dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding that Claimants were not engaged'in employment with Venango as defined by Section 401(Z )(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. § 753(Z )(2)(B). The facts in the present case are remarkably similar to those in Johnson v Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Dubois Courier Express and PMA Insurance Co.), — Pa.Commonwealth Ct. -, 631 A.2d 693 (1993), wherein we held that a workers’ compensation claimant who delivered newspapers for the Dubois Courier Express was an independent contractor rather than an employee. For the reasons set forth in Judge Friedman’s dissent in Johnson, I believe Claimants in the present case are employees of Venango rather than independent contractors.
As Judge Friedman noted in Johnson, the key factor in determining employee status is the employer’s right to control or supervise the manner and method by which the claimants completed their deliveries. Dissenting op. 631 A.2d at 699-700. Like the Dubois Courier in Johnson, Venango retains *389control over all essential aspects of Claimants’ work: their time, their territory and their manner of performance. If Claimants did not deliver the papers and advertisers in a certain condition or manner, or by a certain time which did not please the customer, the customers complained directly to Venango which was free to, and in fact did, terminate one of the Claimants.
I would hold that Claimants are employees under Section 401(Z )(2)(B).