DISSENTING OPINION BY
COLVILLE, J.:I dissent.
MRO filed amended preliminary objections to C & M’s second amended complaint. MRO’s preliminary objections raised several grounds in support of its contention that C & M’s complaint is legally insufficient. Central to this appeal, MRO maintained that a demurrer is appropriate because MRO “complied with [Section 6155 of the MRA] by charging fees that did not exceed the amounts set forth in [Subsection 6152(a)(2)© of the MRAJ” MRO’s Amended Preliminary Objections to C & M’s Second Amended Class Action Complaint, 04/06/10, at ¶ 22.
MRO’s preliminary objections did raise other grounds in an attempt to have the court grant a demurrer. For instance, in its complaint, C & M alleged that MRO charged a sales tax for its services and that such charges are not permitted under Pennsylvania law. MRO argued that Counts I and II of the complaint, ie., counts that, in part, concern the charging and payment of sales tax, should be dismissed because MRO is required to charge a sales tax. MRO further argued that, if C & M believes that they are entitled to recover the sales tax, they must petition the Department of Revenue for such relief. In addition, MRO contended in a separate preliminary objection that, even if C & M’s claims are legally sufficient, the claims are barred by the voluntary payment doctrine.
*1283In response to MRO’s preliminary objections, the trial court entered the following order:
On this 17th day of June, 2010, upon consideration of [MRO’s] preliminary objections seeking dismissal of [C & M’s] Second Amended Complaint on the ground that [C & M] were not charged any amount for production of medical records that exceeded the amounts set forth in the second sentence of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6152(a)(i), as adjusted, it is hereby ORDERED that these preliminary objections are overruled based on my construction of the relevant provisions of the [MRA] as not allowing charges that exceed actual and reasonable expenses.
I am of the opinion that this order of court overruling [MRO’s] preliminary objections involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from this order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter.
Trial Court Order, 06/18/10 (emphasis added). This Court later granted MRO’s petition for permission to appeal the court’s order.
The order subject to this appeal only overruled MRO’s preliminary objections which claimed that a demurrer was required because the amounts MRO charged C & M did not violate Subsection 6152(a)(2)(i) of the MRA. As I interpret the trial court’s order, the court has yet to rule on the remainder of MRO’s preliminary objections. Thus, in my view, the sole controlling question of law before this Court is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the MRA such that MRO could only receive payment for its actual and reasonable expenses.1
I do not believe that a Pennsylvania appellate court, including the Supreme Court in Liss & Marion, P.C. v. Recordex Acquisition Corp., 603 Pa. 198, 983 A.2d 652 (2009), has addressed the issue currently before this Court. Thus, I would turn to the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et. seq., for guidance in interpreting the pertinent provisions of the MRA.2
Under the Statutory Construction Act, the object of all statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intention. When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
*1284Parker, 962 A.2d at 1212 (citations omitted).
Subsection 6155 of the MRA, which governs the manner in which MRO was to determine its charges, states in relevant part, “A health care provider or facility shall not charge a patient or his designee, including his attorney, a fee in excess of the amounts set forth in section 6152(a)(2)(i) (relating to subpoena of records).” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6155(b). Pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language employed in Subsection 6152(a)(2)(i) of the MRA, designated agents of health care providers, such as MRO, “shall be entitled to receive payment of such expenses before producing the charts or records.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6152(a)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
The only reference to “expenses” in Section 6152 that precedes Subsection 6152(a)(2)(i)’s “such expenses” terminology can be found in Subsection 6152(a), wherein the General Assembly specifically references “estimated actual and reasonable expenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6152(a) (“[I]t shall be deemed a sufficient response to the subpoena if the health care provider or health care facility notifies the attorney for the party causing service of the subpoena ... of the estimated actual and reasonable expenses of reproducing the charts or records.”) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, after mandating that entities such as MRO receive payment of “such expenses,” Subsection 6152(a)(2)© provides,
The payment shall not exceed $15 for searching for and retrieving the records, $1 per page for paper copies for the first 20 pages, 75<[ per page for pages 21 through 60 and 25<c per page for pages 61 and thereafter; $1.50 per page for copies from microfilm; plus the actual cost of postage, shipping or delivery.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6152(a)(2)© (emphasis added). In my view, by stating that “the payment shall not exceed” the various prices listed, the plain language of Subsection 6152(a)(2)® sets a cap on the amounts entities such as MRO can charge with respect to their expenses; the subsection does not set a default rate that such entities may or should charge.
In short, I am of the opinion that the clear and unambiguous language of the pertinent provisions of the MRA evinces the General Assembly’s intent to require entities such as MRO to receive payment only for their estimated actual and reasonable expenses; these expenses cannot exceed the limits expressed in Subsection 6152(a)(2)©. Consequently, because the trial court’s interpretation of the MRA comports with the Statutory Construction Act, I would affirm the order and remand for further proceedings.
. My beliefs in this regard are bolstered by the trial court’s opinion, which only addressed its interpretation of the MRA. In fact, in its opinion, the court states, inter alia:
If [MRO's] construction of the [MRA] is correct, this case and all related litigation will be dismissed. However, if [C & M's] construction of the MRA is correct, this litigation will require consideration of several (possibly complicated) factual and legal issues, including what are actual and reasonable expenses, the applicability of the voluntary payment doctrine, and the applicability of the prior approval provision of [Subsection 6152(a)(2)(i).
Trial Court Opinion, 06/18/10, at 3 (emphasis added); id. at 12 ("For these reasons, I am overruling [MRO’s] preliminary objections seeking dismissal of [C & M's] complaint on the ground that [MRO’s] charges did not exceed the amounts provided for in the second sentence of 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6152(a)(2)(i).”) (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
. "Statutory interpretation implicates a question of law. Thus, [this Court's] scope of review [would be] plenary, and [its] standard of review [would be] de novo." U.S. Bank. Nat. Ass’n v. Parker, 962 A.2d 1210, 1211 n. 1 (Pa.Super.2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted).