On November 18, 1982, a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County convicted Donald Thomas of the first degree murders of Donald Spurling and his wife, Sarah. At the same trial, Thomas was also found guilty of the first degree rape of Noel Wilkins, of committing two first degree sexual offenses upon Ms. Wilkins, and of robbing her at knife point. Having been previously given the required statutory notice that the death penalty would be sought for the first degree murders, Thomas elected to have the trial judge decide whether he should be executed for those crimes.
On December 13, 1982, Thomas was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Donald Spurling, death for the murder of Sarah Spurling, concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree rape and first degree sexual offenses, and a twenty-year consecutive sentence for the armed robbery. This Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court as to both the convictions and the sentences, including imposition of the death sentence. Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294, 483 A.2d 6 (1984). The Supreme Court of the United States denied Thomas’s petition for writ of certiorari. 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1856, 85 L.Ed.2d 153 (1985).
Thomas then filed a petition for post conviction relief. Thomas sought a new trial, or in the alternative, a new sentencing hearing. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the court found no merit in the claims that Thomas had been improperly convicted but vacated his *166death sentence and ordered a new sentencing hearing. This relief was granted because the court concluded that trial counsel had failed to render Thomas effective assistance when he permitted Thomas to be re-examined by Dr. Mi-chael Spodak following his convictions in preparation for Dr. Spodak’s testimony at the sentencing hearing.
The State applied for leave to appeal the court’s granting of a new sentencing hearing to Thomas. Thomas filed a cross-application to appeal the court’s denial of a new trial on the charges of which he had been convicted. We granted both applications on January 23, 1991.
I.
In an indictment filed on November 9, 1981, Thomas was charged with the crimes of which he now stands convicted. He entered pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and incompetency to stand trial. Pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.), Art. 59, §§ 23-28, the court ordered that he be transferred to the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center for a mental examination and evaluation.
Dr. Spodak, a member of the staff at Clifton Perkins, after conducting a psychiatric examination of Thomas, prepared a “psychiatric case work up report.” Reports were also prepared by one of the hospital’s social workers who had interviewed Thomas and by a clinical psychologist who related his findings upon his testing of Thomas. On February 4, 1982, Thomas appeared at a conference at Clifton Perkins attended by Dr. Spodak, the social worker who had interviewed him, the clinical psychologist who had tested him, and three other staff psychiatrists. Thomas was further interviewed at this conference. It was the unanimous opinion of the psychiatrists present at that conference that
“At the present time Mr. Thomas is able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense.”
“At the time of the alleged offenses, Mr. Thomas was not suffering from a mental disorder which caused him to *167lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”
Those conclusions were reported to the court, and Thomas was returned to the Baltimore County Jail.
In light of the Clifton Perkins evaluation, R. Clark Kinsley, Esq., the public defender assigned as Thomas’s trial counsel, arranged to have him examined by a psychiatrist of his choice, Dr. B.F. Beran. That examination produced no evidence with which to contest the evaluation of the Clifton Perkins staff, and Mr. Kinsley so advised the court at the outset of the trial on October 18,1982. The court concluded that Thomas was competent to stand trial. Thomas was then re-arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to all of the charges pending against him.
After the jury returned its verdicts, the State petitioned the court for permission to conduct a pre-sentence psychiatric evaluation of Thomas. It represented in that petition:
“1. That the Defendant was evaluated at the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center following his entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity;
“2. That the findings of the Hospital Center are contained in a report to the Court dated February 4, 1982;
“3. That it is desirable to supplement the original insanity evaluation with further interview(s) of the Defendant to develop material for presentation at sentencing;
“4. That Dr. Michael Spodak, who participated in the insanity evaluation, can conduct such further interview with the Defendant at the Baltimore County Detention Center and can do so within a few days of a court order authorizing such evaluation;
“5. That counsel for the Defendant has no objection to such an evaluation.”
The court granted that petition, and Dr. Spodak interviewed Thomas on November 27, 1982. Before the interview began, Dr. Spodak advised Thomas that he had been “retained by the State’s Attorney’s office ... to evaluate him on *168certain issues concerning the death penalty and that depending on what he said and depending on my findings, I might very well be called as a witness to testify at the sentencing phase.” Dr. Spodak also testified that Thomas indicated that he understood that explanation and was willing to be interviewed at that time.
Dr. Spodak wrote to the office of the State’s Attorney on November 30, 1982. He stated that based upon his several interviews with Thomas as a member of the staff of Clifton Perkins, the interview he conducted on November 27, and the review of records associated with the case he was of the opinion to a reasonable medical certainty that the murders of Donald and Sarah Spurling were not committed while the capacity of Thomas to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder, emotional disturbance or intoxication. He further opined that it is not unlikely that Thomas would engage in further criminal activities that would constitute a continuing threat to society. These opinions negated two possible circumstances which might mitigate against the death penalty pursuant to Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(g)(4) and (7).
