In this case we must determine whether expert testimony about the history, hierarchy, and common practices of a street gang is admissible as proof of motive or is prohibited by Maryland Rule 5-404(b) as evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts. We hold that such testimony is permissible where fact evidence establishes that the crime charged was gang-related and the probative value of the testimony is not sub*482stantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice to the defendant.
Defendant Mario Rodriguez Gutierrez was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence following the shooting death of Francisco Quintanilla. At trial, witnesses testified that the incident was linked to Gutierrez’s affiliation with the MS-13 street gang. The court also permitted testimony, over Gutierrez’s objections, of a “gang expert” who generally described the violent customs of MS-13, including its initiation practices and culture of retaliation for perceived insults. A Prince George’s County jury convicted Gutierrez of the murder, and he appealed the conviction to the Court of Special Appeals. On our own initiative, we granted certiorari before argument in the Court of Special Appeals and affirm the conviction.
FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Around midnight on July 14, 2007, Francisco Quintanilla was standing with a group of friends outside a house in Riverdale, in Prince George’s County. A black Honda Civic containing four males approached the house and the front passenger addressed the group, shouting “Mara Salvatrucha[.]” The witnesses interpreted this statement to mean that the passenger was a member of the MS-13 street gang. The passenger then demanded to know the gang affiliation of the assembled group, including Quintanilla. One of Quintanilla’s companions answered, saying that he did not belong to any gang, while another member insulted MS-13. The passenger responded by firing multiple shots into the group, fatally wounding Quintanilla.1 The black Honda then immediately fled the scene.
*483Ellen Villatoro was a part of the group in front of the house and claimed to have had a clear and sustained view of the shooter. On July 24, 2007, she met with detectives in an attempt to identify the shooter, whom she described as a “[hjispanic male, young looking, Asian look, acne, curly hairstyle.” The detectives showed Villatoro approximately 400 photos, but without success. Gutierrez’s photo was not among those shown to Villatoro at that time. On September 5, 2007, after further investigation, detectives met with Villatoro once again to present her with a photographic array. This time, Gutierrez’s picture was among the six in the array, and Villatoro confidently identified him as the shooter. A week or two later, the police took Gutierrez into custody.
At trial, Luis Alvarado-Pineda, Gutierrez’s co-defendant driver who turned State’s witness, testified that, on the night of the shooting, he received a call from Gutierrez saying that they “should head over to Riverdale.” Alvarado-Pineda confirmed that Gutierrez was riding in the front passenger seat, and that two other males were sitting in rear passenger seats. Once in Riverdale, the group spotted the party and drove by two or three times, until Gutierrez told Alvarado-Pineda to stop in front of the house. Then, according to AlvaradoPineda, a member of the party insulted Gutierrez for representing that he belonged to MS-13 and Gutierrez responded by pulling out a gun and firing four shots into the crowd.
The prosecution also introduced pictures from Gutierrez’s MySpace webpage. One of Gutierrez’s fellow passengers, Hector Tirado, testified for the State and identified Gutierrez’s gestures as those used by members of MS-13. He identified Gutierrez as the shooter that night. A transcript of Tirado’s grand jury testimony, in which he claimed that Gutierrez shot Quintanilla to gain entry into MS-13, was also admitted into evidence.
*484The prosecution then called Sergeant George Norris, Supervisor of the Prince George’s County Gang Unit, as an expert witness “in the area of MS-13 and gangs in general.” Norris provided jurors with an overview of the MS-13 culture. He began by explaining that “MS-13” stands for “Mara Salvatrucha,” with “mara” meaning gang or group, “salva” referring to El Salvador, and “trucha” translating as “watch out” or “look out.” The 13 in the gang’s name, he testified, is “indicative of their alliance with the Mexican Mafia[.]” Norris also described how prospective members are inducted, or “jumped,” into MS-13, which involves a 13 second beating by four or five gang members. He identified Langley Park, the location of the apartment where Gutierrez, Alvarado-Pineda, and Tirado were congregated before driving to Riverdale, as an MS-13 stronghold. Riverdale (the scene of the crime), on the other hand, was a predominantly Mexican neighborhood and “[t]he gangs within that community are more of the Mexican-based gangs as opposed to MS-13, which is predominantly Central American based.” Thus, Riverdale is “an area where rival gang members are expected to be.” Norris explained that MS-13 members respond to criticism of their gang or untruthful displays of MS-13 membership (an act known as “false flagging”) with violence “up to death.” In fact, MS-13 is “the gang that [law enforcement] had seen the most violence with recently for the past four, four and a half years in this region....” Finally, Norris, who often conducted internet investigations by visiting gang members’ MySpace webpages, articulated a belief that Gutierrez was affiliated with MS-13 based on pictures of the defendant taken from MySpace.
