(concurring in part). We join in the opinion of Judge Conford with respect to defendant Zurich American Insurance Company subject to a comment hereinafter made, but we conclude that there should also be a retrial of the case with respect to State Earm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
In dealing with the omnibus clause, we should be mindful of several considerations which call for an expansive view of its coverage.
The insured has plenary authority to decide whether to permit another to use the covered vehicle. The carrier is bound by the insured’s decision, and the amount of the premium does not depend upon how extensive or restrained are the insured’s actions in that regard. Thus viewed, the omnibus clause is for the benefit of the insured rather than the insurer, the carrier’s liability turning wholly upon whether the insured did or did not, in his sole discretion, choose to permit another to use the car.
And permission involves no specific ritual. It may be given most casually, and may readily be implied from circumstances, especially when the actors are friends and the use involved is quite small. Ordinarily an insured would want his friends to be covered. That fact remains cogent, even if the insured is unable to say categorically that the operation was with his permission or consent. Weight must be given to the relationship of the parties and to the probabilities which that relationship would normally generate. When friends are involved, a court should lean toward a finding of coverage because such a finding, more likely than not, will accord with the unspoken truth.
*180Another factor strongly supporting an expansive view of the omnibus clause is the public concern for the victims of automobile traffic. It is in part for their protection that a policy of automobile liability insurance must contain an omnibus clause at least as favorable for coverage as the omnibus clause1 specified in N. J. S. A. 39-.6-4:6(a). Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Zullo, 48 N. J. 362 (1966); see also Matits v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 33 N. J. 488, 495-496 (1960). The public interest is advanced when doubts are resolved in favor of those victims.
Our decisions in this area are discussed in a comprehensive opinion in Odolecki v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 55 N. J. 542 (1970). The coverage issue may arise in sundry settings. The. simplest is when it is claimed the driver received permission or consent directly from the owner. In the case now before us the parties assumed the question was whether Busby had thus impliedly permitted J ohns to drive the Busby car. It will be recalled that Busby and Johns arrived at the 7-11 store in Busby’s car; that Busby asked Kay if he could take Kay’s car on a short spin; that Kay permitted Busby to do so; that Busby left the keys in the ignition of his own car; that Johns and Kay later entered Busby’s car; that J ohns, who was in the driver’s seat, took off with Kay in Busby’s car for a ride of a like brevity.
The trial court found that Busby had not given implied permission to Johns. But the parties overlooked the fact that Kay’s presence in the car raised the further question *181whether Kay had Busby’s permission to use Busby’s car and whether Johns’ operation was in furtherance of that use. The trial court made no finding with respect to that phase of the factual complex.
As the record now stands, the trier of the facts could readily find that Busby impliedly gave Kay permission to try out Busby’s car if Kay wished to do so. These boys were intensely interested in automobiles, a familiar phenomenon at their age. Busby and Kay each owned a car of some distinction. Busby having sought a chance to drive Kay’s car, and having left the keys in the ignition of his own car, we would infer that Busby by implication extended the same courtesy to Kay. And if Kay was thus using the ear, it would not matter whether Kay or Johns was the driver. The car would then be put to the use which Busby had by implication permitted Kay to make of the car, and that being so, Johns would be within the omnibus clause, and indeed would be within it even if Busby had directed that Johns shall not drive. See Baesler v. Globe Indemnity Co., 33 N. J. 148, 153-154 (1960); Small v. Schuncke, 43 N. J. 407 (1964).
We think the critical question on this facet of the case is whether Kay was a party in interest in the drive, that is, whether Kay wanted the ride or was only an indifferent passenger. The trier of the facts must look to the total circumstances to decide whether by implication Kay was thus a participant. If Kay was thus a party to that use of the ear, then Johns too would be covered, for, as we have said, the use to which the car was being put would remain a use which Busby had impliedly permitted Kay to make even if Johns was not permitted by Busby to drive the ear.
We do not think it appropriate to require a finding that Kay “accepted” an offer of permission to use the ear or that Kay assumed “possession” or “dominion” of the vehicle, or that Kay consciously exercised some act of sub-delegation of permission. Those concepts, however useful in other settings, would merely encumber the inquiry. The *182question is simply whether the use to which the car was put ■was impliedly permitted by Busby. If Busby permitted that use by or for Kay and it was so used, it does not matter that Johns simultaneously enjoyed the experience. The contractual concept of offer and acceptance is foreign to this scene. So, too, are the concepts of “possession” and “dominion”; “permission” depends upon neither. “Possession” and “dominion” are merely ultimate conclusions expressing a final result in some inquiry in which “possession” or “dominion” is relevant. Ueither would be a meaningful guide in an inquiry as to whether the use of a car was with permission.
The factual determination should not, however, be made on the present record, for the parties did not zero in upon this phase of the permission issue. It may be that testimony directed to that subject will be more revealing. Justice is therefore better served by ordering a retrial with respect to coverage under the State Earm policy along with the retrial of the coverage question under the Zurich policy.
We add a comment with respect to the Zurich policy. We agree that the matter should be retried under the “reasonably believed” portion of the permission clause, and since that portion of the clause is more favorable for coverage than the remainder of the clause, we need not comment upon the remainder.
Mr. Justice Jacobs, Mr. Justice Proctor and Judge Sullivan join in this concurring opinion. The judgment in favor of State Earm is also reversed and the matter remanded for retrial as to it.
N. J. 8. A. 39:6-46 (a) requires a policy to insure “any other person using or responsible for the use of any such motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the insured.” The State Farm policy provides that the word “insured” includes “any other person while using the owned automobile, provided the operation and the actual use of such automobile are with the permission of the named insured or such spouse and are within the scope of such permission.” This policy provision may not be read more narrowly than the statutory provision.