dissenting.
I disagree with the court’s imposition of a constructive trust. Here a trust was established for the education of the parties two minor children and was to automatically expire ten years *403and ninety days after its creation. The funds were then to revert solely to Appellant.
At the time of equitable distribution, both parties knew the terms of the trust. They were aware that although Appellant stated it was his intent that this money be used exclusively for their children’s education, the terms of the trust were obvious and did not require such a use after termination. No legal action was taken to extend the trust beyond the expiration date or to assure wife would receive a portion of the funds, if available, upon the expiration of the trust. The fact that distribution of the marital estate was made, knowing that these funds would revert to Appellant at a date certain, constitutes an agreement on their distribution. If the Appellee sought an interest in the fund, or wished to encumber it further for the children’s education, the matter should have been addressed at the time of distribution.
Also, the trial court’s action does not determine how long the trust should continue, or the conditions for payment of educational costs and it does not deal with the ultimate distribution of excess funds.
I note that the children have the ability to compel Appellant provide necessary post-secondary educational funding. By refusing to impose a trust in favor of Appellee, I do not conclude that the children are unable to seek a contractual determination of their status as beneficiaries of an agreement between their parents governing father’s payment of educational costs. These matters should await the appropriate case before being addressed.
Therefore, I must dissent from the Majority’s affirmance of the order imposing a constructive trust.