During the lower court proceedings, defense counsel attempted to prevent the admission of evidence of MS-13 affiliation four separate times. Prior to trial, defense counsel moved in limine to bar “any testimony as to [MS-13] and [Gutierrez’s] involvement in a gang.” The Circuit Court, relying on Ayala v. State, 174 Md.App. 647, 923 A.2d 952 (2007), denied the motion on grounds that the State was using the gang evidence to prove motive. Again, before voir dire, the defense renewed its “motion to exclude testimony by any expert on gangs” because news reports of a supposed gang-*485related fatality in Riverdale the week before trial rendered such evidence unduly prejudicial to Gutierrez. The court once again denied the motion, but asked that neither side mention the MS-13 connection during jury selection so as not to dissuade jurors from serving. As the State was about to make its opening remarks, defense counsel asked the court for a standing objection to “any reference to gang membership, gang procedures, or MS-13 except as that may have been uttered by any person at the time [of the shooting].” The court granted a “standing objection to any reference that the State makes to MS-13.” The final objection occurred immediately before Norris was admitted as an expert, when defense counsel asked for a continuing objection to any testimony presented by Norris that did not pertain to the events of July 14, 2007. The court also granted this continuing objection.
Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted Gutierrez of first-degree murder and the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. The Circuit Court imposed a life sentence on Gutierrez for murder and a consecutive 20 year sentence for his handgun conviction. Gutierrez appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, and, on our own initiative, we granted certiorari to consider the following question:
Did the trial court err by admitting “expert” testimony regarding the violent street gang MS-13 such that said testimony potentially misle[d] the jury to believe that defendant’s possible membership in said gang cause him to form the intent for premeditated murder rather than inferring said intent from the facts of the crime?
Gutierrez requests that this Court vacate his convictions and remand the case to the Circuit Court with the direction that no expert testimony “regarding propensity be admitted as to ... Gutierrez’[s] alleged involvement or non-involvement in MS-13.”
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
Maryland Rules 5-702 through 5-706 govern expert testimony. Specifically, Rule 5-702 provides:
*486Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony.
In Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 372 A.2d 1069 (1977), this Court articulated the standard of review for the admissibility of expert testimony:
[T]he admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court, and its action in admitting or excluding such testimony will seldom constitute a ground for reversal. It is well settled, however, that the trial court’s determination is reviewable on appeal, and may be reversed if founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if the trial court has clearly abused its discretion.
Id. at 301, 372 A.2d at 1074-75 (quotation marks and citations omitted). A reviewing court may find an abuse of discretion where the prejudice of the admitted testimony outweighs its probative value. See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 641, 552 A.2d 896, 901 (1989). Prejudice that would “outweigh probative value involves more than mere damage to the opponent’s cause.” State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 102, 517 A.2d 741, 747 (1986).
II. Analysis
On appeal, Gutierrez asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Norris’s irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony on gang activity. Specifically, he points to five of Norris’s statements as sources of the error:
(1) MS-13 is “the gang that we had seen the most violence with recently for the past four, four and a half years in this region....”
*487(2) The “18” in “MS-18” is “indicative of their alliance with the Mexican Mafia.... ”
(3) When a non-gang member uses hand-signs that identify him as a member of MS-13, also known as “false flagging,” he would “be subject to punishment up to death.”
(4) When responding to criticism of their gang, MS-13 members react with “[violence ... [u]p to death.”
(5) In order to join MS-13, a prospective member must be “jumped in,” meaning that he is “beaten by usually four or five gang members. It’s called a 13. Because, technically, it’s suppose to be for 13 seconds.”
