concurring in part, dissenting in part'.
I join in the Court’s determination that the August 27 and August 28 statements made by defendant to Tracey are admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). However, I disagree with the majority’s use of the archaic, catch-all phrase res gestae to describe an exception to the hearsay rule that has been codified precisely under our evidence rules.1 Moreover, I am not persuaded by this record that the victim’s reaction to defendant’s August 27 and August 28 phone calls appropriately can be characterized as an excited utterance.
Res gestae, the Latin phrase meaning “things done,” can be used to refer to the events surrounding the issue being litigated, or “other events contemporaneous with them.” Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999). The phrase may have made its first appearance “as early as 1637[but] was not in common use until the early nineteenth century.” Chris Blair, Let’s say Good-bye to Res *167Gestae, 33 Tulsa L.J. 349, 349 (1997). Although “the phrase initially developed as an exception to the hearsay rule for statements [that] were associated with the happening of the principal litigated event, such as a murder, a collision, or a trespass,” eventually it “ ‘seemed to embody the notion that evidence of any concededly relevant act or condition might also bring in the words which accompanied it.’ ” Id. at 349-50. Over the years the res gestae exception has evolved into several different exceptions, including the “present sense impressions, excited utterances, and statements of then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition ... [or] words that we now would refer to as verbal acts or verbal parts of acts.” Id. at 350. Res gestae also has been “used to explain the admissibility of evidence of uncharged misconduct.” Ibid. Although not admissible to show that a “defendant acted in conformity with his character,” uncharged misconduct evidence can be used where “the uncharged misconduct was a part of a single criminal episode and [] the jurors could not adequately evaluate the charged crime without the contextual evidence provided by the uncharged misconduct.” Id. at 350-51.
Use of the res gestae term has been criticized by commentators who find the term to be archaic and largely superseded by specific exceptions set forth in the evidence rules. One commentary has described res gestae as “a confusing and much discredited common law concept” that once served as “a substitute for reasoning and careful analysis.” Virginia M. Klemme & Dennis D. Prater, Res Gestae Raises Its Ugly Head, 65 J. Kans. Bar Ass’n 24, 27 (1996). Yet another discusses how the phrase has outlived its usefulness:
Although the phrase may have played some beneficial role in the development of the law of hearsay and uncharged misconduct evidence, it has been widely criticized for being useless and harmful. It is useless because the concepts included within res gestae can all be explained by reference to other more refined principles of evidence law. It is harmful because it causes confusion of evidentiary principles and acts as a deterrence to principled analysis of evidentiary concepts.
[Blair, supra, 33 Tulsa L.J. at 349 (emphasis added).]
Endorsing its repudiation, Wigmore On Evidence adds:
The phrase res gestae has long been not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful. It is useless, because every rule of evidence to which it has ever been *168applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle and can be explained in the terms of that principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated as a vicious element in our legal phraseology.
[6 Wigmore on Evidence § 1767, at 255 (Chadbourn rev.ed.1976).]
Agreeing that the phrase res gestae no longer enjoys contemporary respect and recognition among courts and scholars, McCormick on Evidence suggests that it can “be jettisoned, with due acknowledgment that it served an era in the evolution of evidence law.” McCormick on Evidence § 268, 196 (Strong ed., 5th ed.1999). That source observes that res gestae once made it easier for “courts to broaden its coverage and thus permit the admissibility of certain statements in new situations,” but suggests that “the law has now reached a stage where expanding admissibility is better done in other ways.” Ibid.
Some federal courts either explicitly or impliedly have expressed disapproval of the continued reference to res gestae in evidence law. The Seventh Circuit in Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1003 (1994), for example, after acknowledging that other federal courts have “described the phrase res gestae as useless, harmful, and almost inescapable of a definition,” noted that “for purposes of the Constitution and federal law, the term res gestae is without significance.” The Third Circuit in Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 509 (1985), stated that “[a] declaration sought to be admitted must qualify under one of the genuine exceptions to the hearsay rule” because “[t]he old catchall, ‘res gestae,’ is no longer part of the law of evidence.”
