Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and LEVY, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
Dissent: ALEXANDER, J.
GORMAN, J.[¶ 1] Eli A. Blackhouse appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Augusta, Soucy, J.) dismissing his complaint for protection from abuse, 19-A M.R.S. § 4003 (2010), for his failure to appear at the final hearing. On appeal, Blackhouse contends that the court erred by dismissing his complaint without first considering his request for reasonable accommodation of his claimed disability. We agree and vacate the dismissal, remanding to the court for action on Blackhouse’s request.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] Blackhouse and Jane Doe are both residents of an apartment building in Gardiner. On May 6, 2010, Blackhouse filed a complaint for protection from abuse against Doe, alleging that he is a victim of Doe’s stalking, and describing her “stalking-like behaviors,” inter alia, as “repeated appearances on property she has no right to occupy,” “directly [harassing him] on a number of occasions,” “repeatedly assailing him with abusive dialog, including language and taunts acknowledging that she actively participates in [his] confinement,” “blocking the entrance of the front doorway so that he cannot exit the building without confronting her,” “intimidating him,” and threatening to send someone to “enact an undisclosed form of retaliation against [him].” Blackhouse also asserted that Doe’s actions have contributed to the deterioration of his health.
[¶ 3] In terms of relief, Blackhouse sought an order prohibiting Doe from having any contact with him or “any minor children in [his] charge,” and from repeatedly, and without reasonable cause, being at or in the vicinity of his residence, school, business, or place of employment. *74He also asked for relief that is not available in this type of action.2
[¶ 4] With his complaint, Blackhouse submitted a request for reasonable accommodation, stating that he was disabled and unable to be physically present in court. In his request, Blackhouse recited that he suffers from “an advanced form of combat-level post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’) specific to having survived an abduction and medical torture.” He also described a condition involving “an easily-triggered startle response,” and requested “absolutely no contact whatsoever with uniformed police officers.” Blackhouse asked the court to accommodate his condition by allowing him to proceed on his complaint without having to enter the physical premises of the court.
[¶ 5] After review of Blackhouse’s complaint, the court (Mullen, J.) denied his request for an ex parte temporary order of protection from abuse. It is not clear from the record whether the court was aware of Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation at the time of that review.
[¶ 6] A final hearing on Blackhouse’s complaint for protection from abuse was scheduled for May 24, 2010. The clerk’s office mailed notice of the final hearing to Blackhouse. Blackhouse failed to appear for the hearing, and the court (Soucy, J.) dismissed his complaint. There is no indication that Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation was called to the court’s attention or that the court otherwise reviewed it before dismissing the complaint.
[¶ 7] Blackhouse subsequently brought this appeal, arguing that the court should have considered his request for reasonable accommodation, and that, by failing to do so, the court violated article I, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution; the Maine Human Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. §§ 4551-4634 (2010); and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12101-12213 (Lex-isNexis 2009).
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 8] An individual with a disability may request special accommodations to ensure an equal opportunity to participate in a court proceeding. See Me. Judicial Branch, Accommodation Request Procedure, http://www.eourts.state.me.us/court_ info/ada/accommodation.html (“Accommodations may be initiated by court personnel or in response to a request from a person needing an accommodation.”); see also 42 U.S.C.S. § 12101(a)(7); (“[T]he Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity [and] full participation.... ”); 5 M.R.S. § 4591; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 532, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) (“This duty to accommodate is perfectly consistent with the well-established due process principle that, within the limits of practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful opportunity to be heard in its courts.” (quotation marks omitted)); Me. Judicial Branch, Policy on Access for People with Disabilities, http://www.courts.state.me.us/court_ info/ada/policy.html.
[¶ 9] “Accommodations are variations in the way things are normally done to enable individuals with disabilities to have an equal opportunity to participate in court activities.” Me. Judicial Branch, Accommodation Request Procedure. Accommodations may include the provision of interpreters, microphones, or sound amplifiers or may involve a modification in court pro*75cedures, e.g., delaying a court event until later in the day. See id. (“The need for an accommodation shall be taken into account in scheduling.... In some circumstances it will be necessary to move or reschedule a hearing to provide a needed accommodation.”); see also Me. Judicial Branch, Policy on Access for People with Disabilities.