Gutierrez contends that evidence of his affiliation with MS-13 coupled with Norris’s testimony about the violent culture of the gang constituted inadmissible prior bad acts evidence. The State, on the other hand, maintains that Gutierrez’s claims are not preserved for appeal and, alternatively, that the evidence was admissible because it was “highly probative of premeditation, motive and intent.”
A Preservation
The State, ever vigilant in its search for waiver of error, contends that Gutierrez never challenged the particular aspects of Norris’s testimony that he now complains of on appeal, and thus his claims are not preserved for review by this Court. According to the State, defense counsel simply objected to any general expert testimony regarding MS-13. With only this general continuing objection, the State avers that Gutierrez cannot now single out certain portions of the testimony as more inadmissible than others.
In support of its rationale, the State cites B. Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 116, 136, 857 A.2d 88, 99-100 (2004), in which this Court refused to review a trial court’s denial of evidence because the defendant’s theory of relevance on appeal was different from the theory he presented to the trial court. In that case, both the defendant and his wife had been convicted of murder in separate trials. See id. at 121-22, 857 A.2d at 91. At his trial, the defendant sought to admit his mother’s *488testimony regarding another incident where his wife had threatened his mother with a gun, offering the testimony to show “simply that there’s another incident of [the wife] pulling a gun on another human being.” Id. at 136, 857 A.2d at 99. The trial court ruled that the testimony was not relevant. Id. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the testimony was relevant “to show that [the wife] Vas capable of pulling a weapon on another individual outside of [the defendant’s] presence’ and had the tendency to show that she was capable of committing the present crimes alone.” Id. We denied that argument on preservation grounds, relying on the established rule that ‘Vhen an objector sets forth the specific grounds for his objection ... the objector will be bound by those grounds and will ordinarily be deemed to have waived other grounds not specified.” Id. (quoting Brecker v. State, 304 Md. 36, 39-40, 497 A.2d 479, 480 (1985)). We refused to interpret the theory advanced on appeal as a more detailed version of the theory articulated at trial because doing so would “require trial courts to imagine all reasonable offshoots of the argument actually presented to them before making a ruling on admissibility.” B. Sifrit, 383 Md. at 136, 857 A.2d at 99-100.
This case is different because Gutierrez’s objections were “general” and not limited to any stated grounds. Rule 4-323(a) provides that “[t]he grounds for the objection need not be stated unless the court, at the request of a party or on its own initiative, so directs.” This rule “reflects] the long established Maryland practice that a contemporaneous general objection to the admission of evidence ordinarily preserves for appellate review all grounds which may exist for the inadmissibility of the evidence.” Boyd v. State, 399 Md. 457, 475-76, 924 A.2d 1112, 1123 (2007). Gutierrez’s counsel objected to “any testimony as to [MS-13] and [Gutierrez’s] involvement in a gang” no less than four times. Furthermore, the trial court granted a “standing objection to any reference that the State makes to MS-13” as well as Gutierrez’s continuing objection to any testimony presented by Norris that did not “pertain[ ] to the events of the evening of July 14th, '07.” The court did not ask, nor did Gutierrez disclose, the ground(s) for his continu*489ing objection. Thus, this case is distinguishable from B. Sifrit where defense counsel articulated the reason that the proposed testimony was relevant and should be admissible, thereby waiving all grounds not specified. Gutierrez objected to all statements made by Norris that did not concern the night of the shooting (effectively all of Norris’s testimony) and now appeals the trial court’s admission of those statements. In short, defense counsel’s objections properly preserved this issue for appeal. We now address the merits of the action.
B. Evidence of “Prior Bad Acts” And The Admissibility of Norris’s Testimony
As provided in Maryland Rule 5-404(b), a court may not admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that is offered “to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Such evidence is known as evidence of “prior bad acts.” See Klauenberg v. State, 355 Md. 528, 547-49 & n. 3, 735 A.2d 1061, 1071-72 & n. 3 (1999) (surveying multiple jurisdictions in an attempt to define “bad acts” evidence and recognizing in dicta that some out-of-state cases have included gang membership as bad acts evidence). We have defined prior bad acts evidence as “an activity or conduct, not necessarily criminal, that tends to impugn or reflect adversely upon one’s character, taking into consideration the facts of the underlying lawsuit.” Id. at 549, 735 A.2d at 1072.
