On rehearing. After the foregoing opinion was filed, the plaintiff’s motion for rehearing was granted.
*376Upton, Sanders & Upton {Mr. Richard F. Upton orally), for New Hampshire Manufacturers Ass’n as amicus curiae, for the motion. Devine, Millimet, McDonough, Stahl & Branch {Mr. Joseph A. Millimet orally), as amicus curiae, for the motion. Booth, Wadleigh, Langdell, Starr & Peters and Charles J. Dunn {Mr. William J. Starr, Jr. and Mr. Dunn orally), opposed. William Maynard, Attorney General and Frederic T. Greenhalge, Assistant Attorney General {Mr. Greenhalge orally), opposed.Wheeler, J. Certain criticisms of the opinion filed on September 28, 1962 which relate to the form of expression rather than the substance of the holding have been dealt with by modification of the opinion which is otherwise reaffirmed. The chief criticisms of the substance of the views formerly expressed have ;been directed to the holding that goods in the' process of manufacture are taxable, and to the holding sustaining the findings of the master as to the average value of property taxable as stock in trade. In the latter connection the plaintiff argues that competent proof presented by it has been erroneously ignored which established that the average value of its inventory for- the tax year April 1, 1955 to April 1, 1956 did'not exceed $124,086.05, since substantially all of its inventory was liquidated between July 1 and September 1, 1955.
In the course of the rehearing, the history of the statutory provisions relating to the taxation of stock in trade was exhaustively explored by counsel, and the suggested interpretations of those provisions have been carefully considered by the court. We adhere to our former decision that goods belonging to a manufacturer which are in process of manufacture are taxable to the manufacturer as stock in trade. RSA 72:15 I. See RSA 73:3, 4; 73:3 (supp).
We believe that the plaintiff’s argument that the valuation of its inventory could not be found to exceed $124,086.05 is based upon an erroneous assumption that the “average value . . . for the year,” at which the statute directs that stock in trade shall be reckoned (RSA 72:15 I), refers to the average value *377for the specific year following April 1 of the tax year. Our consideration of the history of the statute persuades us that this is not so. As counsel have pointed out, the statute originally provided that stock in trade should be reckoned “at the average value thereof for a year.” (Emphasis supplied). 8 Laws of New Hampshire 183 (1812); 10 Id., 157 (1830); 10 Id., 423 (1833). See Laws 1836, c. 238, s. 1. Raw materials and manufactures were made taxable as “stock in trade” in 1825. 9 Laws of New Hampshire 445. In the consolidation which occurred in R. S. [1842] c. 39, s. 4, the language relating to stock in trade was changed to “average value . . . for the year,” but the pertinent Commissioners’ Report indicates that no change in meaning was intended.
This history, together with decided cases and the practice in administration of the tax, leads us to this conclusion: The phrase “average value ... for the year” is not restricted to the average value either for the year preceding or for the year following April 1 on which the property is liable to be taxed. RSA 73:1. It means rather the average value for any year, for which an average can be taken at the time of the assessment, which is found to be a reasonable indication of the average amount of stock in trade which the taxpayer, on April 1, is carrying in his business year by year. Conn. Valley Lumber Co. v. Monroe, 71 N. H. 473, 477; Boston & Maine R. R. v. Concord, 78 N. H. 463, 467.
A manufacturer’s stock of raw material and manufactures, like a merchant’s stock of goods employed in his trade, is by its very nature a fluctuating asset. It was this characteristic which gave rise to its taxation upon the basis of the value of the stock averaged to be employed in a business from year to year, rather than the value of the stock which chanced to be on hand on April 1. See Annot. 66 A.L.R. 2d 833.
The determination of that average for purposes of assessment, or when an abatement is sought, is a matter for the judgment of the finders of the facts, who in the first instance are the assessors. In reaching that judgment, when the taxpayer asserts that a decline in the average is taking place the assessors may adopt a policy of “wait and see,” (RSA 75:1) but for a limited time only. In the nature of things any delay in acting upon a petition to the assessors for abatement must necessarily yield to the practical requirement that the annual tax levy of the district shall be determined and collected. RSA 76:10, 11.
*378Where the value of stock on hand for a particular date falls below the prior average for a year, this may or may not be significant in the assessment of the tax, according to whether it represents merely a temporary condition subject to offset by later increases, or on the other hand a condition which has persisted over a sufficient part of a year to indicate a true reduction in annual average. The category into which such a decline in valuation will fall cannot well be determined in advance.
Taxes are assessed as of April 1 and upon a practical basis. A reduction in stock which occurs after an assessment made upon the basis of a yearly average carried in the business as of April 1 will not necessarily require reassessment or abatement of a tax already properly determined without reference to the later reduction.
We are of the opinion that the master did not err in fixing the valuation of the plaintiff’s inventory upon the basis of the average amount carried in its business for a year which ended December 31, 1954. The figures embodied in the requests which the plaintiff contends should have been granted were based upon averages for the year April 1, 1955 to April 1, 1956 and included classifications each of which was carried into the average at zero for periods ranging from six to nine of the twelve months averaged. Since the statute did not require use of the average for the year following April 1, 1955, the master could properly refuse to adopt the figures of the plaintiff’s requests.
Former result affirmed.
All concurred.January 31, 1963.