Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones,On October 8, 1929, Mary A. Rudolph, now Mary A. Russell, the defendant and present appellant, executed two judgment notes, the one in favor of Alice A. Brooks and the other in favor of Richard Brooks. Judgment was entered on each of these notes on July 30, 1931, and on January 23, 1934, both judgments were marked of record to the use of Warren F. Brooks, the appellee. On October 30, 1950, the use-plaintiff is*23sued writs of scire facias to revive and continue the liens of these judgments. The defendant filed an affidavit of defense to each of the writs; and the use-plaintiff thereafter ruled the defendant for judgments for want of sufficient affidavits of defense. After argument, the learned court below, in thorough and well-reasoned opinions, made the rules absolute and entered the judgments for the use-plaintiff from which these appeals were taken.
The affidavits of defense are so similar that they can be considered togther. As summarized by the appellant in her history of the case, the defendant’s affidavits (1) deny that the judgments entered against the defendant on July 30, 1931, were due and payable and aver that the notes on which the judgments were entered were paid in full to Alice A. Brooks, the payee in the one instance, prior to January 23, 1934, and to Bichard Brooks, the payee in the other instance, prior to his death in November, 1934; (2) deny that the judgments were assigned by Alice A. Brooks and by Richard Brooks to the use of Warren F. Brooks on January 23, 1934, or at any other time; (3) aver that, by reason of the lapse of time, a presumption of payment arose in respect of each judgment; and (4) aver that no demand for payment of the judgments was made by the use-plaintiff prior to his issuance of the writs of scire facias on October 15, 1950.
While the affidavits of defense baldly allege that the judgments were paid, they fail to set forth with any particularity how and when payment was made or the person or persons to and by whom the judgments were paid. Such averments are essential to a sufficient allegation of payment. In short, payment is a legal conclusion in support of which it is necessary that facts be averred: see Hiestand v. Williamson, 128 Pa. 122, 131, 18 A. 427; McCracken v. The First Reformed Presbyterian Congregation of Pittsburgh, 111 Pa. 106, 109, *242 A. 94; and Leas v. Safer, 39 Pa. Superior Ct. 160, 162. The defendant’s averments of payment in the present instance were insufficient to prevent judgment.
The denial of the affidavits of defense that the judgments were assigned to the use-plaintiff on January 23, 1934, or at any other time is equally insufficient. If the allegation was designed to question the validity of the order pursuant to which the assignments were made of record, the defendant failed to set forth any facts to support the conclusion. Furthermore, the only defenses available to a scire facias to revive and continue the lien of a judgment are that the judgment does not exist, has been paid or has been discharged: see Cusano, Admrx., v. Rubolino, 351 Pa. 41, 44, 39 A. 2d 906; and Dowling v. McGregor, 91 Pa. 410, 412.
The averments as to the presumption of payment from lapse of time and the allegation that the use-plaintiff made no demand for payment prior to his issuance of the writs of scire facias are equally ineffectual to prevent judgment. In the case of a judgment the lapse of time necessary to raise a presumption of payment is measured from the date when the judgment became legally collectible (Roemer to use v. Lancaster County, 126 Pa. Superior Ct. 11, 16, 190 A. 347) which, according to the general rule, is the date of the entry of the judgment, in this instance July 30,1931: Camp v. John, 259 Pa. 38, 41, 102 A. 285. As the writs of scire facias were issued on October 13, 1950, there was accordingly an intervening lapse of time of a little over nineteen years from the date when the judgments became collectible which is less than the period legally required to support the presumption.
The appellant contends, however, that, even though the lapse of time is less than twenty years, the actual period of nineteen years, two and one-half months plus the fact that the use-plaintiff made no demand for payment justify the presumption' of payment. • ■ In.- support *25of this contention, the appellant cites and quotes copiously from Conrad’s Estate, 333 Pa. 561, 3 A. 2d 697. But, that case is not authority for the proposition that a presumption of payment of a specialty or judgment arises from a lapse of less than twenty years. Such a presumption may arise in less than twenty years but not because of the delay alone. It arises from facts other than the delay. That was plainly recognized in Conrad’s Estate wherein it was said (p. 565),— “. . . where there is a long delay, presumption of payment of a sealed instrument may arise in a period less than twenty years if there is a factual basis to support it other than the delay” (Emphasis supplied). The only additional fact to which the present appellant points is that the use-plaintiff made no demand for payment. As a lack of demand for payment is the fact which gives rise to the presumption of payment after the lapse of twenty years (see Roemer to use v. Lancaster County, supra, at p. 16), it has no such efficacy in the ease of a lesser period of delay. In other words, lack of demand for payment does not help to a presumption of payment unless such lack existed for the full period of twenty years.
There is one further averment peculiar to the affidavit of defense to the writ of scire facias issued on the judgment in favor of Richard Brooks. The defendant there avers that “. . . the signature on the alleged assignment of judgment to Warren E. Brooks is not the true signature of the said Richard Brooks and was not in fact signed by him.” Such an allegation might have been assigned as a reason for striking off the assignment, but it does not affect the judgment. It does not constitute an allegation that the judgment does not exist, has been paid or has been discharged. See Cusano, Admrx., v. Rubolino, supra; and Dowling v. McGregor, supra. The defendant’s attempted impeachment of the assignment in the judgment in favor of *26Richard Brooks is irrelevant on a question as to a scire facias to revive and continue the lien of a judgment.
The learned judge of the court below was correct in concluding that the affidavits of defense to the writs of scire facias were insufficient and in entering judgments accordingly.
Judgments affirmed.