We issued a writ of certiorari in this case to determine the validity of ordinances enacted by two municipalities which restrict the placement of state-licensed cigarette vending machines to locations which are not generally accessible to minors. The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County determined that the ordinances were valid. We shall hold that the municipal ordinances are pre-empted by state law, more specifically, the cigarette licensing scheme provided by Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Cum.Supp.), Article 56, §§ 607 through 631, and therefore, shall reverse.
I.
On July 23, 1990, the City of Takoma Park enacted Ordinance No. 1990-39, which repealed and reenacted with amendments, Chapter 10B of the Takoma Park Code (“Takoma Park ordinance”). As enacted, § 10B-15(a) provides that “[n]o person shall sell tobacco products through a vending machine without first obtaining a permit for the placement of a ciga*283rette vending machine in compliance with the provisions of [this ordinance].” 1 Section 10B-16 provides:
“(a) No permit shall be issued for placement of a cigarette vending machine except in locations which are not generally accessible to or frequented by minors, such as bars, cocktail lounges, liquor stores, and private clubhouses for members of fraternal or civic organizations not operated as public businesses or open to the general public.
“(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, no permit shall be issued for a cigarette vending machine which is:
(1) Located in a coat room, restroom, unmonitored hallway, outer waiting area, or similar unattended or unmonitored area of a bar, cocktail lounge, liquor store, private clubhouse or other place to which minors are not generally permitted access; or
(2) Accessible to the public when the establishment is closed.
“(c) The burden of showing that a location is not generally accessible to or frequented by minors shall be on the person who is seeking a permit for a cigarette vending machine.”
Section 10B-17 requires the permit to be posted on, or conspicuously in the immediate vicinity of, the cigarette vending machine. Under Section 10B-34(f), a violation of the Takoma Park ordinance by either the cigarette vending machine vendor or the person in charge of any area in which a cigarette vending machine is located, subjects the violator to a *284$75.00 fíne for the first day there is a violation and to a $150.00 fine for each subsequent day there is a violation.
The purposes for the enactment of these provisions were set forth in the ordinance’s preamble as follows:
“WHEREAS, the Council wishes to discourage minors from experimenting with smoking and to make tobacco products less accessible to minors by restricting where cigarette vending' machines are placed ... and ...
“WHEREAS, smoking by minors is detrimental to the public health and contrary to public policy; and ...
“WHEREAS, smoking has been linked to lung cancer, respiratory disease and heart disease; and ...
“WHEREAS, the Surgeon General has determined that smoking is the leading cause of preventable death; and ...
“WHEREAS, nicotine in tobacco has been found by the Surgeon General to be a powerfully addictive drug and it is therefore important to prevent minors from using nicotine until they are mature and capable of making an informed and rational decision; and
“WHEREAS, everyday more than 3,000 minors begin smoking; and
“WHEREAS, one-half of all smokers began smoking before the age of 18; and
“WHEREAS, Article 27, Section 404 of the Annotated Code of Maryland prohibits the sale of tobacco products to minors; and
‘WHEREAS, despite the Maryland state law, access by minors to tobacco products is a major problem; and
“WHEREAS, cigarette vending machines are often located in unattended or unmonitored areas where minors can readily purchase tobacco products; and
“WHEREAS, a City permit requirement which would allow the placement of cigarette vending machines only in establishments which are not generally accessible to or *285frequented by minors or are not open to the general public would help restrict the access of minors to tobacco products; and
“WHEREAS, a City cigarette vending machine permit is necessary for regulatory purposes to more effectively restrict the access of minors to tobacco products in the interest of public health.”
On April 15,1991, the City of Bowie enacted ordinance 0-1-91 (“Bowie ordinance”), which added a new section, § 11-4, to the City of Bowie Code and which is nearly identical to the Takoma Park ordinance. After stating the purposes for its enactment, which are similar to those provided in the preamble to the Takoma Park ordinance, § 11-4(D)(1) of the Bowie ordinance provides that a cigarette vending machine “shall not be placed or permitted to remain in the city in a public place unless a license for its location has been obtained from the city.”2 Section 11-4(E) provides:
“(E) License Restrictions.
(1) No license shall be issued for placement of a vending machine except in locations which are not generally accessible to or frequented by minors, including by way of example, bars, cocktail lounges, and private clubhouses for mem*286bers of fraternal or civic organizations not operated as public businesses or open to the general public.
(2) Notwithstanding the foregoing, no license shall be issued for a vending machine which is:
(a) located in an unmonitored coat room, restroom, outer waiting area, or similar unattended or unmonitored area of such establishments; or
(b) accessible to the public when the establishment at which the vending machine is located is closed.
(c) located in an area which is less than twenty five (25) feet from any point of public ingress to or public egress from the establishment.”
Under § 11-4(H), the City Manager may revoke or refuse to renew a license for repeated distributions of cigarettes to minors from a vending machine or for placing a vending machine in a public place without a license. Under the Bowie ordinance, the failure to obtain or renew a license, placing a vending machine in an unlicensed location, or the failure to properly display the license is a violation punishable by a fine of $100.00 for the first offense and $400.00 for each subsequent offense. §§ 11-4(1) and 11-5.
II.
On September 12, 1991, appellants, Allied Vending, Inc. (“Allied”) and D.C. Vending Co., Inc. (“D.C. Vending”) filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County against the City of Bowie, City of Takoma Park, and Alexander Williams, Jr., the State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County,3 seeking declaratory relief that the ordinances were invalid and requesting both interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the enforcement of the *287ordinances.4 In their complaint, the vendors asserted that the ordinances were invalid for the following reasons: 1) they are pre-empted by state law; 2) they are in conflict with state law; 3) they affect the entire state and thus are not local laws; 4) they were not enacted pursuant to any express authority granted to a municipal corporation; 5) they are pre-empted by federal law; 6) they are in conflict -with federal law; 7) they impair the vendor’s contracts; 8) they deny the vendors equal protection of the law; and 9) they are void for vagueness and violate other due process guarantees.