Notwithstanding this exclusionary rule, a trial judge may admit prior bad acts evidence if it satisfies three requirements. See Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634-35, 552 A.2d at 897-98; see also Joseph F. Murphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 510 (4th ed. 2010). First, the evidence must be “substantially relevant to some contested issue in the case....” Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 897. Such evidence may be relevant to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Md. Rule 5-404(b). Second, the evidence must be “clear and convincing in establishing the accused’s involvement” in the prior bad acts. Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 898; see also Murphy, *490Jr., supra, at § 510. Finally, the evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . .” Md. Rule 5-408; see also Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635, 552 A.2d at 898.
The admissibility of evidence regarding gang affiliation and gang culture, and its tension with the rule against prior bad acts, is an issue with which courts across the country have struggled. See generally John E. Theuman, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Accused’s Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R.4th 775 (2010). Numerous jurisdictions have permitted the inclusion of such evidence as relevant and not unduly prejudicial. See, e.g., United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 652-55 (7th Cir.2002) (no error in permitting a gang specialist to testify as to the history, leadership, and operations of the Traveling Vice Lords because the average juror is not familiar with the operations of street gangs); United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1561-65 (10th Cir.1992) (expert testimony of gang affiliation and gang’s involvement in cocaine trafficking was permissible); People v. Gonzalez, 38 Cal.4th 932, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649, 656-59 (2006) (allowing expert testimony about whether members of a street gang would intimidate persons who testify against a member of that or a rival gang); People v. McDaniels, 107 Cal.App.3d 898, 166 Cal.Rptr. 12, 14-16 (1980) (testimony about gang fights in neutral territory admissible to show that when the defendant drove his friends into a rival gang’s territory he knew or should have known they were planning a retaliatory slaying and not just a fist fight); Cyrus v. State, 231 Ga.App. 71, 498 S.E.2d 554, 555 (1998) (testimony explaining gang culture was relevant and not unduly prejudicial in case involving the shooting of a 10-year-old child); State v. Tran, 252 Kan. 494, 847 P.2d 680, 687-88 (1993) (evidence of gang membership was relevant to show the motive to retaliate or get even with a rival gang, resulting in a fight that lead to the victim’s death); State v. Nieto, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442, 450 (2000) (“[The expert’s] testimony, both as to Defendant’s affiliation with the 18th Street Gang and the specific rituals and procedures of that gang, was admissible to show Defen*491dant’s alleged motive (to rise up in the ranks of the gang by performing a hit on its behalf) and intent to murder the victims.”); Utz v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 411, 505 S.E.2d 380, 387 (1998) (expert’s testimony about the culture of two different area gangs was admissible where the defendant and murder victim each belonged to rival gangs). As one commentator observed, the rationale behind this trend is that the “relevance and significance of evidence of gang membership may be lost on a jury without the use of expert witness testimony about the sociological and psychological aspects of gang conduct.” James Blake Sibley, Gang Violence: Response of the Criminal Justice System to the Growing Threat, 11 Crim. Just. J. 403, 412-13 (1989) (discussing California courts’ growing acceptance of expert testimony regarding gang methods).
Analysis of this trend reveals a common, albeit frequently unacknowledged, thread among those cases where gang expert testimony was deemed admissible. Generally, a gang expert’s testimony is relevant and not unduly prejudicial when other evidence demonstrates that the crime was gang-related. In Mansoori, a gang expert’s testimony was relevant to the charge of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine where court-authorized wiretaps recorded the defendants’s involvement in a drug deal and three of the five defendants were members of a gang that controlled narcotics distribution in the area. See 304 F.3d at 642-43. In another possession with intent to distribute case, gang affiliation evidence was relevant where the defendants were discovered with drugs, scales, razors, and gang-related items and the expert testified that the primary purpose of the gang was to traffic in crack cocaine. See Robinson, 978 F.2d at 1557. In California, testimony on a gang’s general practice of witness intimidation was necessary to explain why witnesses who had identified the gang-tattooed defendant as the gunman later recanted at trial. See Gonzalez, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d at 656-57. Expert testimony was also admissible to explain why an alleged gang gunman was expecting “more than just a fist fight” when, according to witnesses, he had traveled to a rival gang’s *492territory. See McDaniels, 166 Cal.Rptr. at 14-15. In yet another shooting death, a gang bandana wrapped around the gun used in the crime, along with witness testimony that the defendant was a member of that gang, opened the door to expert testimony on gang culture. See Cyrus, 498 S.E.2d at 555. In New Mexico, an expert’s testimony on the specific rituals of the 18th Street Gang was admissible to rebut defendant’s assertion that, when he accompanied fellow gang members to the victim’s cabin, he did not know that they intended to carry out a gang-ordered hit on the victim. See Nieto, 12 P.3d at 449-50. Finally, in Virginia, expert testimony was relevant to rebut defendant’s claim of self-defense, where the defendant and the victim were members of rival gangs. See Utz, 505 S.E.2d at 387.