At the sentencing hearing, the State called Dr. Spodak as a witness. Mr. Kinsley, who had been provided a copy of Dr. Spodak’s report to the State’s Attorney’s office on November 30, 1982, objected to any opinions being expressed by Dr. Spodak. He argued that he was under the impression that Dr. Spodak would interview Thomas as a neutral expert from the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center when he consented to the interview of Thomas following the jury's verdicts. He stressed that, had he been aware that Dr. Spodak had been employed by the State’s Attorney’s office to conduct that evaluation, he would not have consented to the evaluation. The court overruled the objection and admitted Dr. Spodak’s testimony and his November 30, 1982 report.
*169On direct appeal to this Court Thomas contended that the trial judge had erred in admitting this evidence since its admission violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). Distinguishing the instant case from Estelle, we held that the court properly admitted Dr. Spodak’s testimony and report and that the admission of this evidence did not violate Thomas’s Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thomas v. State, 301 Md. at 324-29, 483 A.2d at 22-24.
In his petition for post conviction relief, Thomas asserted that Kinsley, in allowing him to be interviewed without counsel by Dr. Spodak post-verdict and pre-sentence, had rendered him ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudicing him at sentencing in violation of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. At the post conviction hearing, Thomas called Kinsley as his witness and questioned him extensively on his rationale for allowing Thomas to be reexamined by Spodak. Kinsley explained that he believed that Spodak’s role in re-examining Thomas was that of a neutral expert from the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center, and that Spodak would therefore be impartial. He further testified that he instructed Thomas to cooperate fully with Spodak in the hope that something beneficial to Thomas might come from the examination. During cross-examination, the State attempted to elicit testimony from Kinsley regarding the results which he had received of Dr. Beran’s pretrial psychiatric examination of Thomas. The court sustained Thomas’s objection to that line of questioning. Following the conclusion of the hearing on August 15, 1990, the hearing judge considered memoranda submitted by the parties and on November 21, 1990, re-convened the hearing and rendered an oral opinion granting Thomas a new sentencing hearing but denying him any post conviction relief from his convictions.
II.
On appeal the State argues that Kinsley’s decision to permit Thomas to be interviewed by Dr. Spodak without *170counsel present was a tactical decision which does not constitute the basis for post conviction relief. Alternatively, the State contends that the hearing judge erred in excluding testimony from Kinsley as to what he had learned from Dr. Beran’s psychiatric examination of Thomas, which knowledge was relevant to the reasonableness of his strategy in permitting the post-verdict, pre-sentence interview of Thomas by Dr. Spodak.
The standards by which we measure whether Thomas received assistance of counsel commensurate with the Sixth Amendment guarantee were promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The Court has since applied those standards in Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); and Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989). The Strickland court stated at 466 U.S. 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693:
“A convicted defendant’s claim that counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.”
The Court also emphasized that the critical basis of inquiry is not whether counsel committed a professional error but whether the defendant received a fundamentally fair trial:
*171“The Court has not elaborated on the meaning of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance in the latter class of cases — that is, those presenting claims of ‘actual ineffectiveness.’ In giving meaning to the requirement, however, we must take its purpose — to ensure a fair trial — as the guide. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result____ Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”
Id. at 686-689, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-694.
The Court also observed:
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1574-1575, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ *172See Michel v. Louisiana, supra, 350 U.S. [91], at 101, 76 S.Ct. [158], at 164 [100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)].”
Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-695. The Court commented upon the important policy considerations which mandate such a deferential review:
“The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel’s unsuccessful defense. Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be. adversely affected, intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between attorney and client.
“Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”
Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.
This court first applied the Strickland tests in Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 496 A.2d 1074 (1985). We revisited its teachings in State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 509 A.2d 1179 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), rehearing denied, 479 U.S. 1060, 107 S.Ct. 942, 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987); State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 548 A.2d 506 (1988); and Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1990).
In the instant case, the State contends that the post conviction court mis-applied the Strickland tests in evaluating Kinsley’s decision to permit Thomas, without counsel, to be interviewed by Dr. Spodak for the purpose of preparing Dr. Spodak to testify at the sentencing hearing. It argues that this decision was a reasonable tactical determination undertaken in the hope that some favorable psy*173chiatric evidence might be obtained for use at the sentencing hearing. Alternatively, the State asserts that the post conviction court committed reversible error when it sustained Thomas’s objection to the State’s attempt to elicit from Kinsley his understanding of the results of Dr. Beran’s psychiatric evaluation. This information, the State posits, was necessary to any fair evaluation of Kinsley’s strategy. Because we agree with the State’s alternative contention, we shall vacate the judgment granting partial post conviction relief and remand the case for admission of that excluded testimony and further consideration, in light of that evidence, of the reasonableness of Kinsley’s decision to permit Dr. Spodak’s post-verdict, pre-sentence interview.