Following a two-day trial, the circuit court filed an extensive written opinion rejecting each of the vendors’ arguments and ruling that both ordinances were valid and enforceable. After appealing to the Court of Special Appeals, the vendors petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we issued prior to any consideration of the case by the intermediate appellate court, 328 Md. 741, 616 A.2d 904.
Because we shall hold that the ordinances are pre-empted by state law, we will not address any of the vendors’ other arguments. Before we discuss pre-emption, however, it would be useful to explain the background behind this dispute and the state laws governing the licensing of cigarette vending machines.
A.
The vendors, Allied and D.C. Vending, own and operate cigarette vending machines. The vendors are licensed by the State of Maryland to operate cigarette vending machines in the Cities of Bowie and Takoma Park. At the time of the trial, Allied was licensed by the State to operate cigarette vending machines in several locations in Bowie, including Bob’s Big Boy Restaurant, Bowie Golf and Country Club, and Pizza Cafe. The cigarette vending machines were operated in each location pursuant to an oral agreement with the owners *288of each of the premises, terminable at the will of either party. Under the agreement, Allied was required to pay the owners a monthly commission on each pack of cigarettes sold, varying from 5 cents per pack at the Bowie Golf and Country Club, 17 cents per pack at the Pizza Cafe, and 37 cents per pack at Bob’s Big Boy Restaurant. Allied’s President, Paul Oh, testified that its profit from a pack of cigarettes is approximately 50 cents and that approximately 63 percent of Allied’s total business is derived from sales through cigarette vending machines.
D.C. Vending operates a cigarette vending machine at the New Hampshire Motor Inn in Takoma Park under a similar oral agreement. William John Deoudes, D.C. Vending’s Vice President, testified that it pays the owner a monthly commission of 15 cents on each pack sold and receives a profit of approximately 30 cents per pack. He also testified that approximately 85 percent of D.C. Vending’s business is derived from sales through cigarette vending machines.
With regard to the location of the cigarette vending machines, the trial court found as a fact that all of the cigarette vending machines involved in this case were located in places which were generally accessible to minors.
B.
Prior to the enactment of the ordinances, the licensing of cigarette vending machines was accomplished exclusively in accordance with Md.Code (1957, 1991 Cum.Supp.), Article 56, §§ 607 through 631.5 Sections 607 through 631 are comprehensive provisions governing the appropriate licenses necessary to sell cigarettes in Maryland at wholesale, retail, over-*289the-counter, and through cigarette vending machines. In order to operate a cigarette vending machine within this State, a vendor must obtain two licenses for each machine.
If a vendor operates cigarette vending machines on 40 or more premises, the vendor is required to obtain a license to engage in the business of a cigarette vending machine operator (“cigarette vending machine operator’s license”) from the Comptroller of the Treasury for a flat fee of $250.00. §§ 610(d), (f), (o), 611(a), 612(c), 613(a)(2). An application for a cigarette vending machine operator’s license is made to the Comptroller on the form and containing the information that the Comptroller requires. § 612(c).
If a vendor operates cigarette vending machines on less than 40 premises, the vendor is required to obtain a license to engage in the business of a cigarette retailer (“cigarette retailer’s license”) from the clerk of the circuit court for the county where the cigarette vending machine is to be located.6 §§ 610(b), (f), (h), (l), 611(a)(2), 612(a), 613(b). For a vendor operating cigarette vending machines on less than 40 premises, a cigarette retailer’s license is required for each cigarette vending machine and costs $3.00. § 612(a). An application for a cigarette retailer’s license is made to the clerk of the circuit court on the form the clerk requires and containing the information the Comptroller requires. Id.
In addition to obtaining either a cigarette vending machine operator’s license or a cigarette retailer’s license for each cigarette vending machine, a vendor is required to obtain for each vending machine a license to make retail sales of cigarettes (“county license”) from the clerk of the circuit court for the county where each cigarette vending machine is located for a fee of $25.00.7 §§ 612(a), (c), 631. The county license, *290required to make retail sales of cigarettes, has been required since 1890. See Chapter 91 of the Acts of 1890. The cigarette vending machine operator’s license and the cigarette retailer’s license have been required since 1956. See Chapter 90 of the Acts of 1956.
The Comptroller, in Title 03, Subtitle 02, Chapter 03 of COMAR, has promulgated regulations governing the information required in the applications for all types of cigarette licenses, including the requirement that the applicant provide the addresses where cigarette vending machines are located. COMAR 03.02.03 provides in relevant part:
“.03 Applications for Cigarette Licenses.
A. Applications for a retailer’s cigarette license or licenses shall show the name and address of the place where cigarettes are sold.
B. Applications for more than one cigarette license shall be accompanied by a list of locations stating names and addresses where cigarettes are sold.
C. Applications by vending machine operators ... for a [cigarette vending machine operator’s license] shall be accompanied by a list showing:
(1) Names and addresses where cigarette vending machines are located;
(2) The number of machines at each location; and
(3) The address of the established place of business maintained by the applicant for the purchase of cigarettes, including but not limited to, the maintenance of warehousing facilities for the storage and distribution of cigarettes.
.04 Record Keeping and Licensing.
A. Holders of any cigarette license shall keep and maintain available for inspection during business hours, for a period of 2 years, the following:
(1) All invoices and bills of lading;
(2) All records covering all purchases and sales of cigarettes; and
*291(3) All records of merchandise sold in connection with cigarettes.
B. The records in § A of this regulation shall be subject to inspection wherever they may be found....
H. A vending machine operator holding a cigarette license shall notify the Comptroller within 10 days of the following:
(1) Discontinuance of a location; or
(2) Addition of a new location.”
Other provisions of Article 56 govern the scope of the licenses, § 614, the term and renewal of the licenses, §§ 615 and 631(f), the assignment, transfer and surrender of the license, § 616, and the denial, suspension and revocation of licenses, §§ 618-621. In addition, § 617 provides:
“(a) License display. — A licensee shall display a cigarette license in the manner that the Comptroller requires by regulation.