Some states have been more vocal about the need for evidence showing that the crime was gang-related, expressing a concern that “evidence of gang affiliation could be used improperly as a backdoor means of introducing character evidence by associating the defendant with the gang and describing the gang’s bad acts.” State v. Torrez, 146 N.M. 331, 210 P.3d 228, 235 (2009) (quoting Nieto, 12 P.3d at 450). In Torrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in admitting gang expert testimony, despite determining that the detective was properly qualified as an expert in gang culture and that his testimony was not impermissible propensity evidence because it was offered to establish the defendant’s motive. See 210 P.3d at 236-38. The court concluded that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial “because there was no evidence presented at trial that [the defendant] was a gang member at the time of the shooting, the party was a ‘gang party,’ or the shooting was in any way gang-related.” Id. at 236. Without corroborative evidence that the incident was influenced by a gang’s code of conduct or other criminal aspects of gang culture, the risk that defendant was convicted because he was, or at one time had been, a member of a gang was too great to allow the evidence to be put before the jury. See id. at 237.
*493Illinois also adopts this cautious approach. In People v. Bryant, 241 Ill.App.3d 1007, 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d 910 (1993), the Illinois appellate court permitted expert testimony on the customs of the Folks Gang, where lay witness testimony supplied a link between that gang and the murder for which defendant Bryant was on trial. There, fact witnesses testified that Bryant exchanged words with the deceased, Houston, and the deceased’s friend, Frazier, over the return of a friend’s pager. See id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 913-14. When Frazier demanded the pager, Bryant turned to an alleged fellow gang member and said, “[Folks], give him that pager.” Id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 913. The alleged gang member complied, tried to shake Frazier’s hand and then “[threw] up a pitchfork.” Id. Frazier returned the handshake, but did not “throw up a pitchfork[,]” to which Bryant responded, “[You’re] not right, you’re not right. I thought you were folks . . . what the hell you doing coming around here if you’re not folks ... you’ll get whooped like your boy.” Id. A physical fight ensued, and Houston joined in to aid his friend. See id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 913-14. Soon thereafter, as Frazier was fleeing the scene, he heard gunshots and looked back to see Bryant standing near Houston and holding a gun. See id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 914.
In addition to this eyewitness testimony, the State introduced, and the trial court permitted, the testimony of a Chicago detective who had dealt extensively with that city’s street gangs and was familiar with the gang that refers to themselves as “folks.” See Bryant, 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 914. The detective explained that the pitchfork is a sign unique to the “folks” street gang, and that, in his opinion, “when an individual uses the hand signal of a pitchfork in an up position, that individual is affiliated with the ‘folks’ gang.” Id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 914, 920. The State’s theory of the case was that the shooting was motivated by Bryant’s anger that Houston and Frazier were not “folks.” See id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 918. Bryant, on the other hand, argued “that the State’s sole purpose in seeking to *494admit [the detective’s testimony] was to inflame the prejudices of the jury in an effort to convict [Bryant].” Id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 920. The appellate court sided with the State, holding that “[e]vidence indicating a defendant was ... involved in gang-related activity is admissible ... to offer a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act, provided there is sufficient proof that such ... activity is related to the crime charged.” Id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 920 (emphasis added). It determined that “there was sufficient evidence to support the State’s theory that the seemingly inexplicable attack on the deceased was gang related” and that the trial court “allowed in only as much gang testimony as was necessary to establish this motive.” Id., 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 920-21.
