In Re the Petition for Reinstatement to Practice Law of Braverman

*212 Digges, J.,

concurring:

I concur in the order of the Court that “Maurice L. Braverman, be . . . reinstated as a member of the Bar of Maryland . . .and with those portions of the majority opinion which conclude that Mr. Braverman has, as required by Maryland Rule BV9 b and d 3, factually demonstrated in these proceedings that he is now “rehabilitated and is otherwise entitled to the relief sought.” However, I cannot subscribe to that portion of the opinion which questions the integrity of the petitioner’s criminal conviction in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland or in the majority’s conclusion that it is necessary to attempt to explain it away. As I read Rules BV4 f 1 and BV9 d 4, they expressly prohibit such a collateral attack in these proceedings. These rules in pertinent part provide:

“The provisions of . .. Rule BV4 (Hearing) . . . shall be applicable to proceedings instituted pursuant to this Rule [(Reinstatement)].” BV9 d 4.
“In a hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule, a final judgment by a judicial tribunal in another proceeding convicting an attorney of a crime shall be conclusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of such crime. ... A final adjudication by a judicial tribunal in a disciplinary proceeding that an attorney has been guilty of misconduct shall be considered as conclusive proof of such misconduct in the hearing of charges pursuant to this Rule.” BV4f 1.

The rule which governs reinstatement (Rule BV9) directs only that we be convinced Mr. Braverman has demonstrated that, despite his conviction and subsequent disbarment, he is now morally and intellectually qualified to re-enter the practice of law in this State. In my view, the establishment of petitioner’s guilt in a trial which he and the two Bar Associations agree was fairly conducted and which has weathered appellate attack must, in the absence of prior nullification by appropriate post conviction procedure or *213executive clemency, be accepted as valid and fully binding on this Court now.