CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:¶ 1 I agree that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction but respectfully dissent from the majority’s refusal to grant Appellant a new trial based upon the trial court’s erroneous instruction that Appellant had the burden of proof as to the existence of a sudden emergency.
¶ 2 The majority first suggests that since the sudden emergency doctrine is a civil concept, it should not be permitted as a defense in this criminal action. I disagree. Initially, it is important to keep in mind that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense to criminal charges. The United States Supreme Court has consistently admonished that the “Constitution ... prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote])]” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, -, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). The Court stated in Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) (emphasis added):
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations. The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948), identified these rights as among the minimum essentials of a fair trial:
“A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense — a right to his day in court — are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.”
Accord Commonwealth v. Ward, 529 Pa. 506, 605 A.2d 796, 797 (1992) (“An accused has a fundamental right to present evidence so long as the evidence is relevant and not excluded by an established eviden-tiary rule.”).
¶ 3 Evidence of the existence of a sudden emergency certainly is not excluded by any evidentiary rule and is relevant in this prosecution for vehicular homicide because it negates the existence of negligence by the actor. It must be recalled that Appellant was charged with negligently causing the death of Ms. Story and specifically with homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(a), which states:
Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to *457the regulation of traffic except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
¶ 4 To establish that the defendant committed the crime of homicide by vehicle, the Commonwealth must have proven that the defendant acted recklessly, as outlined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). Commonwealth v. Grimes, 842 A.2d 432 (Pa.Super.2004). Section 302(b)(3) states:
(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.
¶ 5 The sudden emergency doctrine absolves a person of liability for negligence in causing a motor vehicle accident if while otherwise driving prudently, the person is confronted with a sudden and unexpected dangerous situation but does not have the opportunity to apprehend and avoid that situation. Lockhart v. List, 542 Pa. 141, 665 A.2d 1176 (1995). It derives from the common law, id. at 148 n. 2, 665 A.2d at 1179 n. 2, and is employed in motor vehicle accidents when a driver is confronted with a dangerous situation requiring a quick response to avoid a collision. It therefore negates the existence of negligence.
¶ 6 As noted above, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(a), vehicular homicide, has an intent element which mandates that a person act “recklessly or with gross negligence.” Thus, to establish that the defendant committed the crime of homicide by vehicle, the Commonwealth must have proven that the defendant acted recklessly, as outlined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3). Grimes, supra. Pursuant to section 302(b)(3), a defendant acts recklessly if he “consciously disregards” a risk, and that disregard must involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the defendant’s situation.
¶ 7 The sudden emergency doctrine applies to establish that a person was not negligent, and thus, acted as a reasonable person would have acted in the defendant’s situation. The existence of a sudden emergency, as it does in the civil setting, would disprove in this criminal setting that the defendant disregarded a risk because the defendant would not have been aware of the risk until it was too late to act reasonably under the circumstances. Similarly, if a defendant was faced with a sudden emergency, leaving him insufficient time to act in the most prudent manner, that fact would prove that he did not act with the criminal intent set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3) because he did not deviate from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the defendant’s situation.
¶ 8 The majority’s conclusion that the trial court incorrectly allowed Appellant to present the sudden emergency doctrine because it was a “civil concept” is inconsistent with Commonwealth v. Uhrinek, 518 Pa. 532, 544 A.2d 947 (1988). In that case, the Supreme Court awarded the defendant a new trial after he was convicted of homicide by vehicle because the trial court excluded evidence of the victim’s intoxication, and the defendant was prepared to establish that the intoxication contributed to the accident. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence of a victim’s “contributory negligence,” which is unquestionably a “civil concept,” even though contributory *458negligence is not a “defense,” can be presented to the jury if that contributory negligence was the cause of the death. The Court in Uhrinek stated that in order to sustain a conviction for homicide by vehicle, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct is a direct and substantial cause of the death and that the defendant is entitled to present evidence that the victim’s actions were the actual cause of the injury.