The Supreme Court stressed in Strickland that “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 (emphasis added). Applying this standard in the instant case, it is clear that without Kinsley’s testimony concerning his understanding of the results of Dr. Beran’s examination of Thomas prior to trial, the post conviction court could not fairly or accurately determine whether Kinsley’s decisions in connection with the Spodak interview were deficient under the first prong of the Strickland test. For example, if Kinsley had been told by Dr. Beran that Thomas suffered from no mental impairments and exhibited the likelihood of future danger to society, then Kinsley’s decision to allow further examination in the hope of obtaining a favorable diagnosis may well have been reasonable. Accordingly, we hold that the post conviction court erred in preventing Kinsley from testifying as to what he had already learned from Dr. Beran about Thomas’s mental state at the time he gave permission for Thomas to be interviewed by Spodak.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the notion advanced by Thomas that any conclusions reached by Dr. Beran were protected from disclosure by Kinsley because of *174the attorney-client privilege since they necessarily were based on his interviews with Thomas. Md.Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 9-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: “A person may not be compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege.” This statute is declarative of the well-settled common law rule which had been recognized in this State prior to its enactment by Chapter 2, § 1 of the Acts of 1973, 1st Spec.Sess. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 135, 345 A.2d 830, 838 (1975). The communications between Thomas and Dr. Beran, were within the attorney-client privilege since Dr. Beran was then acting as an agent for Mr. Kinsley, who required the psychiatrist’s services in order to prepare his client’s defense. State v. Pratt, 284 Md. 516, 520, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (1979). Notwithstanding the privileged nature of these communications and the opinions reached by the psychiatrist based upon them, we adopt the universally accepted rule that the privilege is waived by the client in any proceeding where he or she asserts a claim against counsel of ineffective assistance and those communications, and the opinions based upon them are relevant to the determination of the quality of counsel’s performance. U.S. v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); Tasby v. U.S., 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1974); State v. Taylor, 327 N.C. 147, 393 S.E.2d 801, 805 (1990); Petition of Gillham, 216 Mont. 279, 704 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1985); Gall v. Com., 702 S.W.2d 37, 44-45 (Ky.1985); State v. Moreno, 128 Ariz. 257, 625 P.2d 320, 323 (1981); Logston v. State, 266 Ind. 395, 363 N.E.2d 975, 977 (1977); Peppers v. Balkcom, 218 Ga. 749, 130 S.E.2d 709, 711 (1963); Waitkus v. Mauet, 157 Ariz. 339, 757 P.2d 615, 616 (App.1988); In re Gray, 123 Cal. App.3d 614, 617, 176 Cal.Rptr. 721, 723 (1981); Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 91, at 220-21 (3d ed. 1984); Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 517, at 129 (14th ed. 1987); 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2327(6), at 638 (McNaughton ed. 1961); Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 503.12, at 494-95 (1987). As we *175explained earlier, what Dr. Beran related to Mr. Kinsley with regard to his psychiatric evaluation of Thomas was highly relevant to the reasonableness of the strategy employed by Kinsley in agreeing to permit Dr. Spodak to interview Thomas. Consequently, we hold that the attorney-client privilege did not prevent Kinsley’s disclosure of Dr. Beran’s psychiatric evaluation of Thomas.
III.
The post conviction court granted Thomas a new sentencing hearing on the sole ground that his trial counsel had rendered him ineffective assistance when he allowed Thomas to be interviewed alone by Dr. Spodak. At the post conviction hearings, Thomas had presented evidence and argument in support of several alternative grounds upon which he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. These grounds were rejected by the hearing judge. Before us, Thomas again urges that any of these grounds support the court’s order that he be provided a new sentencing hearing.
Preliminarily, the State argues that these issues were not presented in either the application of the State or the cross application of Thomas for leave to appeal from the order of the post conviction court and, therefore, that they are not properly before us. We disagree.
Each of the issues were discussed in the response which Thomas filed to the State’s application for leave to appeal the partial grant of post conviction relief. Maryland Rule 8-306(e), which governs review by this Court in capital cases states that Md.Rule 8-204, which regulates applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, shall govern appeals of post conviction proceedings in capital cases except that the application shall be filed in this Court. When we granted the State’s application for leave to appeal from the order granting a new sentencing hearing, we did not limit the issues on appeal in any way.
Md.Rule 8-204(g) provides that if an application for leave to appeal is granted, further proceedings “shall be conduct*176ed pursuant to this Title and as if the order granting leave to appeal were a notice of appeal filed pursuant to Rule 8-202.” Thus, if this case were before the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to a notice of appeal, that court could affirm the post conviction court’s order “on any ground adequately shown by the record (and even though the ground was not relied on by the [post conviction judge]).” J.L Case Credit Corp. v. Insley, 293 Md. 483, 487, 445 A.2d 689, 691 (1982). Consequently, we hold that Thomas is entitled to seek affirmance of the grant of partial post conviction relief on any alternative grounds not relied upon by the hearing judge.
