concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This appeal requires that we address what duty, if any, a baseball stadium operator or its concessionaires owe patrons with respect to a peril unique to sports facilities: objects leaving the playing field that strike and injure patrons. On summary judg*92ment, the trial court held that the limited duty rule set forth in Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 527, 777 A.2d 380 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387, 788 A.2d 772 (2001), barred the causes of action pressed here. Accepting the trial court’s articulation of the limited duty rule, the Appellate Division nonetheless created an exception to the limited duty rule for those patrons who have left their seats and are “in the process of placing orders or reaching for money or accepting the purchases or striking up conversations with others [in] line____” Maisonave v. Newark Bears Profl Baseball Club, Inc., 371 N.J.Super. 129, 134, 852 A.2d 233 (App.Div.2004). Focusing on whether a patron is a “spectator” and distinguishing those instances when the patron/speetator is no longer paying attention to the sporting contest and is otherwise engaged in one of the sports arena’s “commercial venture[s] which by its nature induces spectators to let down their guard,” the panel held that the baseball stadium operator and its concessionaires “have a concomitant duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [the inattentive spectators] during such times of heightened vulnerability.” Ibid.
Sustaining, but modifying, the Appellate Division’s reasoning, a majority of this Court now “adopt[s] the Appellate Division’s opinion in Schneider, to the extent that it holds that owners and operators must offer sufficient protected seating to those who would seek it on an ordinary basis and to provide screening in the most dangerous sections of the stands.” Ante, 185 N.J. at 81-82, 881 A.2d at 706-07. The majority then defines the area where the limited duty rule applies—the stands—to
include! 1 the stairs that fans ascend and descend to access their seats in the stands. Similarly, areas immediately ac(jacent to the stands designated as “standing room only,” and dedicated solely to viewing the game, fall within the purview of the limited duty rule. In contrast, multi-purpose areas, such as concourses and playground areas, are outside the scope of the rule,____
[Ante, 185 N.J. at 82, 881 A.2d at 707.]
Relying on Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 503, 643 A.2d 600 (1994) for the proposition that “ ‘Recognition of a duty of care, ultimately, rests on considerations of public policy and on notions of fairness,’ ” ante, 185 N.J. at 80, 82, 881 A.2d at 706, 707, the *93majority distinguishes between the areas within a sports facility where the duty of care of the owner/operator is defined by the limited duty rule and those “areas of the stadium outside of the stands,” ante, 185 N.J. at 83, 881 A.2d at 708, where the duty of care of the owner/operator “is the business invitee rule, which provides that a landowner ‘owe[s] a duty of reasonable care to guard against any dangerous condition on his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered.’ ” Ante, 185 N.J. at 86, 881 A.2d at 709 (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993)).
Insofar as the majority adopts the limited duty rule of Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc. as the duty of care an owner/operator of a sports facility must meet for the distinct peril of objects leaving the playing field, I concur with the majority’s conclusion. However, to the extent the majority creates a hybrid duty of care for exactly the peril addressed by the limited duty rule—a hybrid duty of care that hinges solely on where a plaintiffs volitional acts take him or her and is independent of any act by the party ultimately held liable—I respectfully dissent. I would apply the same duty of care (the limited duty rule) for the same peril (objects leaving the playing field) irrespective of the plaintiffs location when injured.
I.
A.
I start from the self-evident proposition that a sports facility is different from any other commercial establishment. As the majority itself acknowledges in the context of this case, “professional baseball is a unique sport because fans actively engage in the game by trying to catch foul balls. Fans often greet out-of-play baseballs with cheers as they dive over walls and rows of seats, risking life and limb, for the thrill of triumphantly claiming the errant ball.” Ante, 185 N.J. at 81, 881 A.2d at 706. Given the peril of objects leaving the playing field that is unique to sports facilities, I embrace the limited duty rule as a reasonable and *94reasoned accommodation of society’s conflicting interests. In Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 527, 533-34, 777 A.2d 380 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387, 788 A.2d 772 (2001), Judge Skillman traced the development of the duty owed by sports facilities to patrons as follows:
There are some cases which hold that the operator of a sports facility has “no duty” to provide spectators with protection from flying balls or pucks, because a person who attends a sporting event assumes the risks inherent in watching the sport. However, the more commonly accepted rule is that a sports facility has a “limited duty” of care to protect spectators from flying balls or pucks. Some cases hold that this limited duty may be satisfied by simply affording spectators the opportunity to purchase a ticket in an area that is protected by netting or plexiglass. However, what has come to be recognized as the prevailing rule is that a sports facility operator’s limited duty of care has two components: first, the operator must provide protected seating “sufficient for those spectators who may be reasonably anticipated to desire protected seats on an ordinary occasion,” and second, the operator must provide protection for spectators in “the most dangerous section” of the stands. The second component of this limited duty ordinarily may be satisfied by the operator providing screened seats behind home plate in baseball and behind the goals in hockey.
