concurring.
I join the majority’s holding that a parent has standing to challenge the appointment of a limited guardian for her minor child’s estate. See Majority Opinion at 427, 434-35, 27 A.3d at 988, 992-93. Notably, neither party to this appeal disagrees with this well-established proposition. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 7; Brief for Appellee at 4. Under the circum*436stances, I believe it would be useful to provide some additional context explaining how it is that we have come to revisit a settled point of law with which all parties agree.
The main difficulty in the case seems to stem from the broad wording of the Superior Court’s holding, which, by its terms, apparently implicated an issue not previously at issue in this litigation. By way of background, in her exceptions to the orphans’ court’s order of February 4, 2008, Appellant had argued that that tribunal erred in creating an irrevocable trust and directing that Father’s life insurance proceeds be deposited into the resultant trust. See Exceptions to February 4, 2008 Order of Court ¶ 14, reproduced in R.R. at 27-30. Appellant had therefore contended that the orphans’ court should partially reverse itself and require that all assets to which daughter was entitled as a result of Father’s death be placed into an interest bearing account and marked “Not to Be Withdrawn until the Minor Reaches Eighteen (18) years of age or Further Order of Court.” Id. ¶ 16. Appellant did not, however, challenge that court’s decision to appoint a limited guardian for her daughter’s estate; indeed, Appellant expressly approved of that ruling. See id. ¶ 14.
Appellee countered by maintaining that, since Appellant did not file her appeal on behalf of or as natural parent of her daughter, Appellant was without standing to pursue “the relief sought by her exceptions.” Answer & New Matter to Exceptions ¶ 16 (emphasis added), reproduced in R.R. at 31-33. The orphans’ court agreed and dismissed the exceptions, and Appellant appealed to the Superior Court. In its Rule 1925 opinion, the orphans’ court concluded that Appellant lacked standing to pursue “the relief sought by way of her appeal,” as she was not a named party in the original petition and did not bring the appeal on behalf of or as the natural parent of her daughter. In re Miller, No. 04-07-1299, slip op. at 2 (C.P. Beaver, Aug. 5, 2008) (emphasis added).
On further review, the Superior Court affirmed in a memorandum decision, determining that Appellant lacked standing “to appeal the February 4, 2008 order.” In re Miller, No. 1022 WDA 2008, slip op. at 3, 981 A.2d 942 (Pa.Super. July 14, *4372009); see also id. at 6 (“[Appellant] has no standing to appeal the decision.”). In so holding, the Superior Court’s opinion evidently was read as suggesting that, not only was Appellant without standing to pursue the relief sought by her exceptions — i.e., the partial reversal of the orphan’s court’s order regarding the creation of the irrevocable trust for the assets of her daughter’s estate, which was the only matter in dispute on appeal — but that she also lacked standing to contest any aspect of that ruling, including the court’s decision to appoint a limited guardian for her daughter’s estate. Cf. In re Miller, 605 Pa. 545, 992 A.2d 111 (2010) (per curiam) (“Does the parent of a minor child under the age of fourteen have standing to challenge the appointment of a guardian of that child’s estate made pursuant to a petition filed under Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 12.5?”).
Therefore, Appellant’s standing to contest the appointment of a limited guardian for her daughter’s estate was interjected into this appeal, if at all, by the Superior Court’s somewhat imprecise holding, thus necessitating the present remand. See Majority Opinion at 435, 27 A.3d at 993.
Chief Justice CASTILLE joins this Concurring Opinion.