dissenting.
Respectfully, I have material differences with the majority reasoning and dissent in favor of an evidentiary hearing.
Initially, concerning the state of this Court’s “layering” jurisprudence in general, I have set down some of my own thoughts in Commonwealth v. Ly, 605 Pa. 261, 989 A.2d 2 (2010) (per curiam), which I incorporate here by reference. See id. at 262-65, 989 A.2d at 2-5 (Saylor, J., dissenting). The concerns raised in Ly are magnified, in the capital arena, due to the involvement of the former relaxed waiver doctrine and its potential impact on the decisions of trial and appellate lawyers in capital litigation throughout the period in which the *358doctrine remained extant.1 See generally Maura Caffrey, Untying the Knot: A Solution for Confusion in Federal Habeas Review of Pennsylvania State Court Capital Convictions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 985 (2009).
I remain convinced that these difficulties cannot be effectively mitigated until this Court addresses the due process concerns being raised regarding both the application of the Hubbard rule in light of time-and-resources constraints connected with direct appeals, see Ly, 605 Pa. at 262-65, 989 A.2d at 2-5 (Saylor, J., dissenting), and the retroactive abolition of relaxed waiver. See Commonwealth v. Steele, 599 Pa. 341, 429 n. 3, 961 A.2d 786, 839 n. 3 (2008) (Saylor, J., dissenting). Notably, the present case is yet another in which it is asserted that direct-appeal counsel understood that his duties did not encompass investigation and presentation of extra-record claims. See Declaration of James J. McHugh, Jr. (Feb. 17, 2006) (relating contents from an interview with Appellant’s direct-appeal counsel).
Second, the majority approves the admission of a detective’s opinion of a child witness’s “ability to distinguish truth from a lie” during an interview. Majority Opinion, at 319 n. 11, 25 A.3d at 299 n. 11. While I agree the detective could testify to his observations of the child’s demeanor, I fail to see how a law enforcement officer’s opinion as to her extrajudicial truth-telling ability would not bolster the Commonwealth’s position concerning such capability in the courtroom. Moreover, the admission of such an opinion seems to me to be in tension with the prevailing law limiting juror involvement in determining competency to testify, see id. at 289-91, as well as the decisions reserving the subject of witness veracity to the jury. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balodis, 560 Pa. 567, 576, 747 A.2d 341, 345 (2000) (explaining that this Court has “rejected] the need for expert testimony on the question of a witness’ veracity”).2 Contrary to the majority position, see Majority *359Opinion, at 319 n. 11, 25 A.3d at 299 n. 11, I also believe the prosecutor’s affirmations of the other child witness’s answers to the voir-dire-type questions — which were improper in the first instance under prevailing law, see id. at 310-11, 25 A.3d at 295 — represented objectionable bolstering. Indeed, it is difficult to envision a more straightforward example of bolstering than affirming a witness’s response as “pretty good.”3
Next, I have difficulty with the characterization of testimony that Appellant attempted to force himself upon the victim in the days prior to the killing, and that a protection-from-abuse order was secured against Appellant by another woman, as “fleeting.” Id. at 320-21, 25 A.3d at 299. While I realize this term was used in the direct appeal, Appellant’s brief at that stage did not mention the prosecutor’s forceful reference to these events in his closing argument. See id. at 334-35, 25 A.3d at 308-09 (quoting the relevant remarks of the district attorney). Moreover, although this extra-record claim was presented on direct appeal, Appellant has proffered that direct-appeal counsel nonetheless engaged in no extra-record investigation. See McHugh Dec. at 1-2. Thus, it would appear that direct-appeal counsel may be among a substantial number of appellate attorneys who did not appropriately represent their capital clients on direct appeal. See Ly, 605 Pa. at 263-65, 989 A.2d at 3-4 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (discussing the controversy surrounding the Hubbard rule that extra-record claims had to be raised on direct appeal on pain of waiver).4 Particularly in light of the potent argument advanced by the prosecutor, it seems unlikely to me that the jurors, in a first-degree murder prosecution advancing a domination theory of motive, would have overlooked an attempted sexual assault of the victim and a restraining order involving another woman. Moreover, and again, we do not have counsel’s explanation for why he did not object, and in this void, the majority’s attribution of a reason for such omission (see