A.
Thomas contends that his election to be sentenced by the court rather than by the jury which had convicted him of the first degree murders of Donald and Sarah Spurling was not a knowing and intelligent one. He bases this contention on the fact that the verdict sheet which would have been employed by the jury in any sentencing proceeding would have been identical to the one which was in issue in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). In Mills the Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because it concluded that under the verdict sheet and the instructions of the trial court as to how it was to be completed there was a substantial risk that the jurors might have been misled into believing that they could only consider a circumstance mitigating against the imposition of death if they unanimously agreed that such circumstance had been established by the evidence. Id. 486 U.S. at 384, 108 S.Ct. at 1870,100 L.Ed.2d at 400. Consequently, Thomas asserts that his only option was to be sentenced by the court or under an unconstitutional procedure before a jury.
We, like the hearing judge, are unpersuaded. Thomas’s argument presumes that the jury which would have sentenced him would have been incorrectly instructed on the employment of the verdict sheet as was the jury in Mills. *177See Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 54, 527 A.2d 3, 13 (1987) cert. granted, 484 U.S. 975, 108 S.Ct. 484, 98 L.Ed.2d 483 (1987), and vacated, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). That sheer speculation does not entitle Thomas to relief from the court imposed death sentence.
B.
Thomas next contends that the State misled Mr. Kinsley into consenting to his post-verdict, pre-sentence interview with Dr. Spodak by not advising Kinsley that Spodak would be paid for his services by the office of the State’s Attorney rather than as a member of the staff of Clifton Perkins. The hearing judge after weighing disputed testimony as to who said what to Mr. Kinsley, expressly found that there was no deception by the State in connection with procuring Kinsley’s consent. That conclusion was not clearly erroneous. Md.Rule 8-131(c).
C.
Thomas also submits that the post conviction relief granted him was proper because of an inappropriate relationship existing between the State and Dr. Spodak at the time of Thomas’s sentencing. Specifically, Thomas argues that evidence introduced at the post conviction hearing demonstrated that Spodak was an “agent” of the State. Thomas asserts that in light of this special relationship, Spodak should not have been permitted to testify at the post conviction hearing, and that his participation in the pretrial evaluation of Thomas was improper.
The short answer to Thomas’s contention is that this issue has been finally litigated. Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(b). On direct appeal, this Court considered the question of whether there was an inappropriate relationship between Spodak and the State such that Spodak’s testimony was biased and therefore inadmissible. We held that “[Thomas’s] objection was one going to the weight, rather than the admissibility____ [Accordingly we *178[found] no error in the admission of this evidence.” Thomas, supra, 301 Md. at 328, 483 A.2d at 23. As to whether there was an inappropriate relationship between the State and Dr. Spodak at the time of Thomas’s pretrial evaluation which allegedly tainted his testimony at the sentencing hearing, Thomas presented no evidence at the post conviction hearing which even remotely indicates such an improper relationship.
D.
Thomas next asserts that Mr. Kinsley rendered ineffective assistance at his sentencing because he: 1) failed to comprehend fully the relevancy of evidence concerning mental impairment of the defendant in a death sentence proceeding; and 2) neglected to consult with a psychiatrist or psychologist prior to the sentencing hearing because he felt that Dr. Spodak “was in effect [his] psychiatrist.”
With regard to Thomas’s contention that Kinsley failed to understand the relevancy of evidence dealing with mental impairment of the defendant, this Court’s review on Thomas’s direct appeal of the evidence presented in mitigation refutes this argument:
“In the instant case, appellant introduced evidence that he had a below normal IQ and had suffered a serious head injury during his early teens; that he was the product of a broken home and had been a victim of child abuse; that his mother was a chronic alcoholic who died when appellant was a teenager; and that his father deserted the family early on. It was also shown that appellant fathered two children and has a history of drug and alcohol abuse. Prior to the murders, appellant had been convicted in 1976 for robbery.
“In passing sentence upon appellant, the court considered all of these factors. It found that his family background was a mitigating circumstance under § 413(g)(8). The court also accepted appellant’s claim, made during closing argument, that he had a ‘mental age’ of 14 or 15, though no such evidence was presented.”
*179Thomas, supra at 332, 483 A.2d at 26 (footnote omitted). Thus, under these circumstances, we hold that Kinsley’s conduct was that of a reasonably competent attorney, and that Thomas has failed to demonstrate under the Strickland test that Kinsley’s actions were deficient.
On the issue of whether Kinsley rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to consult with another psychiatrist or psychologist prior to Thomas’s sentencing, we hold in accordance with Part II of this opinion that without the admission of evidence revealing what Kinsley knew from Dr. Beran’s pre-trial psychiatric evaluation of Thomas, a court cannot fully evaluate Kinsley’s effectiveness in this regard.