In Maryland, the Court of Special Appeals has permitted gang expert testimony where fact evidence showed that the crime was motivated by gang affiliation. See Ayala, 174 Md.App. at 664-66, 923 A.2d at 962-63. In Ayala, this fact evidence came in the form of two pretrial statements, the contents of which were admitted at trial, in which Ayala said that he was a member of MS-13, that the victim had claimed to be a member of the 18th Street Gang, and that Ayala had previously been beaten by a member of the 18th Street Gang and still had a cut on his forehead from the fight. See id. at 653-54, 923 A.2d at 955-56. The State’s theory was that Ayala killed the victim because he believed, albeit mistakenly, that the victim was a member of a rival gang. See id. at 651-52, 923 A.2d at 954. The trial court permitted a Fairfax County detective to testify as to the meaning of the name MS-13, including its link to the Mexican Mafia, the “jumping in” process, and the expectation that gang members must “get[ ] at [the gang’s enemies].” Id. at 654-55, 923 A.2d at 956. The detective also identified the 18th Street Gang as the chief rival of MS-13. See id. at 655, 923 A.2d at 956.
In affirming the trial court’s admission of the State’s expert witness, the Court of Special Appeals stated that the testimony served to “explain the otherwise inexplicable, by providing a motive for a brutal and seemingly senseless killing.” Ayala, *495174 Md.App. at 664, 923 A.2d at 961 (quotation marks omitted). The Court conceded that “evidence that a defendant is a member of an organization known for violent acts may be evidence of bad character or prior bad acts.” Ayala, 174 Md.App. at 658, 923 A.2d at 958. Yet it reasoned that
[g]ang evidence is relevant when ... it provides motive for an otherwise inexplicable act.... In particular, any evidence that tends to show the defendant had a motive for killing the victim is relevant because it enhances the probability that the defendant did kill the victim.
There may be strong prejudice against street gangs ... but that alone does not render gang evidence inadmissible. Gang evidence is admissible despite the prejudice that attaches if it is relevant and particularly if it is crucial in establishing motive.
Id. at 663, 923 A.2d at 961 (quoting People v. Davis, 335 Ill.App.3d 1, 268 Ill.Dec. 829, 779 N.E.2d 443, 456 (2002)). According to the Court of Special Appeals, the expert’s testimony corroborated Ayala’s pretrial statements about gang membership and “was highly probative in that it explained the gang’s code of conduct and revealed the gang’s long and bitter rivalry with the 18th Street [G]ang.” Id. at 664, 923 A.2d at 961. Thus, it was “highly probative in establishing motive and was not unduly prejudicial under the circumstances.” Id. at 664, 923 A.2d at 962.
Turning to the case at hand, we must determine whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony of a gang expert at all, and if not, whether Norris’s testimony was unfairly prejudicial. In doing so, we remain ever-cognizant of the highly incendiary nature of gang evidence and the possibility that a jury may determine guilt by association rather than by its belief that the defendant committed the criminal acts. We agree with the Supreme Court of New Mexico that courts must be vigilant in guarding against the improper use of gang affiliation evidence “as a backdoor means of introducing character evidence by associating the defendant with the gang and *496describing the gang’s bad acts.” Torrez, 210 P.3d at 235 (quoting Nieto, 12 P.3d at 450). Thus, we hold that the threshold requirement for the admissibility of gang expert testimony is fact evidence showing that the crime was gang-related. Accord Torrez, 210 P.3d at 235-36. Proof of such a link transforms a defendant’s gang membership, current or prospective, from an impermissible prior bad act to a concrete component of the crime for which the defendant is on trial.2 To be clear, this requirement may be satisfied by fact evidence that, at first glance, may not indicate gang motivations, but when coupled with expert testimony, provides the gang-crime connection. For example, an expert’s testimony that the crime was committed in rival gang territory may be necessary to show why the defendant’s presence in that area, a fact established by other evidence, was motivated by his gang affiliation. See McDaniels, 166 Cal.Rptr. at 14-15. As another example, expert testimony that a gang, of which the defendant is a member, specializes in drug trafficking may be used to show why drug paraphernalia found in the defendant’s apartment demonstrates that he was a part of a larger drug conspiracy with other gang members. See Robinson, 978 F.2d at 1563-64. In adopting this threshold requirement, we are simply saying that a defendant’s membership in a gang, in and of itself, is not enough.3
*497Here, evidence supplied by no less than three fact witnesses suggested that Quintanilla’s murder was motivated by Gutierrez’s ties to MS-13. In Tirado’s grand jury testimony, supplied to the jury in this case as a State exhibit, he claimed that Gutierrez shot Quintanilla as part of a gang initiation:
