Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.
Dissent: ALEXANDER, and JABAR, JJ.
MEAD, J.[¶ 1] Christopher A. Bond appeals from an order entered by the District Court (Portland, Dobson, J.) granting Lynda J.R. Bond’s motion to have two post-judgment motions for relief heard by the same referee whose report formed the basis of the parties’ divorce judgment. Christopher contends that (1) the court’s order is immediately appealable; (2) although he had agreed to have a referee hear the divorce case, the court erred in appointing a referee to hear the post-judgment motions over his objection pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 119; and (3) the court lacked authority pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 252(1) (2010) to appoint a referee to hear the particular motions at issue. Because we conclude that no exception to the final judgment rule applies in this case, we dismiss the interlocutory appeal and do not reach its merits.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Lynda and Christopher Bond were married in October 1981; Lynda filed a complaint for divorce in January 2008. By joint motion, the parties asked the District Court to appoint a referee to hear the divorce case pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 119 and 19-A M.R.S. § 252 (2010).1 The court granted the motion and appointed Attorney Karen F. Wolf as referee.
[¶3] The case was presented to the referee in February 2010. During the *819four-day hearing, the referee heard testimony from the parties and seven expert appraisers, in addition to receiving in evidence a large number of exhibits and two stipulations. On August 17, 2010, the referee filed her thirty-two-page amended report. Both parties waived objection, and on August 31 the court (Goranites, J.) accepted the report, entering a divorce judgment incorporating the report two days later.
[¶ 4] Twenty-two days after the divorce judgment was entered, Lynda filed two motions for post-judgment relief, one pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)2 and the other pursuant to the omitted property statute,3 based on her allegation that Christopher had reneged on his agreement at the hearing to file their 2009 tax returns jointly. Lynda moved to have the motions heard before the same referee that conducted the earlier hearing. Christopher opposed this request, asserting inter alia that pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 119 the court could not do so without his renewed consent. After hearing argument, the court referred the motions to the referee over Christopher’s objection, finding that “it is in the interest of judicial economy for the Referee to hear the post-judgment motions because of the complex issues and the Referee’s familiarity with the case.” This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 5] Before reaching the merits of the parties’ arguments, we must first decide whether this interlocutory appeal should be dismissed pursuant to the final judgment rule. Absent an exception, “the final judgment rule prevents a party from appealing a trial court’s decision on a motion before a final judgment has been rendered.” Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71, ¶ 12, 974 A.2d 918. Although both parties urge us to reach the merits here, we will “consider sua sponte whether a matter is properly before us on appeal from a final judgment.” Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶ 7, 15 A.3d 756. “A judgment is final only if it disposes of all the pending claims in the action, leaving no questions for the future consideration of the court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
[¶6] Here, although the terms of the divorce judgment became final when the judgment was signed, see Estate of Banks v. Banks, 2009 ME 34, ¶ 9, 968 A.2d 525; M.R. Civ. P. 115(b), Christopher’s appeal is not from the judgment’s terms, but rather the court’s procedural order referring Lynda’s post-judgment motions back to the referee whose report formed the basis of the judgment. The resolution of those motions remains a “question[ ] for the future consideration of the court” in the divorce action. Bank of N.Y., 2011 ME 38, ¶ 7, 15 A.3d 756 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we must determine whether any exception to the final judgment rule applies to this interlocutory appeal taken from the court’s second order of reference, or whether an appeal must await a new or amended final judgment following resolution of the post-judgment motions.4
*820[¶ 7] There are several exceptions to the final judgment rule, three of which we discuss here: the death knell, collateral order, and judicial economy exceptions. See Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 304(a)-(c) at 202-04 (3d ed.2008); Fiber Materials, Inc., 2009 ME 71, ¶¶ 14, 25, 26, 974 A.2d 918.
A. Death Knell Exception
[¶ 8] In Fiber Materials, Inc., we said:
The death knell exception applies if substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment. A right is irreparably lost if the appellant would not have an effective remedy if the interlocutory determination were to be vacated after a final disposition of the entire litigation. Put differently, where an interlocutory order has the practical effect of permanently foreclosing relief on a claim, that order is appealable. Cost or delay alone is insufficient to establish the irreparable loss of a right.
2009 ME 71, ¶ 14, 974 A.2d 918 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 9] Christopher asserts that absent an immediate appeal he will irreparably lose “[t]he right to have the District Court, and not a referee, determine the facts de novo,” and that this right, “once taken away cannot be regained.” His assertion does not withstand scrutiny.
