dissenting.
Acknowledging at the outset that the appeal presents a close call and that the Court’s approach assuredly is plausible, I nevertheless would affirm substantially on the basis of the Appellate Division’s opinion, which in turn relied on the trial court’s letter opinion. Unlike the majority, I do not find in the plain language of the New Jersey Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 17:33A-1 to -14, the answer to the question presented — whether, when a person commits multiple violative acts in support of a single fraudulent insurance claim, the civil penalty under the Act should be based on one violation or on the number of acts committed.
Because the Act is a civil penal statute, it must be construed narrowly. See In re Suspension of DeMarco, 83 N.J. 25, 36, 414 A.2d 1339 (1980). The pertinent sections, N.J.S.A. 17:33A-4 and -5, are not so unambiguous as to require a finding that each submission of material false information in support of an insurance claim constitutes an independently punishable act. The Legislature has demonstrated that it knows full well how *447to do what it avoided doing here, namely, to craft a statute that imposes multiple penalties for what might appear to be a single offense. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.8, the Consumer Fraud Act “going out of business sale” provision, which authorizes penalizing a merchant separately for each day in violation of that provision: “For any person in violation of this act, each day in violation shall constitute an additional, separate and distinct violation.” Moreover, my understanding of the law on fractionalization of offenses leads me to conclude that courts will impose multiple penalties only when the offender has committed separate acts that cause separate injuries, in light of the violation as defined in the statute under review. See Caldwell Terrace Apartments v. Borough of Caldwell, 224 N.J.Super. 588, 592-93 & n. 2, 541 A.2d 221 (App.Div.1988). This defendant’s conduct falls short of that requirement.
I read the Act as providing that the making of a fraudulent insurance claim amounts to a single violation, no matter how many documents are submitted in support of that claim. The Act itself authorizes substantia] penalties, ranging up to $5000 for the first violation, up to $10,000 for the second violation, and up to $15,000 for each subsequent violation. Because in imposing penalties a trial court is accorded a generous measure of discretion that can take into account the number and materiality of fraudulent statements supporting the claim, I would affirm the Appellate Division’s holding that the trial court properly imposed one penalty rather than six.
HANDLER and POLLOCK, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.
For affirmance — Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER and POLLOCK — 3.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 4.