(b) Cigarette display and vending machine label requirements. — A licensee who sells cigarettes through a vending machine shall:
(1) Position each package of cigarettes in a vending machine so that the tax stamps required in § 12-304 of the Tax-General Articlet[8] are visible when the package is in an area of the vending machine that allows the package to be seen;
(2) Identify each vending machine:
(i) With a conspicuous label that states the licensee’s name, address, and telephone number; and
*292(ii) In the manner that the Comptroller requires by regulation; and
(3) Display, in the manner that the Comptroller requires by regulation, a conspicuous label that states the age requirement and penalty as provided under Article 27, §§ 404 and 405 of the Code.”
Section 617(3) is a recent addition to the section, added by Chapter 301 of the Acts of 1989. Chapter 301 raised the minimum age of a person, from 16 years to 18 years of age, to whom it is lawful to sell cigarettes or other tobacco products. See Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 404.9 Chapter 301 also added Article 27, § 405(b), which exempts from criminal penalties a cigarette machine vendor from whose machine a minor has purchased cigarettes if the vendor complies with the display requirements of § 617(b)(3).10 Article 27, § 405(b) provides:
“(b) Exceptions. — If the requirements of Article 56, § 617(b)(3) of the Code are satisfied, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply to the owner of a tobacco product vending machine or any other person exercising control over a tobacco product if a person under 18 has purchased a tobáceo product from a vending machine.”
*293Under the authority granted in § 617, the Comptroller has promulgated regulations governing the display of cigarette licenses. COMAR 03.02.03.04 provides in relevant part:
“D. Cigarette Vending Machine Requirements.
(1) A licensee who sells cigarettes at retail through a vending machine shall display on each machine:
(a) A label that indicates the licensee’s name, address, and telephone number; and
(b) The label provided by the Comptroller that states the:
(i) Age requirement for the purchase of cigarettes, and
(ii) Penalty as provided by Article 27, §§ 404 and 405.
(2) Operators of cigarette vending machines not covered in § D(l)(a) shall display the retailer’s cigarette license on the machines they operate.
E. Other holders of retailer’s cigarette licenses shall visibly display the license on the premises where cigarettes are sold.”
The cigarette license fees paid to the Comptroller are used to administer the licensing scheme embodied in §§ 607 through 631 and enforcement of the Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act.11 § 624. Section 628(a) provides:
“[t]he Comptroller shall seal a [cigarette] vending machine to prevent the sale or removal of cigarettes from the vending machine if:
(1) the tobacco tax stamp is not visible on packages of cigarettes in the vending machine, as required in § 617 of this subtitle; or
(2) The vending machine is not labeled as required under § 617....”
*294There are numerous criminal offenses punishable by fines or jail, which are provided in the licensing scheme. These provisions include operating without a cigarette vending machine operator’s license or a cigarette retailer’s license, § 630(a), operating without a county license, § 631(j), violating regulations issued by the Comptroller, including the regulations governing display of cigarette licenses, § 631(k), improper display of the county license, 631(g), and willfully tampering with a seal placed on a cigarette vending machine by the Comptroller. § 630(b). These provisions are in addition to those which allow the Comptroller to deny a license to an applicant, reprimand any licensee, or suspend or revoke a license. §§ 618, 631(h).
Under Md.Code (1990 Repl.Vol.), § 11-507 of the Commercial Law Article and Md.Code (1988), § 2-107 of the Tax-General Article, the Comptroller is given authority to enforce the Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act and the tobacco tax laws of Title 12 of the Tax-General Article. The record indicates that during fiscal year 1990, there were over 3,000 inspections of retail outlets, including inspections of cigarette vending machines. Marion E. Schanze, Assistant Director of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Comptroller of the Treasury, testified that the enforcement unit of the Comptroller’s office conducts inspections of approximately ten percent of the cigarette vending machines for each cigarette vending machine operator’s license issued by the Comptroller and makes spot inspections of many cigarette retailers. Although there is no express provision for enforcement of the warning label requirement, it is clear from the record that this warning label requirement, imposed by both § 617(b)(3) and COMAR 03.02.03.04D, is enforced by the Comptroller. For as stated previously, it is a misdemeanor to fail to comply with a regulation issued by the Comptroller, § 631(k), (l) and subjects the vendor or other person exercising control over the vending machine to a fine if a minor purchases cigarettes from a vending machine that does not display the warning label. Art. 27, §§ 404, 405.
*295C.
The powers of incorporated municipalities are provided in Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution and Article 23A of the Maryland Code. Mayor of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 342, 435 A.2d 425, 431 (1981). Under Article XI-E, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution, each municipal corporation in Maryland is vested with “the power and authority ... to amend or repeal an existing charter or local laws relating to the incorporation, organization, government, or affairs of said municipal corporation heretofore enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland, ... and to amend or repeal any charter adopted under the provisions of this Article.” This authority is qualified by Article XI-E, § 6, of the Maryland Constitution which provides that “[a]ll charter provisions, or amendments thereto, adopted under the provisions of this Article, shall be subject to all applicable laws enacted by the General Assembly.” Likewise, Maryland Code (1957, 1990 Repl.Vol.), Article 23A, § 2 provides:
“(a) The legislative body of every incorporated municipality in this State, except Baltimore City, by whatever name known, shall have general power to pass such ordinances not contrary to the Constitution of Maryland, public general law, or, except as provided in § 2B of this article, public local law as they may deem necessary in order to assure the good government of the municipality, to protect and preserve the municipality’s rights, property, and privileges, to preserve peace and good order, to secure persons and property from danger and destruction, and to protect the health, comfort and convenience of the citizens of the municipality. ...”
Following this delegation of general power, Article 23A, § 2(b) grants certain express powers to municipal corporations and provides in relevant part:
“(b) In addition to, but not in substitution of, the powers which have been, or may hereafter be, granted to it, such legislative body also shall have the following express ordinance-making powers: ...
*296(32) To exercise the licensing authority granted in Article 56 and other provisions of the law.
