DISSENTING OPINION by
Judge PELLEGRINI.I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I would hold that the Community College of Beaver County (Community College) is immune from suit because the action brought sounds in tort, not in contract. I also dissent because the majority holds that the Community College is engaged in “trade or commerce” as that term is used in the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (CPL).1 Because that issue was not raised and briefed, I would not address that issue. Because the majority did, I would hold that the CPL does not apply as a governmental agency does not engage in the business of “trade or commerce” because a governmental agency only engages in the “business” of government.
A group of former students (Students) filed a civil action against the Community College for breach of contract and breach of warranty as well as various unfair or deceptive acts as defined in the CPL. In them complaint, the Students alleged that they had completed a substantial portion of the training when the Community College lost its certification under the governing statute as a result of decertification, the credits they earned could not be recognized elsewhere, and they incurred damages as a result. In Meyer v. Community College of Beaver County, 606 Pa. 539, 2 A.3d 499 (2010), reversing in part this Court, our Supreme Court held that governmental immunity created by the Political Subdivision Torts Claim Act2 does not extend to all statutory causes of action, regardless of whether they sound in tort or contract. The Supreme Court then remanded the matter to us to address issues previously raised in the Community Colleges’ partial motion for summary judgment but not addressed in our opinion.
While it raised many issues in its partial motion for summary judgment, the Community College only addressed two of those issues in its brief. First, the Community College argued that it was not subject to liability under the CPL because it is not a “person” within the definition of Section 2.2 of the CPL so as to impose *601liability under Section 9.2(a).3 I agree with that portion of the majority’s opinion that the Community College is a “person” for the purpose of imposing liability under the CPL if it meets the other preconditions for liability under the CPL.
The second issue the Community College raised in its brief is that the Students’ claims sound in tort, not contract. It argues that a course catalog does not create a contract between the parties upon which to base a contract action. Second, representations made by the Community College staff members cannot create a contractual obligation. Based on an examination of the complaint, the majority finds that those allegations the Students have pled sound in contract, not tort. I disagree with the majority because I do not believe that the Students have made out a contractual claim and would dismiss the action.
Insofar as the Students claim that a contract action can be based on breach of representation contained in the student handbook because the handbook created a contract, we rejected that contention in Tran v. State System of Higher Education, 986 A.2d 179 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009), where we explicitly held that a student handbook of a public university does not create a contract between the public university and the student. See also Crabtree v. California University of Pennsylvania, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 606 A.2d 1239, 1240 n. 3 (1990). Because community colleges are public colleges, a contract action cannot be maintained on an alleged breach of a student handbook or catalog.
As to whether representations by the Community College staff can create a contract between the parties, ignoring that contracts with bodies have to be entered in compliance with statutory formalities, representations made by staff members are not sufficient to bring a contract claim. In Matarazzo v. Millers Mutual Group, Inc., 927 A.2d 689 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), we addressed whether a contract claim could be brought based upon a governmental employee’s representation on which a party relied causing them injury. While we agreed that an action could be maintained for private parties, it could not be used to turn negligent actions by governmental employees into contract actions to avoid governmental immunity. If we were to hold otherwise, any guidance counselor who foolishly and negligently promised to a student that if he or she took a course and did well, he or she would get into Harvard, and then the student would take those courses and do well but did not get into Harvard, could bring an action in contract.
Finally, in footnote 16, the majority holds that it sees “nothing in the language or structure of the CPL to suggest a legislative intent to insulate local agencies engaged in trade or commerce from responsibility for unfair or deceptive practices which cause a loss to Pennsylvania Consumers.” First, I disagree because this issue was never raised or briefed by any of the parties, and we should not address it sua sponte. Second, I disagree with the substance of the holding. The reason that I would hold that the CPL does not apply is not that the Community College is not a person but that is not engaged in the conduct of a “trade or commerce.” “Trade or commerce” is mercantile activity in which the person engaged in that business is doing so for private profit which could motivate unfair or deceptive practices for private gain or, more accurately, private greed. All of the provisions of the CPL are aimed at private businesses. The Community College is not engaged in the *602conduct of “trade or commerce” but is carrying out a public responsibility with tax dollars to provide students with an affordable education to citizens of the Commonwealth. In other words, when a governmental entity is carrying out a public duty, it is not engaged in the conduct of a trade or commerce, but in the conduct of government. If this issue was before us, I would hold that the CPL does not apply.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
. Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, as amended, 73 P.S. §§ 201-1 — 201-9.3.
. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8541.
. Added by the Act of November 24, 1976, P.L. 1166.