Although the operator of a commercial recreational facility, like the operator of any other business, has a general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons, the measure of that duty is “due care under all the circumstances.” The critical circumstance that determines the scope of the duty of an operator of a baseball field or hockey rink is that most spectators prefer to sit where they can have an unobstructed view of the game and are willing to expose themselves to the risks posed by flying balls or pucks to obtain that view. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to accommodate this preference, so long as the sports facility operator provides sufficient screened seats for those spectators who may be reasonably expected to request protected seats and also screens any seats that pose an unduly high risk of injury from flying balls or pucks.
[ (citations omitted).]
I cannot improve on, and therefore adopt, Judge Skillman’s excellent analysis and would hold that, in respect of the peril of objects leaving the playing field, the operator of a sports facility has a two-part limited duty of care: to provide protective seating in a quantity sufficient to satisfy reasonable demand, and to protect patrons in those areas of the stadium which are most dangerous. I would also hold, consistent with Judge Skillman’s conclusions, that the latter requirement is, in large part, “satisfied by the *95operator providing screened seats behind home plate in baseball....” Ibid.
B.
If we are to be consistent in our adoption of the limited duty rule as the standard of care owed by a stadium owner/operator to its patrons, our analysis must be defined and circumscribed by it. The limited duty rule does not immunize a stadium owner/operator from liability to persons injured by objects leaving the playing field. On the contrary, the limited duty rule crystallizes the duty a stadium owner/operator owes in respect of the specific peril of objects leaving the playing field: to provide sufficient screened seats so as to satisfy the demand therefor, and to screen those areas of the stadium where there is an unduly high risk of injury from objects leaving the playing field. We analyze the application of the limited duty rule in stages.
We first inquire whether the plaintiff sought protected seating. If he did so and, while so seated, was injured by an object leaving the playing field, the question that must be addressed is whether the stadium owner/operator provided sufficient protected seating to satisfy demand. If so, then the stadium owner/operator has satisfied his duty of care and no breach of duty—and, hence, no liability—would flow. However, if plaintiff requested protected seating and the stadium owner/operator failed to provide sufficient protected seating so as to satisfy the demand therefor, and if plaintiff was then injured as a result of an object leaving the playing field, then a breach of duty and resultant civil liability follow.
When, as here, a plaintiff is not injured while seated in a protected area, the focus of the inquiry under the limited duty rule shifts to whether the plaintiffs location when injured as a result of an object leaving the playing field was one that carried an unduly high risk of injury from objects leaving the playing field. If so, and if the stadium owner/operator did not screen that area, then the standard of care of the limited duty rule has been breached *96and liability follows. However, if the plaintiffs location when injured as a result of an object leaving the playing field was not one that carried an unduly high risk of injury from objects leaving the playing field or was otherwise screened, then the standard of care of the limited duty rule has not been breached and no liability should follow.
An application of these principles to this case leads to the conclusion that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that his location when injured as a result of a batted ball leaving the playing field was one that carried an unduly high risk of injury from objects leaving the playing field. Indeed, the only proof adduced by plaintiff here was of his own injury; there was no proof of any other injuries at that location arising from objects leaving the playing field. Thus, if we apply the limited duty rule as it is generally understood—and as the majority adopts it before limiting its application—plaintiffs claim must fail.
II.
Reasoning that “a fair and appropriate accommodation of the competing interests” requires that the application of the Schneider limited duty rule be circumscribed to only those injuries suffered from objects leaving the playing field while the plaintiff is located in the “stands,” ante, 185 N.J. at 86, 881 A.2d at 709, the majority instead adopts a hybrid standard of care for the same peril: if a plaintiff is located in the stands when injured by an object leaving the playing field, then the duty of care owed is that of the limited duty rule; if, however, the plaintiff is located within the stadium but other than in the stands when injured by an object leaving the playing field, then the duty of care owed is of “ ‘reasonable care to guard against any dangerous conditions on his or her property that the owner either knows about or should have discovered.’ ” Ante, 185 N.J. at 86, 881 A.2d at 709 (citing Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 434, 625 A.2d 1110 (1993)). According to the majority, this shifting or moveable duty of care—which is triggered not by any act of the party who owes the duty of care, *97but instead is activated by a plaintiff merely moving from one part of the stadium to another—is required by “ ‘considerations of public policy and on notions of fairness.’ ” Ante, 185 N.J. at 81, 881 A.2d at 706 (citing Crawn v. Campo, 186 N.J. 494, 503, 643 A.2d 600 (1994)).
The duty of care owed by an owner/operator of a sports facility to patrons in respect of the peril of objects leaving the playing field cannot be as fickle as the majority would have it. We have consistently held that “[t]he inquiry [whether a duty of care exists] involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.” Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291 (1962). We have also made clear that,
[i]n most eases, the justice of imposing such a duty [of care] is so clear that the cause of action in negligence is assumed to exist simply on the basis of the actor’s creation of an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm resulting in injury. In fact, however, more is needed, “more” being the value judgment, based on an analysis of public policy, that the actor owed the injured party a duty of reasonable care. [Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984) (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied) (holding limited by N.J.S.A 2A:15-5.7).]
