dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Appellant’s cause of action for support is fully barred by the criminal statute of limitations 1 and cannot be revived now.
The majority opinion concludes that a cause of action for civil support lies even though criminal prosecution of the putative father is barred by the running of the statute of limitations. This result is reached by labeling the criminal prosecution merely “ancillary” to the mother’s right to seek support in a civil suit.
This position is untenable, as analysis of the precedents shows.
In Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968) our Supreme Court decided that the Civil Procedural *282Support Law, as amended, could not discard a putative father’s right to a jury trial in the determination of paternity-
The Civil Procedural Support Law as originally enacted2 did not provide for the support of illegitimate children. In 1963, however, the statute was amended to include an action for support of illegitimate children.3 Prior to the adoption of this amendment, an order for support of an illegitimate child could only be entered after a determination of paternity had been established by criminal proceedings under the Penal Code of June 24,1939. This determination could be made either in a prosecution for fornication and bastardy under § 506 of the Code, 18 P.S. § 4506, or in a prosecution for willful neglect to support a child born out of lawful wedlock under § 732 of the Code, 18 P.S. § 4732.
Id., 431 Pa. at 483, 246 A.2d at 861.
As this court said in Commonwealth ex rel. Yentzer v. Carpenter, 240 Pa.Super.202, 362 A.2d 1101 (1976).
Further support for the proposition that the putative father cannot be deprived of a criminal trial on the issue of paternity absent an admission or express waiver is our Court’s negative response to the question of whether a civil action could be maintained when the statute of limitations for a criminal action had expired. In Commonwealth ex rel. Kolodziejski v. Tancredi, 222 Pa.Super. 436, 295 A.2d 174 (1972), the complainant filed under the Civil Procedural Support Law. A hearing was held at which the defendant denied paternity, and the lower court ordered that appellant be held for court on criminal charges, but proceedings were delayed until the Supreme Court-*283decided Commonwealth v. Dillworth, supra. Subsequently, the defendant petitioned to have all criminal proceedings against him dismissed on the ground that the statute of limitations had expired. We held that a complaint filed pursuant to the Civil Procedural Support Law did not toll the statute of limitations on bastardy charges, and, therefore, dismissed the criminal charges. After our decision, the complainant again filed suit under the Civil Procedural Support Law. The defendant denied paternity and demanded that he be tried in a criminal procedure by a jury. Thereupon, the lower court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, we affirmed without opinion. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Kolodziejski v. Tancredi, 230 Pa.Super. 710, 326 A.2d 532 (1974), allocatur refused January 15, 1975. Thus, it is reasonable to state that a civil action cannot be maintained absent a waiver or admission if the criminal statute of limitations has expired.
Id., 240 Pa.Super. at 207, 362 A.2d at 1103.
Under the teaching of Dillworth, Yentzer and Kolodziejski the criminal proceeding simply cannot be characterized as “ancillary” to a civil support proceeding. If the reputed father contested the issue of paternity a criminal determination was an absolute prerequisite to any civil support case. Here, Debra Williams bore a child on September 17, 1973. Wolfe, the putative father, allegedly last contributed to the child’s support on September 23, 1974. Within two years of that date Debra Williams could have brought a criminal action to determine the paternity of her child. After September 23,1976 she was barred from seeking support for the child unless Wolfe waived a criminal trial or admitted paternity.
Williams now argues that the repeal of the criminal statute of limitations and the reenactment of the civil support law in the Judicial Code at 42 Pa.C.S. § 6701 et seq., gave her a new cause of action and a new six year statute of limitations.2 She filed this action within the six year limita*284tion period. The superficial appeal of Williams’ contention is negated by section 25(b) of the Judiciary Act of 19763 which provides
No cause of action fully barred prior to the effective date of this act shall be revived by reason of the enactment of this act.
Accordingly I dissent.
. At 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4323(b) the statute provided:
(b) Limitation of action.—All prosecutions under this section must be brought within two years of the birth of the child, except where the reputed father shall have voluntarily contributed to the support of the child, or shall have acknowledged in writing his paternity, in which case a prosecution may be brought at any time within two years of any such contribution or acknowledgement by the reputed father.
The statute was repealed by Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 106, No. 46, § 3, eff. June 27, 1978.
Act of July 13, 1953, P.L. 431 § 2, 62 P.S. §§ 2043.31-2043.44.
Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 872, 62 P.S. §§ 2043.32, 2043.35. To the definition of ‘Duty to Support’ was added ‘prosecution for fai[l]ure to support a child born out of lawful wedlock,’ so that the definition now reads as set forth in footnote 1. Likewise, § 5 of the original act (62 P.S. § 2043.35), setting forth the procedure for filing a complaint, was amended by adding to subparagraph (3) the following: ‘if married, or if unmarried, the date and place of birth of each child born out of lawful wedlock.’
. The Judiciary Act Repealer Act (JARA) repealed the civil support law. Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a) [1291] eff. June *28427, 1978. Section 10 of JARA reenacted the support law in the Judicial Code at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6701 et seq. The new statute of limitations may be found at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6704(e).
. Judiciary Act of 1976, July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, eff. immediately.