¶ 9 We applied Uhrinek in Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 423 Pa.Super. 571, 621 A.2d 681 (1993). In Hutchinson, the defendant was convicted of homicide by vehicle, driving under the influence, and driving at an unsafe speed. The victim was driving a tractor at the time of the nighttime accident, and there was evidence that tractor did not have proper lights on the rear and that its improper lighting contributed to the accident. We concluded that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the decedent’s failure to place proper lighting on the tractor was the cause of the accident. We also held that the jury should have been instructed that the jury must consider whether the decedent’s conduct, as opposed to that of the defendant, was the cause of the accident and that in order to be convicted, the defendant’s conduct must be the direct cause of the death.
¶ 10 In the present case, the sudden emergency doctrine would negate the intent element of vehicular homicide by establishing that Appellant was not acting recklessly when he struck the truck and caused it to move into oncoming traffic because he was faced with a sudden, unexpected emergency leaving little or no time to react, and he did not consciously disregard a risk of harm to others. He was constitutionally entitled to present this evidence and obtain a related instruction that the existence of a sudden emergency can negate the existence of recklessness. Commonwealth v. Weiskerger, 520 Pa. 305, 312-313, 554 A.2d 10, 14 (1989) (citing Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988)) (“A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any recognized defense which has been requested, which has been made an issue in the ease, and for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his or her favor.”).
¶ 11 Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s position, Appellant’s testimony regarding how the accident occurred, even though refuted by other witnesses, was sufficient to establish the existence of a sudden emergency and warranted an appropriate instruction that the existence of a sudden emergency can demonstrate that a person was not negligent under the circumstances. It is beyond question in this Commonwealth that a defendant’s testimony, standing alone, can provide the necessary factual support to require jury instructions on a given defense. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874 (Pa.Super.2001). Our Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s testimony that he was not at the scene of the crime, even if contradicted by other compelling testimony, is sufficient to require an alibi instruction and an instruction that even if the jurors do not believe the defendant’s testimony, they should acquit if the defendant’s alibi evidence raises a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Pounds, 490 Pa. 621, 417 A.2d 597, 602 (1980). Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 766 A.2d 342 (2001), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for simple assault because the defendant’s testimony, by itself, established the existence of self-defense, and the Commonwealth had failed to adduce any evidence to refute the existence of self-defense.
*459¶ 12 In my view, Appellant’s testimony was sufficient to establish the existence of a sudden emergency. Consistently with a statement given to police, Appellant testified at trial that he was traveling within or slightly above the speed limit in the left-hand southbound lane and was not tailgating the pickup truck when he passed Mr. Ortiz the second time on Fruitville Pike. He also stated that the pickup truck suddenly swerved into the right lane to avoid hitting the tractor-trailer and that he did not see the tractor-trailer until this point. Appellant told the jury that he swerved into the right lane to avoid the tractor-trailer, hit the curb, and then struck the tractor-trailer.
¶ 13 Specifically, Appellant testified as follows. He left home before daylight at approximately 6:10 a.m. to arrive for work at 7:00 a.m. He had plenty of time to arrive at work, stopped at the Fruitville Bagel Shop, and proceeded south on Fruit-ville Pike in the left lane, stopping next to Mr. Ortiz, who was in the right hand lane, at a red light at the intersection of Red Rose Commons. It was not possible to view the intersection with Dillerville Road from that vantage point due to a ridge in the roadway.