(33) Subject to the limitations imposed under Article 24 of the Code, the Tax-General Article, and the Tax-Property Article, to establish and collect reasonable fees and charges:
(i) For the franchises, licenses, or permits authorized by law to be granted by a municipal corporation.... ”
The enactment of Article 23A, § 2(b)(32) and (33) was an unambiguous response by the General Assembly to our decision in Campbell v. City of Annapolis, 289 Md. 300, 424 A.2d 738 (1981). In Campbell, we determined that a rental dwelling license fee imposed by the Annapolis City Code was invalid because the fee had not been expressly authorized by the General Assembly. In response to Campbell, the General Assembly enacted two identical bills as emergency legislation. Those bills added Article 23A, § 2(b)(32) and (33). See Vytar Assocs. v. City of Annapolis, 301 Md. 558, 561, 483 A.2d 1263, 1264-65 (1984); 67 Op.Att’y Gen. 307 (1982). Thus, subsections (32) and (33) enable municipal corporations to exercise the licensing authority granted in Article 56, and further, to establish and collect reasonable fees for the licenses and permits authorized in Article 56 to be granted by municipal corporations.
The ability of a municipal corporation to regulate businesses through licensing and permitting processes is circumscribed in part by Article 56, § 12. Section 12 provides in relevant part:
“Except as otherwise expressly provided in this article, no county, city or other political subdivision of this State shall require any person, firm or corporation to obtain a permit or license to transact in such county, city or other political subdivision any business or occupation for which it or he is required to obtain a State license under the provisions of this article, nor shall any county, city or other political subdivision of this State levy an occupational tax or fee upon such person, firm or corporation for transacting any such business or engaging in any such occupation for which such *297State license is required. Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, any county, city or other political subdivision of this State may require permits or licenses to be obtained where necessary for regulatory purposes in the interest of the public health, safety or morals.”
Although municipalities may require permits or licenses for regulatory purposes in the interest of the public health, safety or morals, this authority is “subject to all applicable laws enacted by the General Assembly.” Md. Const. Art. XI-E, § 6. Moreover, ordinances passed pursuant to such authority are permissible as long as they are “not contrary to the Constitution of Maryland [or] public general law....” Art. 23A, § 2(a). In short, if the General Assembly has preempted a certain field, such as the sale of cigarettes through cigarette vending machines, it is irrefutable that municipalities have no authority to legislate in that field.
III.
We recognized in Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986),
“[t]he doctrine of pre-emption is grounded upon the authority of the General Assembly to reserve for itself exclusive dominion over an entire field of legislative concern. When properly invoked, the doctrine precludes local legislative bodies from enacting any legislation whatsoever in the pre-empted field.”
Id. at 324, 513 A.2d at 902. As we recently explained in Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487-88, 620 A.2d 880, 883 (1993), state law may pre-empt local law in one of three ways: 1) pre-emption by conflict,12 2) express pre-emption,13 or *2983) implied pre-emption. Over the last twenty-five years, we have frequently examined the concept of implied pre-emption. Skipper, supra; Howard County v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. 511, 573 A.2d 821 (1990); Board of Child Care of the Balt. Annual Conf. of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, 316 Md. 683, 561 A.2d 219 (1989); Ad + Soil, supra; National Asphalt Pavement Ass’n, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 292 Md. 75, 437 A.2d 651 (1981); Montgomery County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 287 Md. 101, 411 A.2d 97 (1980); McCarthy v. Board of Educ., 280 Md. 634, 374 A.2d 1135 (1977); County Council v. Montgomery Ass’n, Inc., 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975); Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969). In Sitnick, we explained the theory of implied pre-emption:
“[W]e wish it understood that there may be times when the legislature may so forcibly express its intent to occupy a specific field of regulation that the acceptance of the doctrine of pre-emption by occupation is compelled.... ”
254 Md. at 323, 255 A.2d at 385.
Although there is no particular formula for determining whether the General Assembly intended to pre-empt by implication an entire area, Skipper, 329 Md. at 488, 620 A.2d *299at 883; Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 522-23, 573 A.2d at 827, and though our decisions have considered several factors, Skipper, 329 Md. at 488, 620 A.2d at 883, we have stated repeatedly that “ ‘ ‘[t]he primary indicia of a legislative purpose to pre-empt an entire field of law is the comprehensiveness with which the General Assembly has legislated the field.’ ’ ” Skipper, 329 Md. at 488, 620 A.2d at 883 (quoting Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 523, 573 A2d at 828 (quoting Harker, 316 Md. at 696-97, 561 A.2d at 226)); Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 328, 513 A.2d at 904.
Among the secondary factors we have considered in determining whether pre-emption by implication exists are the following: 1) whether local laws existed prior to the enactment of the state laws governing the same subject matter, Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 529, 573 A.2d at 830-31; Harker, 316 Md. at 698, 561 A.2d at 227; Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 333, 513 A.2d at 906; National Asphalt Pavement Ass’n, 292 Md. at 79-80, 437 A.2d at 653; Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 60 n. 5, 333 A.2d at 600 n. 5; Sitnick, 254 Md. at 322, 255 A.2d at 385, 2) whether the state laws provide for pervasive administrative regulation, Skipper, 329 Md. at 489, 620 A.2d at 884; National Asphalt Pavement Assoc., 292 Md. at 79, 437 A.2d at 653, 3) whether the local ordinance regulates an area in which some local control has traditionally been allowed, Skipper, 329 Md. at 493, 620 A.2d at 886, Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 65, 333 A.2d at 603, 4) whether the state law expressly provides concurrent legislative authority to local jurisdictions or requires compliance with local ordinances, Skipper, 329 Md. at 492, 620 A.2d at 885; Harker, 316 Md. at 698, 561 A.2d at 226-27; Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 326-28, 513 A.2d at 903-04, 5) whether a state agency responsible for administering and enforcing the state law has recognized local authority to act in the field, Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 525-28, 573 A.2d at 828-30; Harker, 316 Md. at 697-98, 561 A.2d at 227; National Asphalt Pavement Ass’n., 292 Md. at 80, 437 A.2d at 653-54, 6) whether the particular aspect of the field sought to be regulated by the local government has been addressed by the state legislation, Skipper, 329 Md. at 492, 620 A.2d at 885; *300Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 526, 573 A.2d at 829; Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 63, 333 A.2d at 602, and 7) whether a two-tiered regulatory process existing if local laws were not pre-empted would engender chaos and confusion, Skipper, 329 Md. at 492-93, 620 A.2d at 885; Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 527-28, 573 A.2d at 829-30; Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 333, 513 A.2d at 906; Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 64, 333 A.2d at 602-03.
