concurring.
Shortly after a large commercial airplane crashed at Lockerbie, Scotland, killing everyone on board, respondent Magdy F. Anis, and his brother, Fady F. Anis, sent a letter to Peter Lowenstein, whose son perished in the tragedy. The letter, which Mr. Lowenstein received on the day following the confirmation of his son’s death, invited Mr. Lowenstein to consider employing the Anis law firm to secure legal redress for his son’s death. Respondent’s letter also contained false and misleading statements relating to the lawyers’ qualifications for such professional services.
I concur in the Court’s determination that respondent engaged in misleading advertising that warrants professional discipline. I also share the Court’s dismay at respondent’s insensitivity in mailing such a letter to the parent of an accident victim. Although such conduct richly deserves the strongest kind of disapproval and criticism imaginable, my remaining concern is that the Court’s opinion may be misconstrued as an invitation to turn indecency or callousness into a critical factor in disciplinary matters involving attorney advertising.
This concern relates to the Court’s interpretation of the focus of the ethical prohibition contained in Rules of Professional Conduct 7.3(b)(1) (hereinafter “RPC’), which provides in pertinent part:
(b) A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
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(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer____
The Comment to RPC 7.3 states that the purpose of this rule is to prevent social harms such as harassment and overreaching, and that the circumstances under which the contact is initiated should be considered in determining whether such a violation occurs. Its focus is exclusively on the state of mind of the attorney sending the communication and indirectly on the *463presumed emotional or mental condition of the person receiving the communication. Other ethics rules govern the acceptability of other aspects of communications involving proposals of “professional employment,” including false or misleading statements. See RPC 7.1 and 7.2.
The Court, in characterizing respondent’s letter, states that “the commercial speech guarantees of the First Amendment do not protect attorney conduct that is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims of their families.” Ante at 458, 599 A.2d 1265. That interpretation properly indicates that RPC 7.3(b)(1) is concerned with important privacy interests of persons who may be considered potential clients. The Court’s emphasis on individual privacy interests, however, is also coupled with the notion of “common decency.” The Court reverses the determination of the Committee on Advertising, namely, that “a solicitation letter [that offends common decency] cannot constitute unethical conduct because it is a protected form of commercial speech.” Ante at 452, 599 A.2d 1265. According to the Court, the central issue in this case is whether the First Amendment prohibits an attorney’s “commercial speech” that “offends common decency.” Ibid.
I do not read the Court’s holding to suggest that “common decency” constitutes a determinative factor in assessing attorney conduct implicating commercial speech. Rather, I interpret the Court’s opinion to be that RPC 7.3(b)(1) focuses on the need to protect a class of persons, potential clients, from certain harmful forms of professional behavior. The prohibitions contained in the rule are designed to prevent attorneys from transforming personal tragedies into business opportunities generated at the public’s expense. It may be that the conduct involved in sending mailings to members of the public who are distraught and vulnerable because of tragedies in their lives is “beneath common decency.” That conduct should be prohibited *464because it is hurtful and invasive, not because it is indecent or contemptible.
We should not suggest that the gravamen of the misconduct under the rule is its lack of decency. A rule that could be interpreted to bar indecent or offensive advertising lacks the clarity of purpose necessary to preserve the protections that are afforded to commercial speech. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977). The basic standards for determining whether an attorney’s exercise of commercial speech violates the ethics rules governing advertising have been expressed by the United States Supreme Court in several cases: Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Comm., 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). The commercial speech of attorneys may be restricted only to advance a substantial governmental interest and only through means that directly advance that interest. Peel, 496 U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 2287, 110 L.Ed.2d at 94.
Although the State has a substantial interest in preventing attorney advertising that is false and misleading, it has no cognizable interest in preventing attorneys from engaging in advertising that only offends societal mores. Thus, in Zauderer, the Supreme Court expressed doubt that the state’s desire that their attorneys maintain “dignity” is “an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgement of their First Amendment rights.” 471 U.S. at 648, 105 S.Ct. at 2280, 85 L.Ed.2d at 670. In In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 104 N.J. 515, 518 A.2d 188 (1986), we faced a challenge to RPC 7.2(a), which required all attorney advertisements “to be presented in a dignified manner.” There we rejected the “dignity” standard, noting both the Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply the standard in Zauderer and the general difficulties involved with the application of such a standard. Id. at 547, 518 A.2d 188. The Court concluded that the same interests could be protected by requir*465ing all attorney advertisements to be “predominantly informational.”
