newspapers printed by appellants, there was a dearth of evidence on whether potential jurors who were unaware of the case could be found in the community.
We conclude, however, that the seal and closure orders run afoul of the second prong of the Tallman standard — that is, that such orders be issued only if alternatives that would adequately protect the defendant’s rights be unavailable. Tallman, 148 Vt. at 474, 537 A.2d at 428. Appellants argue that the trial court failed to weigh properly the alternatives that do exist.
The second prong of the Tallman test is derived from Press-Enterprise II. The Court in Press-Enterprise II stated:
But this risk of prejudice does not automatically justify refusing public access to hearings on every motion to suppress. Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some circumstances, a court can identify those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an impartial verdict. And even if closure were justified for the hearings on a motion to suppress, closure of an entire 41-day proceeding would rarely be warranted. The First Amendment right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity might deprive the defendant of that right. And any limitation must be “narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”
478 U.S. at 15 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510). The alternatives that needed to be considered here included partial disclosure, voir dire and change of venue. See Herald Ass’n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 534, 419 A.2d 323, 326 (1980).
We note at the outset that although the court’s primary concern was with the part of the affidavit that disclosed *351that defendant had made a statement that might be suppressed, the court considered the sealing motion as an all or nothing proposition. Pretrial publicity per se will not interfere with defendant’s fair trial right. Rather, interference comes from publicity that may inflame and prejudice the whole community and prevent the impanelling of an unbiased jury. See Seattle Times v. United States Dist. Ct. for W.D. of Wash., 845 F.2d at 1517. Obviously, not all of the information in the affidavit could have such an effect. The court, then, if it orders sealing at all, must consider first redacting the portions of the affidavit that create the substantial probability of prejudice to defendant’s fair trial right and releasing the remainder. See In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d at 129. A court rejecting the appropriateness of redaction must make “specific reasons and findings on the record,” id., a step not taken by the trial court here.
We also note that the court ordered a permanent sealing of the probable cause affidavit. As a result, the press still has not gained access to the affidavit, though the State dismissed this case years ago. A sealing order should not extend beyond the time necessary to protect defendant’s fair trial rights. See Herald Ass’n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. at 534-35, 419 A.2d at 326-27 (order that extends beyond time necessary to protect defendant’s fair trial right is void).
We cannot conclude, however, that either redaction or a time limit would have been sufficient to protect the public access right in this case. While the trial court considered the alternatives of voir dire and change of venue, it dismissed them summarily without serious consideration. We believe that the alternatives were not properly evaluated under Press-Enterprise II.
As a basic principle, voir dire is the normal and preferred method of combating any effects of pretrial publicity. In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 855 (4th Cir. 1989). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted:
Since the inception of our criminal justice system, courts have acknowledged the utility of skillfully conducted voir dire as a means of ascertaining a prospective juror’s impartiality. ... “[T]esting” by voir dire remains a preferred and effective means of determining a juror’s impartiality and assuring the accused of a fair trial.
*352United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 973 (3d Cir. 1984). Of course, publicity about a case may be so pervasive and damaging that voir dire is ineffective to combat it.
We cannot conclude that the potential publicity in this case, especially if combined with a change of venue, would rise to the level where voir dire would be ineffective. Although we share the trial court’s concern that potential jurors who have read about defendant’s confession would have difficulty being open-minded, there is no evidence to show that a jury free of such persons could not be drawn in the district in which the case is heard, and the trial court made no finding on this issue.4 We do not believe that the fact that the case is covered by newspapers with statewide circulation means that there will be widespread knowledge of the facts reported in all areas of the state or even in the community where the crime occurred. While the evidence of publicity here was greater than what we categorically rejected as insufficient in Greenwood v. Wolchik, 149 Vt. at 445, 544 A.2d at 1158-59 (evidence consisted of two front-page stories in the local newspaper and a showing that this newspaper reached half the homes in the county), it is not sufficient to show that voir dire would be ineffective. Ironically, the only direct evidence of community knowledge of the case — that is, the survey conducted by the newspapers — was rejected by the trial court.