A.
In light of the comprehensive state-licensing scheme for cigarette vending machines provided by Article 56, §§ 607 through 631, we conclude that the sale of cigarettes through cigarette vending machines is one of those “areasfs] in which the Legislature has acted with such force that an intent by the State to occupy the entire field must be implied____” Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 59, 333 A.2d at 600.
In Talbot County v. Skipper, supra, we recently held that the state law governing sewage sludge utilization, which requires a person to obtain a state-issued permit before the person may utilize sewage sludge in this State, pre-empts by implication a county ordinance requiring a landowner to record certain information in the county land records before applying sewage sludge to his land in accordance with a state permit. 329 Md. at 482-83, 620 A.2d at 880-81. Although the statutory scheme at issue in Skipper, which included fifty pages of regulations, is comparatively more complex than the statutory scheme embodied by the cigarette licensing scheme in this case, the comprehensiveness with which the General Assembly has legislated in both fields is qualitatively equivalent. Whereas a larger and more complex statutory and regulatory scheme is warranted in the field of sewage sludge utilization given the many environmental and land use concerns, a smaller statutory scheme may pre-empt a less complex field of law. As we have recognized before, the inquiry is simply “whether the General Assembly has manifested a *301purpose to occupy exclusively a particular field.” Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 324, 513 A.2d at 902.
Similar to the state laws governing the utilization of sewage sludge at issue in Skipper, the state laws governing the sale of cigarettes through vending machines requires a permit, §§ 611, 631, specifies the contents of the application, § 612, requires the issuance of the license by the Comptroller or clerk of the proper circuit court if the application requirements are satisfied, §§ 613, 631, authorizes the licensee to engage in the licensed business, §§ 614, 631, establishes provisions for the term and renewal of the licenses, §§ 615 and 631, establishes additional requirements in order to keep the license, including the proper labeling of the cigarette vending machine with an identification label and a warning label, § 617, COMAR 03.02.03.04D, provides for inspection of the cigarette vending machines, Md.Code (1990 Repl.Vol.), § 11— 507 of the Commercial Law Article and Md.Code (1988), § 2-107 of the Tax-General Article, establishes grounds for denial of a license and specifies the circumstances under which a license can be suspended or revoked, §§ 618-622, and provides numerous criminal offenses punishable by jail or fines for failure to comply with the state laws. §§ 622, 630, 631. See Skipper, 329 Md. at 489-91, 620 A.2d at 884-85.
We conclude that “[tjhese statutory provisions manifest the general legislative purposes to create an all-encompassing state scheme,” Skipper, 329 Md. at 491, 620 A.2d at 885, to regulate the sale of cigarettes through cigarette vending machines. Moreover, other factors support our conclusion that the state has pre-empted the field of regulation of the sale of cigarettes through vending machines.
For many years the General Assembly has exercised exclusive control over the sale of cigarettes. Since 1890, a county license to make retail sales of cigarettes has been required, Ch. 91 of the Acts of 1890, and since 1956, the cigarette vending machine operator’s license and cigarette retailer’s *302license have been required, Ch. 90 of the Acts of 1956. Further, the General Assembly recently addressed the sale of cigarettes to minors through vending machines, the stated purpose for enactment of the municipal ordinances in this case. In Chapter 301 of the Acts of 1989, the General Assembly sought to curb the purchase of cigarettes by minors through vending machines by requiring that each vending machine display a conspicuous label stating the minimum age required for the lawful sale of cigarettes and the penalty for such a violation.
Obviously feeling the legislation did not go far enough to curb the sale of cigarettes to minors through vending machines, the cities of Takoma Park and Bowie subsequently enacted their ordinances in 1990 and 1991. What we stated in Montgomery Ass’n can be adapted to the instant case:
“In view of the General Assembly’s long and exclusive control of [the sale of cigarettes] in this State, the Legislature’s failure to foresee and take action expressly to prevent future local government trespass in this area of exclusive state legislative authority is no support for the validity of the ... ordinances.”
274 Md. at 60 n. 5, 333 A.2d at 600 n. 5. See also Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 529, 573 A.2d at 830-31; Harker, 316 Md. at 698, 561 A.2d at 227; Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 333, 513 A.2d at 906; National Asphalt Pavement Ass’n, 292 Md. at 79-80, 437 A.2d at 653; Sitnick, 254 Md. at 322, 255 A.2d at 385.
These ordinances attempt to regulate an area in which no local control has traditionally been allowed, Skipper, 329 Md. at 493, 620 A.2d at 886; Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 65, 333 A.2d at 603, and unlike Harker, supra, and Ad + Soil, supra, there are no references in §§ 607 through 631 to concurrent legislative authority of local jurisdictions, Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 626-28, 513 A.2d at 903-04, or requiring compliance with local ordinances, Harker, 316 Md. at 698, 561 A.2d at 226-27.
*303Although the particular aspect of the field sought to be regulated by the Cities of Takoma Park and Bowie is not addressed by §§ 607 through 631, i.e., the physical location of the cigarette vending machines on the premises,14 Skipper, 329 Md. at 492, 620 A.2d at 885; Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 526, 573 A.2d at 829, Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 63, 333 A.2d at 602, a two-tiered, or multi-tiered regulatory process depending on the number of jurisdictions that enact similar ordinances, would invite chaos and confusion, Skipper, supra; Potomac Elec. Power Co., 319 Md. at 527-28, 573 A.2d at 829-30; Ad + Soil, 307 Md. at 333, 513 A.2d at 906; Montgomery Ass’n, 274 Md. at 64, 333 A.2d at 602-03, engendering, as it may be in this case, a requirement tantamount to a ban. The trial court determined that all of the cigarette vending machines in this case were generally accessible to minors. If we were to uphold these municipal ordinances and the vendors could not comply with these ordinances, the ordinances would be tantamount to a ban on cigarette vending machines in locations in which the State has granted the vendors a license to operate those vending machines.