[¶ 10] An individual may submit a request for accommodation to “the clerk of court where the proceeding will take place or to the assigned judge, case management officer or mediator.” Me. Judicial Branch, Accommodation Request Procedure. When, as here, the request for accommodation is one that may impact the way in which a hearing or trial will be conducted, a judicial officer should consider the request.
[¶ 11] The court may order reasonable accommodations and auxiliary aids and services “to ensure effective communication and participation of individuals with disabilities in the court system.” Id. For example, courts are authorized to allow witnesses to present testimony by telephone. See M.R. Civ. P. 43(a) (stating that a court may permit the presentation of testimony in court “by contemporaneous transmission from a different location” on its own motion or for good cause shown); cf. M.R. Civ. P. 7(g) (approving the use of telephone or video conference calls for conferences and non-testimonial hearings). Alternatively, if the court determined that allowing telephonic testimony in a particular case or type of case would fundamentally alter the nature of the hearing, the court could consider a different accommodation, such as scheduling the hearing at a time when contact with other members of the public would be minimized. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 532, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (“[Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act] requires only ‘reasonable modifications’ that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided, and only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service.”); see also Suzman v. Comm’r, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2005 ME 80, ¶¶ 9-10, 876 A.2d 29, 32-33; Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of S. Portland, 508 A.2d 948, 955 (Me.1986).
[¶ 12] If, however, after considering a request for accommodation, the judicial officer denies the request, the officer must provide a written explanation to the parties and the State Court Administrator giving the reason for the denial, accompanied by a copy of the Judicial Branch grievance procedure. See, e.g., Me. Judicial Branch, Accommodation Request Procedure; see also Me. Judicial Branch, Grievance Procedure, http://www.eourts. state.me.us/court-info/ada/grievance.html.
[¶ 13] In this case, the record contains no indication that any judicial officer even considered Blaekhouse’s request for accommodation. Despite this gap in the appropriate process, the dissent suggests that we should nonetheless affirm the dismissal of Blackhouse’s complaint because it is not plausible on its face, as his allegations against Doe are bizarre, vexatious, and frivolous.
[¶ 14] Blackhouse filed a complaint for protection from abuse in accordance with 19-A M.R.S. § 4005(1) (2010), alleging a course of conduct by Doe that, if proved, could allow a court to grant Blackhouse a protection from abuse order. See 19-A M.R.S. §§ 4006(1), 4007(1) (2010); see also 17-A M.R.S. § 210-A(1)(A), (2)(A) (2010). Although, as the dissent notes, Doe is eighty-six years old, neither her age nor Blackhouse’s disability allows us to prejudge the veracity of Blackhouse’s allega*76tions.3 See 19-A M.R.S. § 4006(1) (“Within 21 days of the filing of a complaint, a hearing must be held at which the plaintiff must prove the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Connolly v. Connolly, 2006 ME 17, ¶ 7, 892 A.2d 465, 467 (holding that a hearing is required in all protection from abuse cases “except those in which the defendant agrees to a finding of abuse, or the plaintiff agrees to an order without a finding of abuse”).
[¶ 15] Blackhouse’s request for accommodation asserts that he suffers from PTSD, a severe anxiety disorder. Persons suffering from mental illness, including PTSD, may have significantly impaired thought processes that, in turn, interfere with one or more major life activities. A mental illness may also prevent an individual from accurately perceiving reality and, in this case, it may well turn out that Blackhouse’s allegations against Doe cannot be supported by evidence. His asserted diagnosis of PTSD, however, does not make Blackhouse immune from abuse, harassment, or stalking. Unfortunately, the converse is often true.
[¶ 16] In this case, Blackhouse’s request that he be permitted to litigate his complaint in a way that would accommodate his claimed disabilities was never considered by the court. Therefore, we vacate the dismissal of his complaint. Whether Blackhouse is entitled to a protection from abuse order against Doe is an issue that should be decided only after a judge has considered Blackhouse’s request for reasonable accommodation, the court has notified Blackhouse and Doe of its decision on Blackhouse’s request, and both parties have been notified of the date of the hearing on Blackhouse’s complaint. See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (“Recognizing that failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion, Congress required the States to take reasonable measures to remove architectural and other barriers to accessibility.”).
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. For example, Blackhouse requested that he be granted “the right to initiate eviction proceedings” against occupants of the apartment building.
. The dissent's suggestion that Blackhouse’s request for relief is overblown is also not a proper basis for determining that his complaint has no merit.