¶ 14 When the light turned green, both Appellant and Mr. Ortiz accelerated, but Mr. Ortiz pulled ahead. A pickup truck passed Appellant on the right and then pulled in front of Appellant. The three vehicles were traveling between forty to forty-five miles per hour, and Appellant was not tailgating the pickup truck. As the three vehicles approached the intersection with Dillerville Road, Appellant saw Mr. Ortiz slow and thought that Mr. Ortiz was turning right. Appellant could not see in front of the pickup truck. Suddenly, the pickup truck moved into the right lane, exposing the rear of the slow moving tractor-trailer. Appellant explained that “all of a sudden it was just like somebody pulling a curtain, bango. Here is this brown truck just sitting there. I estimate his speed at 10 miles an hour. And I had, I felt at that time, one to two seconds to decide what I should do, could do” N.T. Trial, 3/4/05, at 454. Appellant stressed that when he first observed the brown tractor-trailer, he had “a second or two to react” to avoid striking it. Id. at 455. In an evasive move, Appellant swerved “into the right lane to avoid hitting the back end of the [tractor-trailer].” Id. Appellant stated that it was not his intention to pass that truck, but he merely tried to avoid hitting it. Id. After proceeding into the right lane, Appellant ov-ersteered, and his car struck the curb. Appellant lost control of his car and “swung back to the left,” striking the tractor-trailer.
¶ 15 Appellant’s testimony, even though contradicted by other evidence, did support the existence of a sudden emergency. Appellant stated that he was neither speeding nor tailgating and could not see the tractor-trailer until the pickup suddenly swerved. He explained that he could not see the tractor-trailer due to the lighting at the time of the accident, the sight lines on the road, and the interference of the pickup truck. Once the pickup truck veered to the right, Appellant stated that he did not have sufficient time to react to avoid the accident. According to Appellant, he was driving prudently but that due to various conditions, he did not see the truck until it was too late.
¶ 16 A standard instruction that the Commonwealth has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to recklessness, together with an instruction on the sudden emergency doctrine, would have correctly conveyed the law. However, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that Appellant had the burden of proving *460the existence of a sudden emergency by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the court stated as follows: “To invoke the sudden emergency doctrine, the defendant must establish a sudden emergency by a preponderance of the evidence and it must appear that he was driving with due regard for the condition of the highway and traffic conditions.” N.T. Trial, 3/7/05, at 661. Appellant lodged a specific objection to the trial court’s placement of the burden of proof on him, arguing that the Commonwealth needed to disprove the existence of a sudden emergency beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 665-67. This instruction was critical constitutional error.
¶ 17 Under the United States Constitution, the prosecution in a criminal matter has the unshifting burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to all elements of a crime, including the intent element of an offense. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). The sudden emergency doctrine negates the intent element of vehicular homicide, one of the elements of the offense outlined by our legislature. When a defense operates to negate the mens rea element of a crime, the Commonwealth has the burden of disproving such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Hamilton, supra; Commonwealth v. Namack, 444 Pa.Super. 9, 663 A.2d 191, 194 (1995). As we stated in Hamilton, supra at 881 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cottam, 420 Pa.Super. 311, 616 A.2d 988, 1000-1001 (1992) (emphases omitted)):
In any criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth has the unshifting burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crime charged. The burden is neither increased nor diminished when a defendant attempts to disprove an element of the crime by introducing an affirmative defense. Accordingly, when charging a jury, a trial judge must communicate to the jury that when evidence of an affirmative defense is offered, the Commonwealth still has the burden to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden never shifts to the defendant. Moreover, the trial judge must state that the jury’s determination that the affirmative defense has not been established is essential to finding that the Commonwealth has met its burden.
Accord Pounds, supra (because the defendant does not have the burden of proof in a criminal case, to infer guilt based upon the failure to establish a defense violates presumption of innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proving offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶ 18 In this case, the trial court shifted the burden of proof to Appellant to establish that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The instruction at issue clearly and unequivocally shifted that burden to Appellant, it was improper, and it prejudiced him. While the Commonwealth counters that the instruction was not prejudicial because it was given in connection with the instructions on the violations of the Motor Vehicle Code, I cannot agree. The jury was improperly told that Appellant bore the burden of proof in this criminal action. Simply put, this instruction’s placement did not obviate its unconstitutional dimension. I would grant Appellant a new trial due to this erroneous jury instruction and respectfully dissent.