Q. What about [one of the other passengers] and MS-13,1 mean was he trying to get in or what?
A. No. Mario was trying to get in.
Q. Do you know — why did he shoot this person then?
A. Because it’s a mission. You have to kill someone to get into MS.
Furthermore, during trial, Tirado, Alvarado-Pineda, and Villatoro all testified that, upon reaching the home, Gutierrez shouted “Mara Salvatrucha” and then asked the group outside the house to identify their own gang affiliations. Like the gang name “Folks” in Bryant, these statements immediately preceded the shooting, and suggest Gutierrez’s motive for pulling the trigger. Clearly, in this case, our threshold requirement is met.
Finally, although the fact evidence in this case was enough to open the door for expert testimony, we must still determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Norris to testify.4 Even if Norris’s evidence was *498otherwise admissible, it could still be excluded if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice____” Md. Rule 5-403; see also Faulkner, 314 Md. at 641, 552 A.2d at 901. The trial court adopted the State’s reasons for admitting the testimony, specifically that the shooting’s strong MS-13 undercurrent heightened the probative value of Norris’s testimony such that it was not outweighed by any unfair prejudice. With regard to four of the five statements challenged by Gutierrez on appeal, we find no *499error in this decision. First, Norris’s discussion of the Spanish name of “MS-13,” including his comment that the “13” denoted a tie to the Mexican Mafia, explained why Gutierrez’s “Mara Salvatrucha” declaration indicated MS-13 loyalties. Second, Norris’s description of the process of “jumping in” as a 13-second beating corroborates Tirado’s grand jury testimony that this seemingly senseless shooting was really Gutierrez’s attempt to join MS-13. Third, his testimony that MS-13 members respond to insults with punishment “up to death” was relevant following testimony that Gutierrez fired four shots after being insulted. The average person would not react to a simple affront in such a brutal manner, and Norris’s opinion shed light on this otherwise “inexplicable act.” See Bryant, 182 Ill.Dec. 376, 609 N.E.2d at 920. We reach the same conclusion with respect to Norris’s fourth statement, that gang members also respond to “false flagging” with violence up to death, because “false flagging” is an insult to the exclusivity and hierarchy of the gang. Ultimately, we do not see how Gutierrez was unfairly prejudiced by this evidence, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when permitting the jury to hear and consider it.
We are in agreement with Gutierrez, however, that the trial court erred in allowing Norris to comment that MS-13 is the gang that law enforcement “had seen the most violence with recently for the past four, four and a half years in this region.” The fact that one gang is generally more violent than others does little to add to the jury’s understanding of why the defendant was the person who committed the particular crime charged.
Yet, we view this as harmless error rather than grounds for reversal of Gutierrez’s convictions. A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a fair trial, but not necessarily a perfect one. Cf. Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 36, 553 A.2d 233, 239 (1989)(“The right of an accused to a fair trial, although not a perfect trial, is paramount.”). We are mindful of the rule that:
*500when an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of — whether erroneously admitted or excluded— may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict.
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976) (footnote omitted). Looking to the other evidence on the record, we are confident that the statement would not have persuaded the jury to render a guilty verdict when it would not have otherwise done so. Other properly admissible evidence established that Gutierrez was affiliated with MS-13 and had traveled into rival gang territory looking for someone to kill as part of his initiation. Upon spotting a crowd, he shouted “Mara Salvatrucha,” was insulted, and then opened fire on the group. Three different eye witnesses named him as the shooter, one of whom viewed approximately 400 photos over two separate days before positively and immediately identifying the defendant when she was shown an array with his picture. Moreover, the statement that MS-13 had displayed the most violence over recent years is not so shocking in light of the mountain of other testimony detailing the violent practices of the gang. Had this been the only comment regarding violence, it could not so easily “blend in,” and we might reach a different result. As it stands in this case, however, the statement constituted harmless error.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Norris to testify because ample fact evidence established a connection between Quintanilla’s shooting death and the gang MS-13. Although the unfair prejudice of one of Norris’s statements outweighed its probative value, the error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
*501BELL, C.J., dissents.