Since the enactment of Ch. 301 in 1989, the General Assembly has experienced a spate of legislative activity concerning the sale of cigarettes from vending machines. House Bill No. 1384 of the 1990 General Assembly session, House Bill No. 663 of the 1991 session, and House Bill No. 172 of the 1992 session would have banned cigarette vending machines on a state-wide basis, but each of those bills died in the House Committee on Ways and Means. House Bill No. 1383 of the 1990 General Assembly session, House Bill Nos. 39 and 662 of the 1991 session, Senate Bill No. 625 of the 1991 session, Senate Bill No. 187 of the 1992 session, and House Bill Nos. 555 and 554 of the 1992 session would have prohibited cigarette vending *304machines in places where minors had access to them, but each of those bills also died in committee.15 If the General Assembly intended to change existing law governing the sale of cigarettes through vending machines, it certainly has had the opportunities to do so. The failure to enact such measures “strongly suggests that there was no intent to allow local governments to enact different ... requirements.” Skipper, 329 Md. at 493, 620 A.2d at 886.
B.
In its analysis, the trial court relied on language in Holmes v. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 90 Md.App. 120, 600 A.2d 864, cert. dismissed sub nom., County Council of Harford County v. Maryland Reclamation Assocs., Inc., 328 Md. 229, 614 A.2d 78 (1992), for the proposition that in determining whether state law pre-empts by implication similar local legislation that determination may hinge on how the “field” is defined. The issue presented in Maryland Reclamation Assocs. was whether state laws governing solid waste management pre-empted local control in the issuing of landfill permits. The intermediate appellate court expressed in dicta:
“Even if state law did not suggest the legislature’s general purpose to reserve entirely this regulatory power to the expertise of state agencies, state legislation may partially preempt the field. In this context, much depends upon the meaning of the word ‘field.’ That is, a field could be defined inclusively to encompass everything under that heading (i.e. ‘Solid Waste Management’ includes all aspects of management, from cradle to grave), or it could be defined to mean precise subfields under the broader heading (i.e. ‘Solid Waste Management’ defined as a series of small fields, one *305of which might be local planning, another of which being state-issued permits).”
90 Md.App. at 154-55, 600 A.2d at 880-81. The trial court, persuaded by the reasoning of the intermediate appellate court, stated:
“This Court agrees with that reasoning. In order to communicate more easily as to whether this Court is referring to a general field or a segment of that field, this Court will use the word ‘aspect’ to mean a particular segment or portion of a general category, and ‘field’ to mean the general category. In this case, the field at issue is ‘the sale of cigarettes’ and the aspect at issue is ‘the location of cigarette vending machines.’ The issues are whether the state legislature has pre-empted the entire field of cigarette sales and, if not, whether it has left open the aspect of the location of cigarette vending machines for municipalities.”
The trial court went on to determine “that the legislature did not intend to completely pre-empt the field of cigarette sales,” and further concluded “that the legislature did not intend to occupy the aspect of the location of cigarette vending machines.”
The trial court filed its opinion in the instant case on September 16, 1992. Previously, on June 15, 1992, we had granted a writ of certiorari in Maryland Reclamation Assocs., 327 Md. 55, 607 A.2d 564. At oral argument in Maryland Reclamation Assocs., the matter of the County Council’s right to seek appellate review in this Court was raised and explored. 328 Md. at 230, 614 A.2d at 80. We determined that the County Council was not entitled to obtain appellate review in this case, and as there were no other parties seeking appellate review in this Court, we dismissed the writ of certiorari on October 23,1993. Id. In dismissing the writ of certiorari, we emphasized:
“Although our dismissal of the writ of certiorari will have the effect of leaving intact the opinion and judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, our action should not be construed *306as approval of the intermediate appellate court’s opinion and judgment.”
328 Md. at 236, 614 A.2d at 82.
Because we have previously determined that Article 56, §§ 607 through 631 pre-empts any local or municipal legislation in the field of the sale of cigarettes through cigarette vending machines, we need not and shall not address the trial court’s discussion of “partial pre-emption” or “selective preemption.”
C.
In deciding that the Legislature did not intend to pre-empt the field of cigarette sales, the trial court placed much reliance on Article 56, § 611(c) which provides:
“(c) Multiple licenses. — A license under subsection (a) of this section is required:
(1) In addition to any other license required by law; and
(2) For each place at which a person engages in the business of a cigarette retailer.”
The trial court determined that the Legislature by providing the phrase “[i]n addition to any other license required by law,” granted to other entities, including municipalities, the power to also regulate the sale of cigarettes through licensing requirements. For several reasons we now explain, we disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of § 611(c).
In interpreting § 611(c), we seek to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, the primary source of which is the language of the statute itself. Boulden v. Mayor of Elkton, 311 Md. 411, 414, 535 A.2d 477, 479 (1988); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). As we stated in Kaczorowski,
“ ‘[W]here a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, *307348 A.2d 275 (1975); Height v. State, 225 Md. 251, 170 A.2d 212 (1961). In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.’ ”
309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632 (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).
The language “[i]n addition to any other license required by law” was part of the original enactment of Ch. 90, § 2 of the Acts of 1956. As stated previously, Ch. 90 of the Acts of 1956 established the requirement for the cigarette vending machine operator’s license and the cigarette retailer’s license. Prior to that enactment, additional licenses were also required elsewhere in the Code. Since the enactment of Ch. 91 of the Acts of 1890, a county license had been required to make retail sales of cigarettes. Md.Code (1951, 1956 Supp.), Art. 56, § 61 (now codified in Art. 56, § 631). In addition, a state sales tax license was required to make retail sales. Md.Code (1951, 1956 Supp.), Art. 81, § 356.16
The only logical and reasonable reading of § 611(c) leads to the conclusion that it is not an express grant of authority to local jurisdictions to regulate the sale of cigarettes through licensing. Rather, the phrase “[i]n addition to any other license required by law” is merely an affirmation that cigarette retailers and cigarette vending machine operators are not exempt from the other licenses required by the Code in order to sell cigarettes.