Setting aside my disagreement with the implementation of that requirement, I agreed with the Court in Felmeister that the dignity, tastefulness or style of an advertisement should not be considered relevant as a regulatory standard. Felmeister, supra, at 564-65, 518 A.2d 188 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The only concerns that are relevant to restrictions on attorney advertising focused on the false or misleading nature of the communications or other substantial state interest:
A court should not have to fret about whether an advertisement appeals more to the heart than the mind. Instead, it should concentrate on whether an attorney’s advertisement may effectively serve the public by alerting some consumers to a previously unsuspected need for legal help ... [I]t is unlikely that attorneys will be able to engage with impunity in ... offensive advertising ... [a]s observed in [Grievance Comm. v.] Trantolo, supra, [192 Conn. 15] 470 A.2d [228] at 234, “[I]f some members of the audience find * * * [the advertisements] distasteful, such consumers might very well react by shunning the service offered, thereby implying an informed sanction more effective than any formal regulation.” [Id. at 565, 518 A.2d 188.]
The United States Supreme Court in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988), dealt with attorney commercial advertising in the form of direct mail solicitations. The Court fully recognized the heightened vulnerability of potential clients in certain settings. It opined that attorney mailings, even though targeted to persons with special needs, are far less overreaching than in-person solicitation because the latter entails the kind of immediate response and badgering not applicable to the former. Id. at 475, 108 S.Ct. at 1922, 100 L.Ed.2d at 486.
The Court in Shapero, however, did not immunize attorney advertising in the form of direct mailings from the reasonable restrictions that are allowed under the First Amendment. Although the Court expressed concern about well-intended, but overbroad, restrictions on free speech, it concluded that a blanket prohibition could not be placed on mailings to clients known to have particular legal needs. In that case, a member *466of the Kentucky Bar had applied to the State Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter that he wanted to send to “potential clients” against whom a foreclosure suit had been filed. The letter stated that “[f]ederal law may allow you to ... ORDE[R] your creditor to STOP,” and that “you may call my office for FREE information,” and that “[i]t may surprise you what I may be able to do for you.” The Court’s primary inquiry in Shapero was whether the mailings, which specifically targeted those known to need legal services and who were therefore overly susceptible to coercive pressures by lawyers, would allow lawyers to exploit that susceptibility. 486 U.S. at 474, 108 S.Ct. at 1922, 100 L.Ed.2d at 484-85. Thus, although the Court acknowledged that direct-mail solicitations were far less intrusive or offensive than in-person solicitations, they themselves presented opportunities to exploit client susceptibilities. However, the existence of such opportunities does not justify a total ban. Ibid. The instruction of Shapero is that the First Amendment limits a state’s ability to dictate the form and content by which an attorney solicits legal business, and that regulatory interference with attorney advertising may not be permitted absent a showing that a substantial state interest would be served by such regulation.
The Court recognizes that there is an important distinction between Shapero and the instant case that lies in the intrusiveness of the communication. It states that the lawyer’s conduct in the present case was so universally condemned that “its intrusiveness can hardly be disputed.” Ante at 456-457, 599 A.2d 1269-1270. The content of the letter, considered in the context in which it was sent, renders it invasive and hurtful. Its offensive quality inheres in the harmfulness of the attorney’s conduct, exploiting the vulnerability and exacerbating the suffering of a potential client. The indecency and incivility of sending such a letter to someone who has, as in this case, just experienced a tragedy, surely offends our sensibilities. However, “[djecency,” as such, is not the central consideration, and, indeed, may serve as a confusing and ambiguous criterion for *467evaluating ethical conduct with respect to commercial speech; it is because such conduct hurts people and destroys their privacy that it should be restrained.
The Court’s explanation of the standards that must govern our advertising restrictions should therefore focus on the harmful and invasive aspects of such commercial speech, and not on any articulation of restrictions in terms of “decency.” The Court’s concerns are best served by analyzing attorney advertising in terms of protecting overwrought and vulnerable persons from attorneys who attempt to solicit employment, as well as the State’s obligation to protect the right to privacy of citizens facing a tragedy in their lives. These concerns, I believe, undergird government’s substantial interest in assuring the welfare of its citizens, an interest that can well be accommodated by the First Amendment.
Therefore, I agree with the Court that we should refer this matter to our Committee on Attorney Advertising to consider guidelines explaining the conditions governing written advertisements directed by attorneys to vulnerable members of the public. Such a rule should identify and define the circumstances under which professional solicitations will unduly infringe on personal privacy or will increase personal suffering.
For reprimand — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that MAGDY F. ANIS of JERSEY CITY and HAZLET, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1987, be publicly reprimanded, and it is further
ORDERED that the entire record of this matter be made a permanent part of respondent’s file as an attorney at law of this State; and it is further
*468ORDERED that respondent shall reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs incurred in the prosecution of this matter.