E.
Thomas next maintains that imposing the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights1 since he has an I.Q. of 73 and organic brain damage. Thomas argues that even though the Supreme Court of the United States has held it is not necessarily a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution2 to execute a mentally retarded person,3 the Maryland Declaration of Rights may include protections not found in corresponding provisions of the United States Constitution. In support of this argument Thomas points out that in 1989, the General Assembly amended the prescribed punishments for murder *180to prohibit the imposition of a death sentence upon a person who was mentally retarded at the time of the crime.4 Accordingly, Thomas urges this Court to interpret Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as prohibiting imposition of the death penalty upon those who are mentally retarded.
Initially, we note that Thomas may have waived this issue by failing to raise it on his direct appeal of his conviction to this Court. Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(c); Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 150-51, 395 A.2d 464, 474-75 (1978).
Nonetheless, assuming the issue is properly before us, we observe that Thomas does not fall within the statutory definition of a mental retardate. Pursuant to Md.Code (1957 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 412(e)(3), a person is deemed to be mentally retarded if
“the individual has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as evidenced by an intelligence quotient of 70 or below on an individually administered intelligence quotient test and impairment in adaptive behavior, and the mental retardation is manifested before the individual attains the age of 22.” (emphasis added).
Thomas’s I.Q. is 73.
F.
Finally, Thomas claims that even if the State’s failure to disclose police records on Donald Spurling did not entitle him to a new trial (see Part IV, B. infra), the withholding of the information entitled him to a new sentencing hearing. In order for Thomas to prove such a claim, he must demonstrate that there is a substantial possibility that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense his sentence would have been different. Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990). Based *181on our review of the record in this case, we hold that Thomas has failed to make such a showing.
In Thomas’s prosecution, the State sought two sentences of death for the murders of Donald and Sarah Spurling. While a sentence of death was imposed for Sarah Spurling’s murder, a life sentence was imposed for the murder of Donald Spurling. In pronouncing sentence for the murder of Donald Spurling, it is clear that the trial judge fully-considered the mitigating circumstances connected with Donald Spurling’s aggressive traits. In his discussion of mitigating factors guiding his decision, the trial judge indicated that he recalled that Spurling used violence in collecting a $15.00 or $20.00 debt owed to him by Sam Houseman, who testified at trial. Moreover, in describing his understanding of what took place at Spurling’s house at the time of the murder the trial judge stated:
“Something happened which still, honestly, has me perplexed. The defendant says Mr. Spurling stabbed him in the leg for no apparent reason, as he puts it, as I recall. Be that as it may, the retaliation by the defendant far exceeded that which was necessary from the multiple stab wounds, it is quite apparent, if that occurred. I don’t know what occurred. It is the stated theory that there was some discussion about doing a job or something like that, but, whatever triggered this, I don’t know, and I don’t want to speculate when this man’s life is in jeopardy.”
As to Sarah Spurling’s murder, we find nothing in the police reports concerning Donald Spurling’s aggressive behavior that is relevant to the sentence of death imposed. Whatever conduct by Donald Spurling which might have provoked Thomas to kill him certainly did not mitigate Thomas’s murder of Sarah.
IV.
In his cross-appeal Thomas contends that the post conviction court erred in refusing to grant him a new trial on his *182guilt or innocence of the crimes of which he was convicted. His cross appeal is based on two grounds.
A.
Thomas claims that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to preserve for appellate review the trial court’s refusal to strike certain prospective jurors for cause. Only two of the veniremen who were challenged, Frederick Schwenker and Robert Siperek, actually served on the jury that convicted Thomas. On his direct appeal, we refused to review Thomas’s unsuccessful challenges for cause because he used only 16 of the 20 peremptory challenges to which he was entitled, and at the conclusion of the jury selection process, he stated that the jury as impanelled was acceptable to him. Thomas v. State, 301 Md. at 310, 483 A.2d at 14-15.
Assuming that Mr. Kinsley’s failure to preserve Thomas’s challenges of jurors for cause constituted deficient performance sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, we hold that Thomas has failed to satisfy his burden under the second prong of that test to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s errors prejudiced his defense.5
Thomas alleges that had this Court reached the jury selection issues raised on Thomas’s direct appeal, there is a reasonable probability that we would have reversed his convictions. Thomas bases this assertion on the premise that the trial court erred in refusing to strike a number of prospective jurors for cause. Specifically, he claims that the trial judge erred in failing to strike 14 veniremen due to *183their views on interracial sex,6 and because some were prepared to give greater credence to the testimony of a police officer than to that of a civilian witness.
Initially, we note that the prejudice component of Strickland “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. ” State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 441, 509 A.2d 1179, 1185-86 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), rehearing denied, 479 U.S. 1060, 107 S.Ct. 942, 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987) citing Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 (emphasis added). Strickland makes clear that a mere possibility that an error had some conceivably adverse effect on the defense is not enough:
“Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense.
