(concurring). I concur in the result reached in the opinion filed by Mr. Chief Justice Weintraub. I consider it appropriate to file this general statement of my views in this matter.
Considered as a supplement to N. J. S. 2A :171-1—the basic Sunday Closing Law enacted as part of the 1951 *235revision—the act in question, L. 1959, c. 119, is unconstitutional. So considered, the 1959 law must be reasonably related to the ends sought to be achieved by N. J. S. 2A: 171-1, i. e., to “provide an escape from the market place for merchant and customer alike.” Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Woodbridge Twp., 25 N. J. 188, 192 (1957). In the Auto-Rite case, I had occasion to point out, in another context, but nevertheless by way of applying the same principle applicable in the instant litigation at this point, that an ordinance prohibiting the Sunday sale only of certain enumerated items could not exist in harmony with the general state policy of overall Sunday closing. It was there held that the limited scope of the ordinance in question “makes a sham of the declared title and purpose to be served,” i. e., the end of achieving a general day of rest. Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Woodbridge Twp., supra, at page 196. In the same manner that the ordinance involved in the Auto-Rite case could not be said to be reasonably related to the State policy of overall Sunday closing and hence in violation of that policy, the statute in question here, L. 1959, c. 119, cannot be said to be reasonably related to the purposes sought to be achieved by it, by hypothesis the same purposes to which N. J. S. 2¿L :171-1 is directed, and hence violates the constitutional provision that legislative classification must bear a reasonable relation to the purposes of the legislation in which they are contained. New Jersey Restaurant Ass’n v. Holderman, 24 N. J. 295, 300 (1957). Assuming, therefore, that the 1959 law is but a supplement to .the 1951 revision, the former must fall as not being reasonably related to the purposes of its enactment.
That the 1959 law cannot be sustained as tending to fulfill the purposes of N. J. S. 2A :171-1 indicates, however, that in fact the Legislature has discarded the policy of the latter act and substituted in its place another policy, radically different from the first. On one hand, the effect of N. J. S. 2A :171—1 et seq. was to preclude all “worldly employment or business” with certain exceptions stated in *236the act and others permitted by referendum within a municipality, whereas, on the other hand, the present statute only proscribes the sale of five general types of goods. Such a difference in effect may be attributed logically only to a difference in underlying policy, a difference which naturally leads to the conclusion that the prior act has been repealed by implication. The remaining question, therefore, is whether chapter 119 of the Laws of 1959 may stand, as isolated, against the charge that it violates the equal protection of the law.
A parenthetical note is in order at this point. That the Legislature intended to repeal N. J. S. 2A:171-1 et seq. does not imply that all municipal ordinances affecting Sunday closing are henceforth contrary to state policy. The power of municipalities to act in this field exists not by virtue of N. J. S. 2A :171-1 et seq., but by B. 8. 40:48-2, the omnibus provision of the Home Rule Act. It is apparent, therefore, that this decision in no manner affects existing or future municipal Sunday closing ordinances; in fact, it eliminates the restrictive effects which the state statute imposed on those ordinances. Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Woodbridge Twp., supra. Whether L. 1959, c. 119, or L. 1959, c. 131 imposes another restrictive policy on municipalities regarding Sunday closing must remain unanswered, however, until litigation presents the issues to this court.
It is my view that chapter 119 of the Laws of 1959 is not void on its face for failure to provide the persons affected by it with the equal protection of the laws. There is no apparent economic hardship imposed on the vendors of the articles the Sunday sale of which is proscribed by the statute inasmuch as the demand for the specific items cannot to any appreciable degree be satisfied elsewhere since all such vendors within the area of the geographical effect of the statute are prohibited from selling the desired articles. Cf. Gundaker Central Motors v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71 (1956). That it might be more profitable for the affected vendors to locate outside the area in which the statute has effect *237is of no importance in considering the constitutionality of the act. And it is not apparent on the face of the statute that it is not a reasonable means of achieving a valid legislative goal: to free the highways from traffic caused by commercial activity to an extent sufficient to allow their unobstructed use by persons seeking relaxation.
The Auto-Rite case, supra, is not to the contrary. In that case, the ordinance prohibiting the Sunday sale of certain enumerated goods was required to be related to the state policy of overall Sunday closing. So related, the ordinance could not stand. In the instant case, however, the statute in question need not be sustained on the presumption that it is intended to secure a general day of rest through inactivity. Indeed, chapter 119 will be sustained if it is reasonably related to any valid legislative purpose, and, as stated above, such would appear to be the situation in the instant case.