It is beyond question that “[a] cause of action founded upon negligence involves a breach of a duty of care that causes injury.” Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 484, 524 A.2d 366 (1987) (citations omitted). We analyze what duty of care is owed through the dual prism of the peril we seek to protect against and the party that owes the duty in the first instance. Ibid. (“What precautions are ‘reasonable’ depends upon the risk of harm involved and the practicality of preventing it. We ordinarily evaluate a defendant’s conduct on the basis of what a ‘prudent man’ would have done in defendant’s circumstances.”). In determining the duty of care to be imposed, our focus is on the defendant’s acts or omissions, not those of the plaintiff.
To be logically consistent, a duty of care imposed on a defendant in respect of an identified peril cannot be altered solely at the whim of the plaintiff because “[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably *98within the range of apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into account in determining the existence of the duty to exercise care.” Hill v. Yashin, 75 N.J. 139, 144, 380 A.2d 1107 (1977) (quoting 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 58 (1970)); see also Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 503, 694 A.2d 1017 (1997); Kuehn v. Pub Zone, 364 N.J.Super. 301, 311, 835 A.2d 692 (App.Div.2003).
To that extent, the position advanced by Justice Wallace in his concurrence in the result is the logical analog to what I express in dissent: there should be one, and only one, duty of care in respect of an identified peril, and the creation of shifting duties of care for the same peril is fraught with uncertainty and inconsistency. Thus, although Justice Wallace and I differ in our conclusions— Justice Wallace would jettison the limited duty rule in its entirety in favor of a common law negligence duty of care, ante, 185 N.J. at 91, 881 A.2d at 713, while I would apply the limited duty rule uniformly across all circumstances affected by the peril we seek to control—we agree on the core principle: one and only one standard of care should apply in respect of the peril of objects leaving the playing field.
Finally, the majority understates the burden that its holding places on stadium owner/operators. As the majority recognizes, in a seven year period, “eight minor league baseball stadiums opened in New Jersey alone.” Ante, 185 N.J. at 74, 881 A.2d at 702. Each such stadium was designed and constructed under what was then the law in New Jersey: Schneider’s limited duty rule. Based on diffuse notions of “fairness” that are not tethered to either law or proper public policy,1 each such stadium now is *99presented with a Hobson’s choice: either incur the expenses for substantial retrofitting, or, unless relief is provided through the Legislature, serve as little more than a hothouse for budding tort litigation. To date, the Legislature has seen fit to live with the balancing of interests that the limited duty rule represents. If the Legislature perceives that balancing to be preferable to the hybrid rule the majority embraces, then it may opt to speak to this subject directly.2
III.
The limited duty rule articulated in Schneider v. Am. Hockey & Ice Skating Ctr., Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 527, 777 A.2d 380 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 387, 788 A.2d 772 (2001), fairly and appropriately addresses the particularized peril of objects leaving the playing field which confronts members of the public at a sports facility. That limited duty should be all that is required of the owner/operator of a sports facility. The adoption of a hybrid duty of care that depends not on the acts or failure to act of the sports facility owner/operator but instead is triggered by the volitional acts of a patron will lead inevitably to one of two equally unfortunate results: additional litigation, or sports facilities hermetically enclosing the entire playing field so that no object can leave it. Either result is, to me, both unwarranted and a wrongful exercise of judgment. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint in the first instance, the trial court here properly held that
[t]he argument that [plaintiffs] attention was diverted from the game by his purchase is not determinative of this issue. People move about baseball stadiums to enter, leave, purchase food, use the restrooms, seek autographs, and engage in other related activity during the course of a game. It would pose an undue burden *100upon operators of sports facilities if their legal responsibility to such persons depended upon what they were doing at a given moment. In short, once a spectator, always a spectator—at least until the last out is registered.
Simply said, the trial court had it right.
Because I cannot subscribe to the majority’s reasoning as set forth in Parts IV and V of the majority’s opinion, ante, 185 N.J. at 82-87, 881 A.2d at 707-10, I respectfully dissent.
Justice LaVECCHIA joins in this opinion.
Affirmance as Modified/Remandment—Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE—5.
Concurrence in Parb/Dissent in Part—Justices LaVECCHIA and RIVERA-SOTO—2.
Lacking something more concrete, the majority characterizes its hybrid rule as one grounded in notions of fairness. Yet, the very facts of this case debunk that analysis. Plaintiff here was an experienced baseball player and fan who, without the need of the warnings provided by defendants, was aware of the peril of objects leaving the playing field. Eschewing either protected seats or, more to the point, protected concession stands where he could purchase the refreshment he sought, plaintiff elected to purchase his beer at an unprotected, albeit *99temporary concession stand. It is unwarranted to state that, under those circumstances, fairness dictates that we jettison the application of the limited duty rule. More to the point, in the context of determining a standard of care for tort liability, an inchoate standard of "fairness” is simply no standard at all.
As the majority recognizes, other states have done so. Ante, 185 N.J. at 79 n. 3, 881 A.2d at 705 n. 3.