“It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet that test, and not every error that conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the result of the proceeding.”
466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697 (citation omitted). What is required is that the defendant must show that there is a substantial possibility that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bowers v. State, 320 Md. at 426-27, 578 A.2d at 739.
Thus, in a case such as this one, where a claimant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to preserve issues concerning jury selection, claimant must show that there is a substantial possibility that the *184specified prejudice influenced the jury impanelled. Merely speculating as to how jurors who did not serve would rule, or hypothesizing about alternative use of peremptory challenges on jurors who did not serve is insufficient. The focus of the reviewing court in examining the prejudice component of Strickland in such cases must rest solely on those jurors who actually served. Cf Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 191, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1636, 68 L.Ed.2d 22, 30 (1981) (refusal of particular voir dire inquiry necessitates reversal only where these is a reasonable possibility that the refusal may have influenced jury); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 420, 583 A.2d 218, 234 (1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed.2d 86 (1991) (striking of prospective juror for insufficient cause not reversible error where unobjectionable jury obtained).
In the instant case, Thomas alleges erroneous rulings by the trial judge on his challenges for cause with respect to only two people who actually served on the jury. He contends that Mr. Schwenker and Mr. Siperek should have been excused for cause based on their comments on interracial sex. Specifically, Thomas states that Schwenker said that he would object to his daughter marrying a black man, and Siperek admitted that he disapproves of sex between a black man and a white woman because he “was brought up that way.” Thomas also asserts that Siperek should have been excused because he was prepared to accord special deference to the testimony of police officers. A review of the actual responses from these two jurors, however, reveals that Thomas’s characterizations of their answers is taken out of the context in which they were elicited, and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Thomas’s challenge of them for cause.
The following colloquy between Schwenker and Kinsley is illustrative:
“MR. KINSLEY: I have a few more questions. How do you feel about sex between a black man and a white woman? Do you approve it or disapprove it?
*185MR. SCHWENKER: It is their affair.
MR. KINSLEY: That is not the answer to the question though. How do you feel about it?
MR. SCHWENKER: I think I have indicated to you that is their affair, and it is fine by me. It is not my business.
MR. KINSLEY: Do you approve it or disapprove it?
MR. SCHWENKER: I don’t have an answer for you and you can wait all afternoon, but I think we are at an impasse on that. I have told you it is not my concern what people do in the privacy of their bedroom, as I would believe it is not the concern of someone else what I do in the privacy of my bedroom____
MR. KINSLEY: Do you have any black friends?
MR. SCHWENKER: Yes, I do.
MR. KINSLEY: Do you have them in your home socially?
MR. SCHWENKER: Occasionally.
MR. KINSLEY: Ever go to their homes?
MR. SCHWENKER: Occasionally.
MR. KINSLEY: How often is occasionally?
MR. SCHWENKER: How often?
MR. KINSLEY: Yes.
MR. SCHWENKER: On the order of two, possibly three, times a year.
MR. KINSLEY: Would you have any objection to your 18-year old daughter going out with a black man?
MR. SCHWENKER: No.
MR. KINSLEY: Would you have any objection to her marrying a black man?
MR. SCHWENKER: It is her choice.
MR. KINSLEY: It is a good question.
MR. SCHWENKER: It is her choice.
MR. KINSLEY: Oh, her choice. Well, that isn’t the answer. Would you have any objection to her marrying a black man?
MR. SCHWENKER: Yes.
*186MR. KINSLEY: Why?
MR. SCHWENKER: It might make it rough on her for the rest of her life.
MR. KINSLEY: Why?
MR. SCHWENKER: If she understands all the problems, I would be willing to concede.
MR. KINSLEY: What problems?
MR. SCHWENKER: Getting along with the rest of society.
MR. KINSLEY: In what way?
MR. SCHWENKER: Acceptance.
MR. KINSLEY: Why acceptance?
MR. SCHWENKER: I think everybody understands.
MR. KINSLEY: No, we don’t. You tell us.
MR. SCHWENKER: I think it is commonly known.
MR. KINSLEY: Tell us what you know.
MR. SCHWENKER: There are difficulties in today’s society in the United States with acceptance in mixed marriage.
MR. KINSLEY: You would disapprove for that reason?
MR. SCHWENKER: Unless I was convinced otherwise they could make it.
MR. KINSLEY: But you have a personal bias of your own, don’t you?
MR. SCHWENKER: No.
MR. KINSLEY: You personally would accept him; is that right?
MR. SCHWENKER: Yes.”
