Concurring and Dissenting.
¶ 1 I agree with the majority’s analysis of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532, and their conclusion that an order, which declares the rights of the parties, constitutes a final, appealable order. However, I believe that our interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act should be applied prospectively, and that this Court should address the merits of the claims raised by State Farm on appeal.
¶ 2 State Farm filed this case as a declaratory judgment action. However, the parties submitted this case, based upon stipulated facts, for the trial court’s determination. Thus, the parties faced a procedural conundrum. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, any order that declares the rights and duties of the parties has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532. Such an order is immediately appealable. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). However, in a case submitted on stipulated facts, the parties must file post-trial motions to preserve their claims for appellate review. See Pa.R.C.P. 1038.1 (stating that the practice and procedure of a case submitted on stipulated facts shall be in accordance with the rules governing a trial without a jury); Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 (requiring the filing of post-trial motions to preserve claims for appellate review).
¶ 3 Further complicating this matter, in Miller v. Kramer, 424 Pa.Super. 48, 621 A.2d 1033 (1993), a panel of this Court held that, in a declaratory judgment action, post-trial motions must be filed following the entry of a decree nisi in a non-jury trial on stipulated facts. See contra Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000) (under different procedural circumstances, holding that an order that affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties constitutes a final order); Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Gisler, 764 A.2d 1111 (Pa.Super.2000) (likewise, under different procedural circumstances, holding that the trial court’s order in a declaratory judgment action, although captioned as a decree nisi constituted a final appealable order).
¶ 4 Because of the conflicting statute, procedural rules and case law, I believe that the majority’s holding should be applied prospectively. I do not believe that *795this Court should penalize a litigant for applying the then valid case law of our Court, and conflicting rules of procedure. For that reason, I agree, in part, with the Dissenting Opinion of my esteemed colleague, President Judge Del Sole, and would address the merits of the claims raised by State Farm on appeal.
¶ 5 TODD, J. joins the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by MUSMANNO, J.