Nor can we accept the additional reasons proffered by the trial court to reject reliance on voir dire — that jurors would not remember the newspaper accounts until after they were impanelled and that potential jurors are not always candid. Such reasoning amounts to a total rejection of the use of voir dire to avoid impanelling prejudiced jurors. We believe that skillful voir dire can overcome these problems.
We also believe that the trial court erred in dismissing the effect of a change of venue in this case. The trial court had *353granted a change of venue in defendant’s earlier murder trial, and the need for one was probably greater in this case. In evaluating the sealing decision, the court needed to consider whether a change of venue was otherwise likely or should be ordered to respond to the potential prejudice from disclosure of the information in the probable cause affidavit. The court did so only perfunctorily, concluding that since the publicity was statewide, the same probability of prejudice existed throughout the state. As our discussion above indicates, we cannot equate publicity with widespread knowledge among potential jurors. It may be in most cases that persons remote from the scene are less likely to read about a crime and that the stories will be less obvious — for example, they may be shorter, have smaller captions and/or be on pages less often read.
Having concluded that the sealing and closure orders cannot be upheld in view of the findings and record, we turn to the order that the lawyers and law enforcement officers not comment on the merits of the case or make statements “as to any evidence which has been secured in connection with this matter or any other matters that are not of record in the court.” Appellants attack this order under standards similar to those applicable to the sealing and closure orders.
We recognize in appropriate cases an order similar to that present here may be necessary to ensure that information contained in sealed documents or closed hearings is not leaked to the press. We also recognize that attorneys and those who work for them are restricted by ethical rules from making extrajudicial statements. See Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107; Florida Freedom Newspapers v. McCrary, 520 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1988). In view of the ethical restraints and the intrusion into the rights of the parties and their counsel, we do not believe that a nondisclosure order of this type is justified without a finding that, absent the order, one or more of the persons covered would make an improper disclosure. In re New York Times Co., 878 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1989). Further, the order must be narrowly tailored to cover only the improper disclosure that would occur in the absence of the order. See New York Times Co. v. Rothwax, 143 A.D.2d 592, 592-93, 533 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (1988); State ex rel. National Broadcasting Co. v. Court of Common Pleas, 52 Ohio St. 3d 104, 112, 556 N.E.2d *3541120, 1125 (1990). There was no finding of necessity here, and the order was overbroad. Even if we had not reversed the sealing order, we cannot affirm the order prohibiting statements about evidence in the case or other matters not of record.
Ordinarily, we would remand to enable the trial court to evaluate appellants’ motion under the standards we have announced herein. A remand is unnecessary here because the passage of time has made any sealing or closure orders inappropriate.
Reversed.
The court also concluded that the affidavit of probable cause was not a public record, and appellants had no right to have it disclosed. This basis for sealing affidavits of probable cause was rejected in State v. Tallman, 148 Vt. 465, 472, 537 A.2d 422, 426 (1987), and, therefore, has not been considered further in this opinion.
The concurrence cites two states where it asserts the courts have adopted different standards. The New Jersey case, State v. Halsey, 218 N.J. Super. 149, 153-55, 526 A.2d 1165, 1167 (1987), adopts no standard, holding rather that the result is the same whichever standard is used. The first Utah case, Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984), precedes Press-Enterprise II and adopts a standard for public access inconsistent with Press-Enterprise II. Since both it and Press-Enterprise II involve the same issue of access to a preliminary hearing, its holding on the standard question can not be taken to have survived Press-Enterprise II. The standard question was not in issue in the second Utah case, Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987); the issue was whether there was a right of access to a competency hearing under any circumstances. The court simply applied the holding of the first case to a different situation with no apparent awareness that the intervening decision in Press-Enterprise II made part of the prior holding erroneous. Indeed, Press-Enterprise II is never cited in the opinion.
In view of our disposition, we do not need to address whether the trial court can award defendant more peremptory challenges than the six provided in 12 V.S.A. § 1941 and V.R.Cr.P. 24(c)(3) in order to ensure a fair jury is impanelled. Nor need we determine whether a “struck jury” system might be implemented in an appropriate case. See State v. Halsey, 218 N.J. Super. at 162-64, 526 A.2d at 1171-72.