Similarly, there is no basis upon which to hold that juror Siperek should have been excluded for his remarks on interracial sex. When first asked about his feelings concerning “sex between a black man and a white woman,” Siperek responded that “it doesn’t matter to me, really it doesn’t.” Later, when pressed to chose between approving and disapproving, Siperek said that he disapproved because he “was brought up that way.” He emphatically denied, *187however, that he was “brought up to have prejudice against black people.” Instead, Siperek explained that his disapproval of interracial sex was based on his concern that “any kid; would come out of it, they would have a hard time the rest of their lives, I think.” Moreover, regardless of his disapproval, Mr. Siperek stated that he could accept the testimony of a defendant who claimed that a white woman liked sex with black men.
Thomas also asserts that Siperek should have been dismissed for cause based upon his answers to questions regarding the superior credibility of police officers. Again, a review of the colloquy between Kinsley and Siperek belies that assertion:
“Mr. Kinsley: If it came to pass that you were called upon to consider who was lying, a police officer or the Defendant with a criminal record, setting aside all other considerations you may have heard in the case, would you believe the police officer over the Defendant with a criminal record simply because he is a police officer?
Mr. Siperek: That is a hard one to answer.
Mr. Kinsley: I am only asking hard ones. This is hard ball.
Mr. Siperek: To tell you the truth, I would probably lean toward the officer____
Mr. Kinsley: Do you think a cop, a police officer, would take the stand and lie? Could you accept that as a possibility?
Mr. Siperek: I guess. Everyone I guess could.
Mr. Kinsley: Could you accept the possibility of evidence directed to the fact that the police would actually stage a crime, in other words, make a situation look like a crime is committed when it wasn’t?
Mr. Siperek: Yes.
Mr. Kinsley: Do you think they could do that?
Mr. Siperek: Sure.
Mr. Kinsley: Have you ever known of a police officer to lie on the stand?
*188Mr. Siperek: Not personally.
Mr. Kinsley: How about from others? You have read about it?
Mr. Siperek: I have read about it in the papers.
Mr. Kinsley: Very good. I have no further questions.” Following this line of inquiry, the State inquired of the juror:
“Mr. Brennan: ... Mr. Siperek, if you were chosen as a member of the jury could you consider all of the evidence of all of the witnesses and all of the exhibits that may be put into evidence, consider those factors and apply the law as instructed by the Court in rendering your decision in this case?
Mr. Siperek: Yes.”
In sum, a review of Thomas’s complaints levied against the two jurors who served reflects no showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial judge that would have resulted in a reversal of his convictions on direct appeal.
B.
The second contention made by Thomas in his cross-appeal is that the State failed to disclose evidence in its possession which was material to his defense, thereby denying him due process of law under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
In preparing for Thomas’s jury trial, Kinsley sought to obtain evidence that Donald Spurling was a violent person or that Spurling had a criminal record. Such evidence was relevant to Thomas's claim that he killed Spurling in self-defense after Spurling attacked him because he refused to perform a contract murder. To this end, Kinsley subpoenaed all employment and/or criminal records from the Maryland State Police pertaining to Spurling, who formerly was employed as a trooper with that agency. In response, the State Police turned over no records indicating that Spurling was involved in any violent or criminal activity.
*189Later, after Thomas filed a petition for post conviction relief, his post conviction counsel was able to obtain from the State Police several reports about Spurling which had not been produced previously. These records indicated that the State Police had generated reports regarding Spurling after his death and prior to the date Kinsley first subpoenaed the State Police records. The records were the product of an investigation of Spurling conducted by Sergeant Charles R. Mazzone of the Internal Affairs Division of the State Police. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether there was any connection between Spur-ling’s murder and a theft of a large quantity of marijuana from police custody while Spurling was a trooper. The investigation disclosed that after he left the State Police, Spurling had been involved in an illegal loan sharking operation in which Spurling acted as a debt collector, and that on one occasion while so employed he broke a reluctant debtor’s arm. During the post conviction hearing it was also discovered that Thomas Basham, the lead Assistant State’s Attorney who prosecuted Thomas, was aware of the investigation and had spoken to Sergeant Mazzone about the investigation prior to Thomas’s trial. In light of these discoveries, Thomas contends that the conduct of the State Police and Basham violated their constitutional duty to produce exculpatory evidence under Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. Thomas also asserts, as he must, that these records were material to his defense within the meaning of Brady.
With respect to the issue of materiality, Thomas notes that “at trial, Mr. Kinsley made the facially implausible argument that Mr. Spurling — an ex-policeman — attacked Thomas because Thomas failed to accept a murder contract that Mr. Spurling had proposed.” Thomas contends that if Kinsley had seen the reports he could have pursued and developed Spurling’s involvement in illegal loan sharking and his violent activities in connection with those activities. Thomas maintains that had any of these lines of inquiry borne fruit, Thomas’s self-defense claim would have been *190based on substantial evidence of Mr. Spurling’s violent character and underworld activities rather than Thomas’s seemingly implausible and self-serving testimony. As to Sarah Spurling’s killing, Thomas argues that, had the State Police information been produced, the jury might have been more likely to accept his explanation that he killed her in a panicked frenzy as a result of Mr. Spurling’s attack on him. We disagree.
