concurring:
I join the majority’s opinion to the extent that it holds that we are compelled by stare decisis to follow existing law on the admissibility of vicarious admissions.
I also agree with both the majority and with President Judge SPAETH that the law in this area should be changed. *547I therefore write separately to state my views on the changes that should be made and to respond to some of the majority’s concerns.
It is my position that the proposed vicarious admission rule stated by a plurality of this Court in Carswell v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 259 Pa.Super. 167, 393 A.2d 770 (1978), which Judge SPAETH would adopt in this case, is the better rule. It is time for the courts of this Commonwealth to discard the fictions of the traditional vicarious admission rule in favor of a rule which is founded on the realities of the modern employer-employee relationship and still reasonably safeguards the reliability of the evidence admitted.
Consequently, I would adopt a rule under which the hearsay declaration of an agent would be admissible against his or her principal if:
1) the statement concerns a matter within the scope of the declarant’s employment;
2) the statement was made before the termination of said employment; and
3) sufficient proof is made of circumstances indicating reliability, such as:
a) authorization to make the statements;
b) personal knowledge, or;
c) some other indicia of reliability.
See SPAETH, President Judge, concurring, at 1305; Carswell, supra, 259 Pa.Superior Ct. at 179-182, 393 A.2d at 776-777.
The majority, while expressing dissatisfaction with the traditional rule, criticizes the Carswell proposal for abandoning the theoretical underpinnings of the vicarious admission rule, i.e., the hearsay testimony is admissible as a party admission. The majority, however, favors change in the traditional rule because of “the blatant concern of necessity”, but implies that such change be made within the framework of party admissions. This path, if followed, will prove troublesome.
*548The admissibility of all hearsay is ultimately grounded on reliability even where the theoretical underpinning derives from party admissions. See Spaeth, P.J., concurring, at 539. It seems to me that the majority’s attempt to rebuild the theoretical basis for vicarious admissions based on party admissions is misguided for the reasons stated below. As Judge Spaeth noted, “In considering whether a hearsay statement should be admitted as within an exception to the rule, the central inquiry should always be whether the circumstances giving rise to the statement offers sufficient assurances to compensate for the inability to cross-examine the declarant.” (SPAETH, P.J., concurring, at 539).
The majority outlines the historic twin bases for exceptions to the rule against hearsay — reliability and the preservation of the opportunity to cross-examine. It is correct that vicarious admissions have traditionally been analyzed under the latter rationale. The requirement of “speaking authority” of the agent supposedly allows us to cross-examine the principal on the agent’s statements which are imputed to him by virtue of such authority [ (see J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 801(d)(2)(c)[01], at 801-152) ]. Even the Federal Rules of Evidence impliedly continue this analysis by placing vicarious admissions within a class described as “admissions by party-opponent.” See F.R.Evid. 801(d)(2).
The majority states that “by removing the requirement of [speaking] authority ... the theoretical scheme of imputation fails.” (Majority at 524). Such a result is to be. welcomed. In this age when corporations engage in far-flung businesses which cross state and national boundaries, the opportunity to cross-examine the employer is likely to be meaningless. As Weinstein notes, in the most common cases of this kind “the agent was the only one who knew what had happened.” J. Weinstein and M. Berger, supra, 11801(d)(2)(D)[01], at 801-160. Cross-examining the employer is of little if any value in assessing the credibility of the employee’s statements where the employer has no firsthand knowledge of the events themselves or of the declarant/employee’s opportunity to observe them.
*549The party admission rationale is no longer appropriate or relevant. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s recommendation that we retain the traditional rule alongside some new rule created in response to the serious injustices arising out of the unwarranted exclusion of evidence under the traditional rule. The traditional rule is no longer rationally defensible on the fiction of preserved cross-examination through the “theoretical scheme of imputation.” For the reasons just stated any new rule cannot rest on the ground of preserved cross-examination. The better approach is to revise the rule on a foundation of reliability. (SPAETH, P.J., concurring at 540-541).
Judge SPAETH is correct when he states that a lack of authority has no bearing on the reliability of the employee’s statement (see SPAETH, J., concurring, at 539). Although the fact of “speaking authority” is not relevant to the question of admissibility, it is relevant as evidence of reliability in a modernized vicarious admission rule. Proof of “speaking authority” will satisfy the reliability prong of the Carswell test. See Carswell, supra, 259 Pa.Superior Ct. at 181-182, 393 A.2d at 777. See also SPAETH, P.J., concurring, at 539 (“[T]he fact that the declarant did have authority to make the statement offers adequate assurance of reliability”). I believe this analysis is sound.
When a principal specifically authorizes an agent to speak on the principal’s behalf, the principal is in effect adopting the agent’s statements prospectively, and we are justified in assuming he will select a spokesperson who will make reliable statements. I note further that “speaking authority” has been preserved in the Carswell test as fact giving sufficient assurance of reliability; therefore, any statement admissible under the traditional rule will also be admissible under such a new rule.
For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s contention that in reforming the vicarious admission rule we necessarily embark on an unprincipled voyage beyond the boundaries of conventional evidentiary analysis. I support the Carswell rule and believe it stands on firm ground.
*550Nevertheless, being aware of our limitations as an intermediate appellate court, I agree with the majority that we are bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court. In light of the existing rule formulated by the Supreme Court, the Superior Court is not free to refashion the rule. I am hopeful that our opinions in this case will indicate to the Supreme Court the pressing need to reconsider its earlier decisions.