[¶ 10] If this appeal is dismissed, the post-judgment motions will proceed to the referee for hearing and decision. Whatever that decision is, it is subject to the parties’ objections and review by the District Court, which may adopt, modify, or reject the decision, with or without receiving further evidence.5 M.R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2). Assuming that the parties do not settle them dispute in the interim, a final judgment of the trial court, encompassing both the procedural issue presented here and the merits of the post-judgment motions, would then be before this Court on appeal. If Christopher prevailed on his argument that the second order of reference required his renewed consent, we could then vacate the judgment and remand for a de novo hearing on the post-judgment motions before a judge. Because we are able to correct on appeal from a final judgment any procedural error the court might have made in initially referring Lynda’s motions to the referee, Christopher suffers no irreparable harm by the court’s action.
B. Collateral Order Exception
[¶ 11] The collateral order exception is closely related to the death knell exception. See Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 304(b) at 203. It applies “when the appellant can establish that (1) the decision is a final determination of a claim separable from the gravamen of the litigation; (2) it presents a major unsettled *821question of law; and (3) it would result in irreparable loss of the rights claimed, absent immediate review.” Fiber Materials, Inc., 2009 ME 71, ¶ 25, 974 A.2d 918 (quotation marks omitted). For the reasons discussed above, there is no irreparable loss of a right at stake here, and so this exception does not apply.
C; Judicial Economy Exception
[¶ 12] The judicial economy exception “is available in those rare cases in which appellate review of a non-final order can establish a final, or practically final, disposition of the entire litigation. It applies only when a decision on the appeal ... regardless of what it is, would effectively dispose of the entire case.” Id. ¶ 26 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 13] Given the history of this divorce litigation, it is possible, and perhaps likely, that the party that does not prevail on the post-judgment motions will appeal from the District Court’s final judgment on the motions, regardless of whether the initial fact-finder is the referee or the court. Neither party has represented that a decision on the discrete procedural issue presented to us now will finally resolve the disputed substantive economic issue. Therefore, a decision on this interlocutory appeal, “regardless of what it is,” will not “effectively dispose of the entire case.” Id. For that reason, the judicial economy exception is not applicable.
D. Conclusion
[¶ 14] Although the parties have succinctly presented an intriguing procedural question to the Court, we cannot reach it at this juncture without doing violence to our well-established jurisprudence. Regardless of how discrete and intriguing an issue may be, unless it falls within an established exception to the final judgment rule, our scrutiny must await a final judgment where it, and all other preserved issues, may be addressed together. For that reason, we must dismiss the appeal as interlocutory.
The entry is:
Appeal dismissed.
.M.R. Civ. P. 119 provides: "The court may appoint a referee in any case where the parties agree that the case may be heard by a referee, pursuant to Rule 53.”
Title 19-A M.R.S. § 252 (2010) provides:
1. Appointment of Referee. The court may appoint a referee in any proceeding for paternity, divorce, judicial separation or modification of existing judgments brought under this Title:
A. When the parties agree the case may be tried before a referee; or
B. Upon motion demonstrating exceptional circumstances that require a referee.
2. Payment for Service. Payment for the services of the referee is the responsibility of the parties, as ordered by the court. If the court finds that either or both of the parties are indigent, the court may pay the reasonable costs and expenses of the referee.
3. Referee’s Report. If all parties waive their right to object to acceptance of the referee's report, the court shall immediately enter judgment on the referee’s report without a further hearing.
. Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment for six reasons, two of which Lynda asserted in her motion: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” and "(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”
. Title 19-A M.R.S. § 953(9) (2010) provides: If a final divorce decree fails to set apart or divide marital property over which the court had jurisdiction, the omitted property is deemed held by both parties as tenants in common. On the motion of either party, the court may set aside or divide the omitted property between the parties, as justice may require.
.The question of whether the appeal must await the entry of a new or amended final judgment pursuant to the final judgment rule is different from the central question present*820ed by the merits of Christopher's appeal, which is whether the second order of reference is part of the original divorce “case” within the meaning of M.R. Civ. P. 119, or constitutes a new “case” requiring his renewed consent before it may be referred to a referee. Our answer to the first question does not answer the second, and we do not address the question presented by the merits.
. The court's active role in conducting a hearing and then deciding Lynda’s motion for a second order of reference demonstrates that it is not refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over this case, a circumstance that could provide a basis for us to hear the interlocutory appeal. Christopher does not contend that the court is declining to exercise its jurisdiction; he contends that the court is exercising its jurisdiction wrongly. Nothing in the record indicates that the court is not fulfilling its role pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2) in the same way that it did following its first order of reference.