*360Majority Opinion, at 320-21, 25 A.3d at 299-300) appears to me to represent extra-record gleaning of motivations and strategies, a practice this Court has previously eschewed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duffey, 579 Pa. 186, 205, 855 A.2d 764, 775 (2004) (directing that “only when the record clearly establishes that the act or omission of trial counsel was without a reasonable basis should the court resolve the reasonable basis prong absent a remand for an evidentiary hearing as to counsel’s strategy”) (citing Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 588, 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 (2003)).5
Next, in rejecting Appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness connected with the introduction of other-bad-acts evidence, the majority indicates that Appellant “implicitly calls into question trial counsel’s overarching strategy and theory of the case.” Majority Opinion, at 326, 25 A.3d at 303. In fact, Appellant’s brief explicitly questions counsel’s overarching strategy, along with the adequacy of the underlying guilt-phase investigation. For example, Appellant argues:
On its face, the guilt phase case against Appellant was substantial. It consisted of two eye-witnesses, that knew Appellant, who testified they clearly saw Appellant shoot the decedent. The Commonwealth also presented evidence of Appellant’s flight immediately after the shooting. The Commonwealth also presented extensive evidence of domestic discord between Appellant and the decedent — in the form of verbal and physical fights — starting at least a week before the shooting and continuing literally up to the moment before the fatal shots were fired. Clearly counsel should have at least considered the fact that the issue for *361the jury in this case was not going to be who did it, but rather what was the state of mind of the shooter before he presented a weak alibi case.
Brief for Appellant at 72.6
Despite such allegations, the extent of counsel’s guilt-phase investigation and preparation remains undeveloped, because the PCRA court refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing.7 While the majority correctly indicates that the Court “will not conclude that counsel was ineffective merely because the jury did not find his narrative convincing or his strategy credible,” Majority Opinion, at 326, 25 A.3d at 303-04, here, deficient investigation and preparation are alleged. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (explaining that a reasonable *362investigation is a prerequisite to the formulation of reasonable strategy).
Next, I differ with the majority’s pronouncement that the other-bad-acts evidence was not inflammatory or extensive. See Majority Opinion, at 830-81, 25 A.3d at 306. In fact, the prosecutor highlighted the assertions in connection with a compelling argument advancing the Commonwealth’s theory that the motive for the killing centered on Appellant’s thwarted desire for domination. See id. at 334, 25 A.3d at 308-09 (quoting the relevant passage from the district attorney’s closing). I also have difficulty with the majority’s explanation that a limiting instruction might well have served only to reemphasize the evidence to the jurors, see id. at 330-31, 25 A.3d at 306, since, particularly after the prosecutor’s potent remarks, its seems unlikely they would have forgotten it. Moreover, the attribution of such a strategy to trial counsel (see id.), in the absence of an evidentiary record, seems, again, to be gleaning.
As to the claims of deficient stewardship for failing to investigate and present the alternate defense of diminished capacity, I agree with the majority that prevailing law is that such a defense cannot be presented in the alternative to an innocence-based one. See id. at 311-313.8 However, I question the majority’s suggestion that trial counsel had no basis to consider investigating alternative defenses. In this regard, the majority repeatedly asserts that counsel was confronted with overwhelming evidence that Appellant perpetrated the killing. See, e.g., id. at 300 n. 13. It seems logically inconsistent to say counsel lacked any obligation to probe the possibility of alternative defenses. See id. at 314. Cf. Commonwealth v. Davido, 582 Pa. 52, 80, 868 A.2d 431, 447 (2005) (Castille, C.J., concurring) (commenting that attorneys “are not potted plants”).