GREENE, J., concurs and dissents.
. Quintanilla suffered four gunshot wounds, including a fatal wound to his head. The force of the fated shot blew off a portion of Quintanilla’s skull, causing it to smack into the knee of Ellen Villatoro, who was standing nearby. The doctor who had performed the autopsy testified *483that the impact of the gunpowder around the victim's wounds indicated that the shots were fired within a few feet of the victim.
. Although, in Ayala, there was independent evidence (i.e., Ayala’s pretrial statements) that the crime was motivated by Ayala's belief that he and the victim were members of rival gangs, the Court of Special Appeals seemed to advance the view that no such evidence was required to open the door to expert testimony on gangs: "We do not agree with Ayala that the State should be prevented from presenting crucial evidence regarding motive merely because it has not had the good fortune to find a witness who is willing to step forward and suggest a connection between the gang and the crime.” Ayala, 174 Md.App. at 659-60, 923 A.2d at 959. We disagree and hold that some evidence connecting the crime and the gang is required.
. We are not suggesting that gang membership will never establish the necessary link between the crime and the gang. As in Ayala and Utz, fact evidence showing that the defendant and the victim belonged to rival gangs, or that the defendant mistakenly believed that the victim *497was a member of a rival gang, may be enough to open the door to gang expert testimony.
. To support his claim that Norris’s statements went outside the bounds of proper expert testimony, Gutierrez cites United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.2008), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that expert testimony should not be admitted, even where fact evidence provides the necessary link to the gang, if it only duplicates material that can be established by trial exhibits or lay witnesses. There, expert testimony was introduced after one defendant testified that he and his co-defendants were members of MS-13 and that, after spotting a member of another gang, they executed a drive-by shooting because of MS-13's general policy of killing rivals. Id. at 185. The defendants were subsequently convicted, but the appellate court *498vacated the convictions because much of the expert testimony presented at trial concerned material within the ken of the jury:
A few examples are particularly striking: [the expert's] testimony that the FBI gang task force had seized "[p]robably between 15 and 25” firearms, as well as ammunition, from MS-13 members; his statement that MS-13 members on Long Island had been arrested for dealing narcotics; and his statement that MS-13 had committed "between 18 and 22, 23” murders on Long Island between June 2000 and the trial. No expertise is required to understand any of these facts. Had the Government introduced lay witness testimony, arrest records, death certificates, and other competent evidence of these highly specific facts, the jury could have “intelligently” interpreted and understood it.
Id. at 194-95. The court stated that, despite the need and utility of expert testimony on gangs, such evidence must be limited to issues where "sociological knowledge is appropriate.” Id. at 190. It reasoned that a distinction should be made between the legitimate role of an expert in translating slang or explaining the hierarchical structure within a particular gang and the impermissible substitution of an expert for factual evidence. Id. at 190-91.
Here, Gutierrez attempts to draw similarities between Norris's testimony and evidence supplied by the expert in Mejia: "When [Norris] described the gang’s violent tendencies, acts of retribution, and the like, the jury was potentially influenced that the Defendant formed his intent for premeditated murder simply by being a member and not from the facts and circumstances of the crime." We disagree with Gutierrez's characterization of Norris’s statements, and believe that Mejia is distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, Norris described the gang-specific rituals of MS-13, such as "jumping in,” and the expected level of retribution for insults and “false flagging.” This is exactly the type of sociological knowledge that, if relevant to an issue in the case, Mejia considered appropriate. Norris did not detail specific criminal acts that could have been better established through fact evidence, including arrest records or death certificates. He limited his opinion to the particular customs and generalized background of MS-13, such as its rivalries with other gangs and the significance of the letters and number composing the gang’s name. This is well within the province of proper expert testimony.