DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.I dissent. The City’s 10-day notice, as written, was “technically” defective. However, it was not “fatally” defective because it did not facilitate Defendants’ default or have any bearing whatsoever on Defendants’ conduct.
This is a subtle argument, but I do not believe it should be ignored in favor of finding a defect “fatal” because the 10-Day Notice failed to follow Pa. R.C.P. No. 237.5 word-for-word. The Majority summarily concludes that since the 10-Day Notice failed to include the language added in 1994, it was “fatally defective” per se.
Unlike the Majority, I believe courts must look at the particular circumstances of each case to determine if the defect was “fatal” before opening the judgment.
A “fatal defect” in a notice is one that misleads, misinforms or one that fails to inform at all. Here, there was no misinformation. The City’s 10-Day Notice, although it did not follow Pa. R.C.P. No. 237.5 word-for-word, it did serve to warn Defendants that they were in default, that action was required or else a judgment would be entered against them within 10 days. It was a notice which clearly warned Defendants that an adverse judgment was imminent if they failed to act. The City’s 10-day notice in no manner or fashion suggested that no action was required of Defendants.
Contrary to the Majority’s approach, our courts have, and must continue to, look at the implication of the alleged defect to determine if it is “fatal” as opposed to having a de minimis effect.
In Malizia v. Beckley, 355 Pa.Super. 257, 513 A.2d 417 (1986), our Superior Court specifically evaluated whether the fact that a 10-Day Notice had not been “signed” had any bearing on the default. There, the plaintiff sent a 10-day default notice. The attorney’s name was typewritten but it was not “signed” by plaintiffs or their attorneys as required by Pa. R.C.P. No. 237.5. The trial court found that the absence of a signature was a “fatal defect” on the record which required that the judgment be stricken. The Superior Court reversed. The court concluded that the absence of a signature “did not operate to confuse [the defendants] or to raise in their minds specters of interlopers in the proceedings ” and was not a proper basis to strike the judgment. Malizia, 513 A.2d at 419 (Emphasis added).
*682By the same token, the missing language in the City’s 10-Day Notice clearly did not operate to confuse Defendants as to whether they were required to respond to the Complaint. Defendants were specifically advised that they must “enter a written appearance personally or by attorney” and “file in writing with the court” their defenses or objections in the accompanying Notice to Defend, which undisput-edly conformed word-for-word to Pa.R.C.P. No. 1018.1. The City’s 10-Day Notice warned Defendants that they were in default and that they must take action. The fact that the Notice did not restate those alternative actions did not mislead Defendants to believe that they were_ required to take no action in response to the Notice, which is what occurred.
Moreover, Lane does not argue that his inaction was caused by the absence of the missing language or that he did not know what to do, so he was justified to do nothing.
In sum, I believe each case must be analyzed based on its particular circumstances with special attention to whether the defect had repercussions and its effect on a defendants’ inaction which caused the default. For example, if no 10-Day Notice is provided, and a defendant defaults, there would be a fatal defect because the lack of notice correlates to a defendant’s inaction.
Here, I do not believe the missing language caused Lane not to respond to the Complaint. Therefore, it was not a “fatal defect.” The Majority’s position promotes form over substance.
President Judge LEADBETTER joins in this dissent.