The proper standard to apply in evaluating whether the State’s failure to produce evidence pursuant to Brady warrants overturning a defendant’s conviction is well established. Evidence is considered material, and relief is therefore appropriate, if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 462-63, 509 A.2d 1179, 1196-97 (1086), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), rehearing denied, 479 U.S. 1060, 107 S.Ct. 942, 93 L.Ed.2d 992 (1987).7 In the instant case, we discern no substantial possibility8 that, had the police reports been revealed to Thomas’s counsel, the result of his trial would have been any different.
The most damning information about Spurling contained in the Sergeant Mazzone’s reports for the State Police was that Spurling was involved in an illegal loan sharking venture and that he was enforcing and collecting loans from people indebted to this operation. Specifically, Sergeant Mazzone wrote:
*191“one week prior to the murder, Trooper 1/C Jane D. Kulp had received a telephone call from Donald Spurling. He informed her that he had received a threatening telephone call from an individual known as Don Thomas, a black male, approximately 23 years old. Spurling requested that Trooper 1/C Kulp check into Thomas’ background and let him know the results. No such check ever occurred, instead, Trooper 1/C Kulp simply filed her notations considering the inquiry as not legitimate. Trooper 1/C Kulp revealed that she had been a friend of Spurling and had continued to talk with him after he left the agency. She further related the contents of discussions she had with him during those months preceding the murders.
“Trooper 1/C Kulp had been informed by Donald Spur-ling that he had been ‘roughing people up’ to collect money for an individual known only as Greenie. This individual would let Spurling know a few days in advance of the identity of the individual from whom he was to collect. Spurling boasted about making $1000 from Greenie in a single week. He also mentioned a future collection job where he (Spurling) would make $1200 by roughing someone up. Spurling reportedly had been collecting for Greenie for about a year and the most severe injury he inflicted (to others) had been a broken arm. There was some indication that from time to time Greenie would loan Spurling money as the need would arise.
“On October 30, 1981, information was received from a past proven reliable informant that the individual Greenie was a white male aged in his 60’s who had retired from the Teamsters Union. He lived on Southwestern Blvd., in Arbutus and frequented the Arbutus Pool Hall. Approximately one week prior to the murder, Spurling and Greenie reportedly confronted two black males while armed with a handgun and demanded money owed by them. This occurred in Baltimore City.
“On December 1, 1981, information was received from the FBI that two independent past proven reliable infor*192mants had told their agency that Greenie was the manager of the Arbutus Pool Hall and that both Donald Spur-ling and Donald Thomas were employed as collectors for Greenie’s operation. Many of the debts resulted from gambling which occurs at a second floor room located at Pratt and Monroe Streets above what once was Mastino’s Bar, in Baltimore City.”
While these reports do indicate Spurling’s willingness to engage in aggressive behavior, we do not believe that this evidence was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. First, Donald Spurling’s propensity to use force in collecting debts was already before the jury. Sam Houseman, a senior linesman for the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, testified for the defense that on the night before he was killed Spurling came to his house in the company of Thomas to collect a gambling debt; when Houseman told Spurling he could not pay, Spurling initiated a fist fight and “whopped” him. Second, the reports were not admissible at trial. The reports were written by Sgt. Mazzone and contained information based upon what Donald Spurling told Trooper Kulp about Spur-ling’s activities. The declarant, Donald Spurling, was not available to testify, and the out-of-court declarations contained in the report fall under no exceptions to the hearsay rule. Consequently, we hold that the reports were not material under Brady and that Thomas is not entitled to any post conviction relief because of the State’s failure to produce them.
JUDGMENT GRANTING NEW SENTENCING HEARING VACATED; JUDGMENT DENYING POST CONVICTION RELIEF FROM CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
. Article 16 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides: "That sanguinary Laws ought to be avoided as far as it is consistent with the safety of the State; and no Law to inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties ought to be made in any case, or at any time, hereafter."
. U.S. Const, amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (holding that as long as the sentencing body can consider and give full effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation, imposition of death sentence is not barred by Eighth Amendment).
. See Chapter 677 of the Acts of 1989 (codified as Md.Code (1957 Repl.Vol.1991 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 412(f)).
. The Supreme Court noted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699 (1984):
"The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”
. Thomas is black. The victim of the rape and first degree sexual offenses for which he was being tried is white. His defense to those charges was her alleged consent to sexual activity with him.
. In Bagley, the Supreme Court specifically relied on the Strickland standard in reformulating the test of "materiality" for Brady purposes. 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494.
. This standard reflects our interpretation of the "reasonable probability” language employed by the Supreme Court in Strickland. Bowers v. State, 320 Md. at 426-27, 578 A.2d at 739.