OPINION BY
PANELLA, J.:Appellants, Jacob Hymes, Rebecca Hymes and William Hymes, appeal from the order granting judgment on the pleadings to Appellee, Allstate Fire and Casualty Company, in this action involving a claim for underinsured motorist’s benefits. After careful review, we affirm.
In this appeal, we must construe the “household exclusion” in an automobile insurance policy to determine if an injured plaintiff is entitled to underinsured motorist coverage. Specifically, we must determine whether language excluding coverage for damages sustained while “on” a motorcycle bars coverage for injuries sustained when a plaintiff is thrown from the motor*1171cycle he was operating after colliding with a car.
The factual basis of this appeal is largely undisputed. On April 25, 2009, Jacob Hymes was operating his 2005 Harley Davidson motorcycle when he collided with a 2001 Chevrolet Malibu operated by Robert Meyer. Meyer was subsequently determined to be at fault for the accident. However, Meyer’s liability insurance proved to be insufficient to fully compensate Jacob for the injuries he sustained in the accident.
Jacob had not elected to have underin-sured motorist coverage from his primary insurer, GEICO, and therefore turned to his parents’ policy with Allstate. Allstate denied Jacob’s claim for underinsured motorist coverage, relying on the policy’s “household exclusion.” Allstate subsequently initiated this proceeding via complaint for declaratory judgment against the Appellants, seeking a determination that the policy did not cover Jacob’s injuries in this case. The Appellants filed an answer and new matter, and thereafter filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted Allstate’s motion and dismissed Jacob’s complaint. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, the Appellants raise one issue for our review:
Did the lower court err in granting declaratory relief to Allstate and determining that a “Household Exclusion” barred recovery by Jacob Hymes of underin-sured motorist benefits under his parents’ insurance policy when Hymes suffered serious injuries while not “in, on, getting into or out of’ his motorcycle and instead suffered those injuries after being thrown from the motorcycle and into the windshield and onto the ground some twenty feet away from the point of impact?
Appellants’ Brief, at 4. •
In reviewing the trial court’s grant of the Allstate’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, our scope of review is plenary. Vetter v. Fun Footwear Co., 447 Pa.Super. 84, 668 A.2d 529, 531 (1995) (en banc).
Our review of a trial court’s decision to grant ... judgment on the pleadings is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether there were facts presented which warranted a jury trial. In so reviewing, we look only to the pleadings and any documents properly attached thereto. Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where the pleadings evidence that there are no material facts in dispute such that a trial by jury would be unnecessary.
Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 541 Pa. 424, 428-429, 664 A.2d 84, 86 (1995).
The central issue in this case is whether Allstate’s policy excluding coverage for damages suffered “while in, on, getting into or out of when struck by a motor vehicle owned or leased by you or a resident relative ...” applies to the injuries suffered by Jacob. The proper construction of an insurance policy is resolved as a matter of law to be decided by the court in a declaratory judgment action. Genaeya Corp. v. Harco Nat. Ins. Co., 991 A.2d 342, 350 (Pa.Super.2010).
“The Declaratory Judgments Act may be invoked to interpret the obligations of the parties under an insurance contract....” General Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 706, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (1997) (citations omitted). When an insured and the insurer disagree on coverage in a policy, we must determine *1172what the parties intended by their contract:
[T]he law must look to what they clearly expressed. Courts in interpreting a contract, do not assume that its language was chosen carelessly. Thus, we will not consider merely individual terms utilized in the insurance contract, but the entire insurance provision to ascertain the intent of the parties. 401 Fourth St., Inc. v. Investors Insurance Group, 583 Pa. 445, 879 A.2d 166, 171 (2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 955 A.2d 1025, 1029 (Pa.Super.2008). In other words, “[g]enerally, courts must give plain meaning to a clear and unambiguous contract provision unless to do so would be contrary to a clearly expressed public policy.” Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 572 Pa. 82, 87, 813 A.2d 747, 750 (2002).
Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that language. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sartno, 588 Pa. 205, 212, 903 A.2d 1170, 1174 (2006). Contractual language is ambiguous “if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Co., 513 Pa. 192, 201, 519 A.2d 385, 390 (1986). “This is not a question to be resolved in a vacuum. Rather, contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts.” Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 557 Pa. 595, 606, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999).
In the present case, following a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court determined that the “clear, unambiguous language of the ‘household exclusion’ bars [Appellants’] claim.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/22/2010, at 2. The trial court properly examined the policy’s “household exclusion” and applied the facts as alleged by Appellants to the exclusion:
[Appellants] respond by pointing out that their New Matter alleges Jacob suffered no injuries until after he was ejected from his motorcycle and his body hit the tortfeasor’s windshield. For defendants’ interpretation of the exclusion language to be reasonable, however, it would have to make sense as applied to any accident in which a tortfeasor strikes a motoring insured, including those accidents involving injuries to the insured occurring both before and after ejection from the motorcycle or other vehicle the insured may have been driving. [Appellants’] interpretation would clearly not be reasonable as applied to such situations. Segmenting the accident under [Appellants’] analysis would create an absurd result.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Allstate policy excludes UIM coverage to “anyone while in, or, getting into or out of or when struck by a motor vehicle owned or leased by you or a resident relative which is not insured for [UIM] Coverage under this policy.” Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company Auto Policy, in effect on 4/25/09, at p. 15, ¶ 3. There is no question that the motorcycle operated by Jacob falls under this exclusion.
As explained by the trial court, our review should not result in an absurd construction of the policy. Words of “common usage” in an insurance policy are to be construed in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense, and a court may inform its understanding of these terms by considering their dictionary definitions.
Moreover, courts must construe the terms of an insurance policy as written and may not modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of ‘inter*1173preting’ the policy. If the terms of a policy are clear, this Court cannot rewrite it or give it a construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language used.
Wall Rose Mutual Ins. Co. v. Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 962 (Pa.Super.2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 747, 946 A.2d 688 (2008) (citations omitted).
Although we have, on occasions, admired good lawyering on behalf of a client and zealous advocacy, we cannot conclude that there is any plausible argument that the injures complained of here are not the direct result of Jacob’s operation of his motorcycle while “on” it. Therefore, we conclude that recovery for UIM benefits is properly excluded under the pertinent policy provision.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
COLVILLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.