Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :There can be little quarrel with the trial court’s conclusion that “[i]t would be the height of injustice to force Edward J. Beggy to pay inheritance tax on his *172own property for the reason that his brother who died owned the other half of the property and kept the property in his safe deposit box.” Furthermore, such an unfair result is neither compelled nor even suggested by the Inheritance and Estate Tax Act of 1961* or by any prior decisions of this Court. For these reasons, I dissent.
Section 241 of the Inheritance and Estate Tax Act deals generally with the taxability of jointly held property and provides in material part as follows: “When any property is held in the names of two or more persons, or is deposited in a financial institution in the names of two or more persons, so that, upon the death of one of them, the survivor or survivors have a right to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment of the whole property, the accrual of such right, upon the death of one of them, shall be deemed a transfer subject to tax under this Act, of a fractional portion of such property to be determined by dividing the value of the whole property by the number of joint tenants in existence immediately preceding the death of the deceased joint tenant. ... If the co-ownership was created in contemplation of death, within the meaning of Section 222 of this Act, the entire interest so transferred shall be subject to tax only under Section 222, as though a part of the estate of the person who created the co-ownership.”
The bonds presently in question were “held in the names” of decedent and his brother Edward Beggy. Although they were deposited in decedent’s, safe deposit box, the trial court specifically found that Edward had contributed at least one half toward their purchase price and that decedent had been holding Edward’s “share” in the bonds merely as a custodian. That be*173ing so, Edward, upon Ms brother’s death, had “a right to the immediate ownership or possession and enjoyment” of the bonds. Finally, there is not the slightest evidence that the co-ownership was “created in contemplation of death.” In light of the foregoing, Section 241 is clearly controlling, and it follows that the trial court correctly ruled that inheritance tax was due only upon one half the value of the bonds.
Notwithstanding Section 241’s unambiguous language and applicability to the instant case, the majority opinion asserts that the decision of this Court in Myers Estate, 359 Pa. 577, 60 A. 2d 50 (1948), compels its present conclusion that the entire value of the bonds is taxable. In my view, Myers is wholly inapposite.
The decedent in Myers purchased bonds with his own funds, registered them jointly in his name and that of Ms brother, and deposited them in a safe deposit box to which his brother did not have access. Because the decedent had bought the bonds with his own assets, the question arose whether all of the bonds were part of his estate or whether there had been a valid inter vivos gift of a one half interest to his brother. Since decedent had retained complete control and had exercised complete dominion over the bonds, it was ruled that all of the bonds were taxable as part of his estate. As an additional reason for so holding, this Court expressed the fear that the opposite result might “encourage the practice of investing one’s estate in such bonds and registering them in joint names for the purpose of circumventing the payment of a legitimate exaction.” 359 Pa. at 582, 60 A. 2d at 53.
In contrast to Myers, the law of inter vivos gifts has no bearing on the present case. As Edward Beggy contributed his own funds to purchase at least one half the bonds, he owned one half of the bonds from the outset. Decedent could scarcely give to Edward that which *174Edward already owned. For the same reason, there should be no concern here about the possibility of a covert scheme of tax avoidance. Since the one half interest in question never belonged to decedent, there was no estate tax to avoid.
The instant case is in essence quite simple: Edward Beggy merely placed his share of the bonds in the custody of his brother. The fact that a decedent holds the property of another in a place inaccessible to its rightful owner surely does not render that property subject to inheritance tax as part of his estate. I for one can find no indication in the Inheritance and Estate Tax Act of 1961 that the Legislature intended such an anomalous and unfair result.
Mr. Justice Baebieri joins in this dissenting opinion.Act of June 15, 1961, P. L. 373, Art II,. §241, 72 P.S. §2485-241.