Dissenting:
¶ 1 I certainly recognize the problems created by the line of cases dealing with the issue of whether alimony pendente lite (APL) survives a common pleas court divorce decree when an appeal has been taken. That is why I believe it is time for an en banc panel of this Court or the Supreme Court to again review the issue to analyze the effect of subsequent legislative changes and case law.
¶ 2 At this point, I would hold that APL continues until the Supreme Court rules on the validity of a petition for allowance of appeal challenging the divorce decree. However, I would urge an en banc panel of this Court (or the Supreme Court) to revisit the opinion of Judge Spaeth in Shuda v. Shuda, 283 Pa.Super. 253, 423 A.2d 1242 (1980). Shuda suggests that the normal rules dealing with the stay of a decision do not apply to APL when a divorce decree has been challenged, and APL must con*337tinue until the Superior Court rules “[s]ince there is an absolute right of appeal” to our Court. Id. at 1244. I would instead hold that the losing party can ask for a stay of the part of the divorce decree that terminates APL on the ground that otherwise she cannot afford to carry out an appeal of the divorce decree.
¶ 3 Until that is done, there seems to be no reason to follow the dicta in Shuda and allow APL until our Court rules, but then deny it when the statutory scheme gives the losing party the right to file a petition for allowance of appeal in the Supreme Court. If the losing party is penniless, she will have no more opportunity to file such a petition than she does to litigate the appeal in our Court.
¶ 4 For example, in DeMasi v. DeMasi, 408 Pa.Super. 414, 597 A.2d 101, 104 (1991), a panel of this Court said that “a divorce is not final for purposes of APL until appeals have been exhausted and a final decree has been entered.” Since appeals are not exhausted if a petition for allowance of appeal is pending, this would mean that APL must still be paid until the Supreme Court rules on the petition. In DeMasi, an appeal was taken from the trial court’s equitable distribution ruling. As a matter of fact, there was no appeal from the divorce decree, and the wife-petitioner had remarried. Id. at 105-06. Still, the DeMasi Court allowed APL to “continue throughout the appeal process and any remand until a final Order has been entered.” Id. at 104 (emphasis in original).
¶ 5 It may also be the case that while equitable distribution is being appealed, alimony is not, and the appellant may be receiving significant alimony and not need APL on top of it. A panel of this Court in Nemoto v. Nemoto, 423 Pa.Super. 269, 620 A.2d 1216 (1993), held that an award of APL was not sacrosanct and could be modified if circumstances warrant it. The Court said:
Unquestionably, the termination of litigation involving divorce and equitable distribution matters results in the cessation of an APL order. [DeMasi v. DeMasi, 408 Pa.Super. 414, 597 A.2d 101, 105 (1991).] This rule does not mean, however, that only the termination of the litigation may mark the end of APL. If, after careful review, the trial judge determines that the spouse who has been receiving APL has acquired assets or income which sufficiently equalizes the financial resources of the parties to pursue the action, APL may be discontinued. See Spink v. Spink, 422 Pa.Super. 126, 619 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa.Super.1992). The Superior Court will uphold the trial court’s action in this regard where the factual findings are supported in the certified record. Id.
Id. at 1221 (emphasis in original).
¶ 6 Because of these developments, I believe there should be a full consideration of the needs of the losing party before APL is granted following a trial court decree terminating the marriage. If the party appealing the divorce decree (or equitable distribution or other financial issues) still needs APL, that party should petition the court for a stay of the part of the order that terminates APL and the normal rules with respect to a stay should apply. Until then, there is no reason to allow an automatic continuance of APL through the ruling of this Court but deny it through the ruling of the Supreme Court on a petition for allowance of appeal.
¶ 7 I would reverse the order of the trial court.