This conclusion is supported by the revisor’s note following Md.Code (1992), § 16-202 of the Business Regulation Article, which is the new section of the Code where former Article 56, § 611 was transferred and recodified without substantive change. See supra note 5. Section 16-202 *308has eliminated the phrase “[i]n addition to any other license required by law.” The revisor’s note states in relevant part:
“In subsection (c) of this section, the former requirement that the license is required ‘[i]n addition to any other license required by law* is deleted as implicit.”
As we recently stated, “ ‘notes of reports of a revisor or revision commission are entitled to considerable weight in ascertaining legislative intent.’ ” Waddell v. Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 63, 626 A.2d 353, 358 (1993) (quoting Office & Professional Employees Int. v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 101, 453 A.2d 1191, 1197 (1982)). See also Belcher v. T. Rowe Price Foundation, Inc., 329 Md. 709, 745, 621 A.2d 872, 890 (1993); Dean v. Pinder, 312 Md. 154, 163, 538 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1988). Although the Business Regulation Article created by Ch. 4 of the Acts of 1992 became effective on October 1, 1992, see supra note 5, which was after the trial court filed its opinion in this case, the revisor’s note to § 16-202 of that article further supports our conclusion that Art. 56, § 611(c)(1) was merely an affirmation that cigarette retailers and cigarette vending machine operators were not exempt from obtaining the other licenses required by the Code in order to sell cigarettes.
Having determined that § 611(c) authorized local jurisdictions to license the sale of cigarettes, the trial court relied on Harker, supra, and Ad + Soil, supra, two decisions where local laws were not pre-empted by state laws, and determined that the cities’ ordinances in this case similarly were not preempted. In Potomac Elec. Power Co., we distinguished Hark-er and Ad + Soil for reasons that are applicable here as well. 319 Md. at 524-25, 573 A.2d at 828-29. There we stated:
“In Harker, we were asked to determine whether a state-licensed and regulated child-care facility was subject to county zoning law as it related to the location of such facilities. In holding that local zoning ordinances were not impliedly preempted, we noted that there was no comprehensive regulatory scheme governing child-care facilities under state law. We recognized that § 5-506(b) of the Family Law Article vested legislative authority in the Social Services Administration of the Maryland Department of *309Human Resources, which in turn promulgated COMAR 07.02.13.07 ‘explicitly requiring] a licensed child-care facility to comply with the zoning ordinances of political subdivisions.’ 316 Md. at 698, 561 A.2d 219. We said that ‘the agency rule is entitled to considerable weight in determining the meaning of [the statewide statutory] provisions relating to child-care facilities.’ Id. at 699, 561 A.2d 219----
“In Ad + Soil, the question presented was whether a county could require a special exception permit for the operation of a sewage sludge storage and distribution facility when the facility had already obtained state permits for its operations. We found that the county zoning ordinance had not been impliedly preempted by the provisions of state law governing the operation of sewage sludge facilities. Of particular importance was the fact that ‘Title 9 of the Health Environmental Article, which contains the bulk of the state law governing sewage management, is replete with references to the concurrent legislative authority of local jurisdictions.’ Id. [307 Md.] at 326-27, 513 A.2d 893. The law also required ‘[e]ach county ... to adopt a comprehensive plan for sewage management, to be submitted for the review and approval of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene;’ and ‘[t]he Department may not issue a permit for a sewage sludge composting facility unless the facility complies with all applicable county zoning and land use requirements and is not opposed by the local legislative body.’ Id. at 327, 513 A.2d 893. ‘In promulgating regulations regarding water pollution, the Department is required to consider local zoning laws.’ Id. In fact, it was unequivocally clear that the General Assembly contemplated deference to local authority as shown by the extensive references to governing bodies of counties and other explicit language used which demonstrated a specific intent to coordinate and supplement local legislation.”
Unlike the state laws in Harker, supra, at no place in Article 56, §§ 607 through 631 is there a provision requiring compliance with local ordinances as a precondition for the sale of cigarettes through vending machines. Moreover, unlike the *310state laws in Ad + Soil, there are no references in Article 56, §§ 607 through 631 to the concurrent legislative authority of local jurisdictions to legislate in this area.
In short, through the enactment of Article 56, §§ 607 through 631, the General Assembly has manifested an intent for the State to completely occupy the field of the sale of cigarettes through vending machines rendering any local or municipal ordinances in this area constitutionally invalid.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY FOR THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT DECLARING §§ 10B-15, 10B-16, 10B-17 and 10B-34(f) of CITY OF TAKOMA PARK ORDINANCE NO. 1990-39 AND CITY OF BOWIE ORDINANCE 0-1-91 INVALID; COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE CITIES OF TAKOMA PARK AND BOWIE.
RODOWSKY, J., dissents and files an opinion in which MURPHY, C.J., joins.
. Section 10B-15(b) requires cigarette vending machine permits to be issued annually, requires a separate permit for each machine, and requires a fee of $25.00. Section 10B-15(c) requires applications for cigarette vending machine permits to be made to the City Clerk on forms furnished by the City Clerk and in accordance with regulations established by the City Administrator. Section 10B-15(d) provides that the City Clerk was to notify all current holders of county and state licenses which authorize those licensees to sell cigarettes through cigarette vending machines located within Takoma Park. Section 1 OB-15 (e) provides that a current state-licensed cigarette vending machine licensee was not required to obtain a Takoma Park permit until the expiration of its current license.