Federal courts are not alone in articulating their dissatisfaction with the phrase res gestae. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 249 Ga. 223, 290 S.E. 2d 71, 74 (Ga.l982)(acknowledging overwhelming criticism of res gestae although deciding ultimately not to abandon “traditional discussions concerning res gestae,” at least in present case); Berryhill v. State, 726 So. 2d 297, 300 (Ala.Crim.App.1998)(“ ‘Although ... nearly always referred to or described in the Alabama decisions as being a part of the res gestae, it is submitted that the terms ‘spontaneous exclamation’ *169and ‘excited utterance’ are preferable because the words ‘res gestae’ have been used to signify so many different things that their use is calculated to promote confusion as to the proper scope of the present exception.’ ”)(quoting Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 265.01(1) at 1281 (5th ed.1996)); B & K Rentals and Sales Co., Inc. v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 324 Md. 147, 596 A.2d 640, 644 (Md.l991)(‘We agree ... that ‘this troublesome expression owes its existence and persistence in our law of evidence to an inclination of judges and lawyers to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis and precise thinking.’”); Bynote v. National Super Markets, Inc., 891 R.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo.l995)(en banc)(disapproving of parties “free use of the term,” and stating that “[t]he phrase is virtually meaningless in determining what a trial court means when it permits testimony on the basis of the ‘res gestae ’ exception to the hearsay rule”); Evert v. Swick, 300 Mont. 427, 8 P.3d 773, 777 (Mont.2000)(“ ‘The phrase res gestae, in itself, adds nothing but confusion to an already complex area of the law. The better practice is to abandon the use of the phrase altogether and to, instead, use the specific rule of evidence or statute that applies to the particular factual situation presented.’ ”) (citations omitted); State v. Hajford, 410 A.2d 219, 220 (Me.l980)(finding “occasion to express [ ] disapproval of the use of the term [r]es gestae,” and stating that “[Continued use of that label by the bench and bar would serve only to confuse and mislead”); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 241, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001)(Wefing, J., concurring)(writing separately “because of [her] disquiet with the concept of res gestae ” to describe evidence that was not so intimately part of chain of events forming charge for which defendant was convicted).
The principles that historically have comprised the res gestae exception have been codified, but without use of the words “res gestae.” Characteristic of the imprecision that accompanies continued reliance on the phrase res gestae is the majority’s reference to res gestae as the state of mind exception now codified at N.J.R.E. 803(c)(3). Ante at 153 and 157, 801 A.2d at 230 and 232. *170However, as noted, the res gestae concept has been superseded by four separate hearsay exceptions: present sense impressions, excited utterances, present bodily conditions, and present mental states and emotions. Because those principles have been codified by specific exceptions, the Court would be better served by abandoning continued reference to the phrase res gestae and replacing it with the precise analysis contemplated by our Rules of Evidence.
I also question the majority’s determination that the August 27 and August 28 statements are admissible under the excited utterance exception. N.J.R.E 803(c)(2) defines an excited utterance as “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event or the condition and without opportunity to deliberate or fabricate.” Although the majority correctly observed that Tracey likely had “no opportunity [ ] to fabricate before recounting the statements to Irene,” ante at 160, 801 A.2d at 234 in my view, defendant’s statements to Tracey were not sufficiently “startling” to justify their admission under the excited utterance exception.
“The assumption underlying this exception is that a person under the sway of excitement precipitated by an external event will be bereft of the reflective capacity essential for fabrication.” Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence Manual § 16.02[01](1987). To come within the exception, the rule requires that the declarant not have had the opportunity to fabricate, but also contemplates that the statements were made in response to something unexpected and shocking that the person has perceived or participated in so as to cause an uncontrollable emotion. “[Tjhere must be an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer.” McCormick on Evidence, swpra, § 272, at 204.
Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on N.J.R.E. 803(c)(2) states:
Note that while the present Rule speaks to statements “relating to” a startling event and eliminates the explicit requirement of the former rule that the deelar-*171ant’s excitement be caused by the perception of the startling event, leaving open the possibility under the new formulation that an admissible statement could be made by a person excited by an event which was reported to him but which took place outside his personal perception, it was the intention of the drafters to replace the former rale without substantive change____It is therefore submitted that the present perception requirement remains implicit in the Rule.
“If the requisite excitement is lacking then statements cannot be admissible under the rule regardless of how close to the time of the starling event they were made.” Ibid. Normally, the sufficiency of the event or occurrence is easily resolved where the declar-ant is involved in or observes the event, such as an automobile accident, a fight or an attack by a dog. McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 272, at 205. In deciding whether the event or occurrence is sufficiently starting, “courts look primarily to the effects upon the declarant” of the statement, id. at 206 or the “shock value of the event in question,” Weinstein, supra, at § 16.02[02].
The majority concludes that the challenged statements are admissible, assuming that Tracey was under the “stress of excitement” caused by defendant’s recitation of the August statements to Tracey. Ante at 160, 801 A.2d at 234. It reasons that because Tracey had “no reason to misrepresent what defendant had told her” and because she repeated them “almost contemporaneously as she heard them over the telephone,” those facts “[cjlearly ... demonstrate that Tracey was under the stress of excitement caused by defendant’s statements” to her that defendant’s mother had fallen and died. Ibid. Although those factors are relevant in proving the reliability of the challenged statements, they do not necessarily demonstrate that Tracey was under sufficient stress or under any stress when those statements were made. In any event, the Court’s conclusion that the statements are admissible pursuant to the state of mind exception is well supported, and reliance on the excited utterance exception is not necessary.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ,
Justices COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 6.
*172Concurring — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justice LONG — 2.
Concurring in part; dissenting in part — Justice STEIN — 1.
With the benefit of hindsight, I must acknowledge that I have been remiss in previously joining opinions that applied res gestae without expressing the reservations about its contemporaiy use that I advance in this opinion. See, e.g., State v. Schumann, 111 N.J. 470, 545 A.2d 168 (1988)