Next, I differ with the majority to the degree it suggests some material difference between an unsworn declaration and an affidavit for purposes of determining the availability of an evidentiary hearing. See Majority Opinion, at 343 n. 19, 25 *363A.3d at 313-14 n. 19. Our rules only require that a petitioner provide “affidavits, records, documents, or other evidence which show the facts stated” in a PCRA petition. Pa. R.Crim.P. 902(D). Declarations have long been accepted by the Court to assist in evaluating whether a hearing is required on a petitioner’s proffer. In light of the limited purposes for which such documents are submitted — which is not to prove a claim, but merely to demonstrate that material facts are in issue and an evidentiary record should be developed — I do not see why the distinction between the different forms of submissions continues to be highlighted in our opinions.
In summary, and in line with many of my previous expressions, I believe that the appropriate way for this Court to address the intractable difficulties which have arisen in the death-penalty arena is to consistently enforce the requirement of an evidentiary hearing where material facts are in issue; to require appropriately developed factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCRA courts; and to apply consistent and fair review criteria on appeal.9 It is my considered position there remains a great need for improvement in each of these areas.
. Appellant discusses a due process concern associated with the relaxed waiver doctrine, which applied at the time of his direct appeal, see Brief for Appellant at 9-10, albeit this is not addressed by the majority.
. While the detective was not qualified as an expert, it seems reasonable to assume that a lay juror might believe that such a law enforcement officer would acquire special experience in evaluating truth telling.
. The prosecutor’s encouraging approach to the questioning of this child-witness is consistent with the manner in which many adults conduct discussions with young children. The difficulty is that, in the courtroom, there is the potential for a collateral bolstering effect.
. Only one other issue was pursued on direct appeal.
. I realize that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court appears to suggest that extra-record gleaning is appropriate for purposes of federal habeas corpus review. See Cullen v. Pinholster, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1404-06, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011). There are material differences, however, between state post-conviction and federal habeas review, see generally Commonwealth v. Beasley, 600 Pa. 458, 483-85, 967 A.2d 376, 391-92 (2009), and it is unclear whether (and/or to what degree) the Pinholster decision will bear relevance to this Court's disapproval of gleaning. At the very least, this Court's own approach — deriving from the compromise decision in McGill — was intended to provide more concrete footing for addressing trial strategies to mitigate differences among members of the Court for purposes of primary-level, state post-conviction review.
. The majority criticizes my opinion for reading the above "out of context,” since the particular expression is set out in connection with a different claim. Majority Opinion, at 326-27 n. 14, 25 A.3d at 303 n. 14. My response is as follows.
Over the past decade, this Court has imposed more and more mandates and strictures on capital petitioners seeking appellate post-conviction review. See, e.g., McGill, 574 Pa. at 587-90, 832 A.2d at 1022-23. Indeed, in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693 (1998), the Court retroactively imposed a mandatory multi-part analytical overlay on derivative post-conviction claims in the death-penalty arena. See id. at 45, 720 A.2d at 700. After having increased the briefing burden multi-fold in such cases, for reasons which are beyond the scope of this opinion, the Court now appears to be in the process of decreasing the allowed length of the briefs. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roney, 587 CAP, per curiam Order (Pa. June 9, 2011); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 CAP, per curiam Order (Pa. June 11, 2011).
Particularly against this landscape, I fail to see how it does anyone any good to require these appellants to repeat every detail of every theme running through their briefs within evety subpart of the submissions. Moreover, the task of solidifying the arguments against a factual context would be far simpler on a developed evidentiary record, had a hearing been allowed, as I believe it should.
Finally, the Court appears willing to rely on the many constraints facing trial attorneys representing capital defendants when passing on challenges to their stewardship. I have difficulty appreciating why there is not some concomitant appreciation of various limitations impacting presentations by appellate counsel when we read their briefs.
. Although no definitive conclusions can be drawn, the Commonwealth’s unexplained stipulation to penalty-phase relief suggests the possibility of deficient stewardship at least in that phase of trial.
. Parenthetically, I have expressed a willingness to reconsider this prohibition upon appropriate arguments. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1, 107-08, 896 A.2d 1191, 1254-55 (2006) (Saylor, J„ concurring and dissenting). Such arguments are not developed here, however.
. Early in my tenure on the Court, we attempted to set forth a roadmap for such decision-making in the 1999 decision of Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167 (1999), albeit differing majority views on this subject certainly have surfaced in the aftermath.