. The Bowie ordinance contains administrative and procedural requirements that mirror the Takoma Park ordinance. For instance, under the Bowie ordinance a license is required annually and a separate license is required for each vending machine location, § 11-4(D)(2); applications for licenses are to be made by owners or operators to the city manager on forms furnished by the city, § 11 — 4(D)(3); a fee of $25.00 is to be charged for each license and renewal thereof, § 11-4(D)(4); the application needs to include such information as is necessary for the city to determine where the vending machine will be located and that the requested location is not generally accessible to minors, § 11-4(D)(5); in addition, plans or drawings and a statement of how the location will be monitored or controlled to exclude access to minors are required, id.; and the license is required to be displayed on the vending machine or posted conspicuously in its immediate vicinity, § 11-4(F). Under the Bowie ordinance, if distributions to minors occur from licensed vending machines, the city may require licensees to relocate the machine and apply to revise the license. § 11-4(G).
. The State’s Attorney for Prince George’s County, who is authorized to prosecute municipal infractions by Maryland Code (1957, 1990 Repl. VoL), Article 23A, § 3(b)(15), was dismissed from the action pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, whereby he agreed to be bound by the judgment rendered in this action.
. The request for interlocutory injunctive relief became moot when the municipalities agreed not to enforce the ordinances against these vendors pending a resolution of the action in the circuit court.
. Effective October 1, 1992, Chapter 4 of the Acts of 1992 added a new article to the Annotated Code of Maryland known as the "Business Regulation Article” and recodified without substantive change the cigarette licensing provisions in Title 16 of the Business Regulation Article. The relevant provisions were transferred to Title 16 of the Business Regulation Article without substantive change. Hereinafter all statutory references are to Md.Code (1957, 1991 Cum.Supp.), Article 56, unless otherwise specified.
. A cigarette retailer's license is required to sell cigarettes to a consumer regardless of whether the sale is effected through a cigarette vending machine or over-the-counter. §§ 610(b), 611(a)(2).
. A county license is required to sell cigarettes to a consumer regardless of whether the sale is effected through a cigarette vending machine or over-the-counter. § 631(a).
. Under Md.Code (1988, 1992 Cum.Supp.), §§ 2-1601 through 2-1605 and 12-101 through 12-305 of the Tax-General Article, a tobacco tax is imposed on cigarettes. Licensed wholesalers pay the tobacco tax to the Comptroller and affix tax stamps to a package of cigarettes as evidence that the tobacco tax has been paid. §§ 12-101, 12-301 through 12-304. The tobacco tax is 36 cents for each pack of twenty cigarettes. § 12-105(2). The revenue generated from the tobacco tax, after deduction of the cost of administering the tobacco tax laws, is distributed to the general fund of the state. §§ 2-1601 through 2-1605.
. Section 404 of Article 27 provides:
"(a) In general. — It shall not be lawful for any dealer, vendor or other person or persons or body corporate engaged in the manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, tobacco, or smokeless tobacco, or in any occupation in which the buying or selling of said goods, wares and merchandise shall constitute the whole or any part of his, her, its or their occupation, to sell, barter or give any cigar or cigars, cigarette or cigarettes, smoking or chewing tobacco, or smokeless tobacco to any individual under the age of 18 years, unless such individual is acting solely as the agent of his employer; nor shall it be lawful for any person not a dealer to purchase for any individual under the age of 18 years any cigar or cigars, cigarette or cigarettes, smoking or chewing tobacco, or smokeless tobacco.”
Since the enactment of Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1886, which prohibited the sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products to minors under fourteen years of age, the State has set the minimum age requirement for the lawful sale of cigarettes and tobacco products.
. The criminal penalty for violating Article 27, § 404 is a fine not to exceed one hundred dollars for each offense. Art. 27, § 405(a).
. The Maryland Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act, Md.Code (1990 Repl. Vol.), §§ 11-501 through 11-510 of the Commercial Law Article, regulates the minimum wholesale and retail prices at which cigarettes may be sold.
. In Skipper, we explained that "[a] local ordinance is preempted by conflict when it prohibits an activity which is intended to be permitted by state law, or permits an activity which is intended to be prohibited by state law.” 329 Md. at 487 n. 4, 620 A.2d at 882-83 n. 4. See also Boulden v. Mayor of Elkton, 311 Md. 411, 535 A.2d 477 (1988); Rockville Grosvenor, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 289 Md. 74, 422 A.2d 353 (1980); Mayor of Annapolis v. Annapolis Waterfront Co., 284 Md. 383, 396 A.2d 1080 (1979); County Council v. Investors Funding, Corp., *298270 Md. 403, 312 A.2d 225 (1973); Mayor of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969); American Nat’l Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Mayor of Baltimore, 245 Md. 23, 224 A.2d 883 (1966); Heubeck v. Mayor of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954); Herman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 55 A.2d 491 (1947); Eastern Tar Prods. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Md. 290, 4 A.2d 462 (1939); Billig v. State, 157 Md. 185, 145 A. 492 (1929); Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581 (1909); cf. Mayor of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 435 A.2d 425 (1981) (municipal ordinance conflicting with county ordinance is pre-empted by conflict).
Because we shall hold that the ordinances in this case are pre-empted by implication, we will not address the vendors’ argument concerning pre-emption by conflict.
. See Montgomery County v. Atlantic Guns, Inc., 302 Md. 540, 489 A.2d 1114 (1985); Mayor of Baltimore v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 226 Md. 379, 174 A.2d 153 (1961).
In this case, the vendors concede there is no express preemption in the field of cigarette sales.
. The sections governing the cigarette license applications, §§ 612(a) and 631, speak only to providing “where the place of business or vending machine is located.” Under § 612, the application is to contain the information the Comptroller requires. In applications for licenses, the Comptroller requires only “Names and addresses where cigarette vending machines are located....” COMAR 03.02.03.03C.
. All of the bills died in the House Committee on Ways and Means, except for S.B. No. 187 of the 1992 session, which died in the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, and H.B. No. 1383 of the 1990 session, which died in the House Committee on Economic Matters.
. A state sales tax license is still required today. Md.Code (1988, 1992 Cum.Supp.), §§ 11-701 through 11-712 of the Tax-General Article.