The defendant, Shirley Varney, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court, Androscoggin County, declaring void a deed to her from a life tenant. Varney contends, inter alia, that the Superior Court erred in construing a provision in a will that granted the life tenant the power to dispose of the property. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Varney.
I
Almon D. Lawrence devised property to several named beneficiaries including his wife, Wanda K. Lawrence, and his daughter, Edith 0. Philoon. The meaning of the sixth paragraph devising the “homestead” is in dispute in this case. This paragraph provides:
I give, devise and bequeath the land and buildings comprising my homestead together with all the furniture, furnishings and other personal property used in the operation of a home to my wife, WANDA K. LAWRENCE, to be held by her during the term of her natural life. I specifically authorize my said wife during her lifetime to trade, sell or mortgage any part of [sic] the whole of said property or to consume the same for her confortable support and care. Upon her death whatever shall remain of the original property and whatever proceeds or substitute property then remains, I give, devise, and bequeath to my daughter, EDITH 0. PHILOON, in fee. (Emphasis added).
In April, 1981, Mrs. Lawrence orally agreed to deed land comprising a part of the homestead to Shirley Varney in exchange for Varney’s agreement to care for her. Varney had known Mrs. Lawrence for approximately 30 years and rendered assistance to her during the last eight years of her life. Following the oral agreement of April, 1981, the scope and frequency of these services increased. Varney did car for Mrs. Lawrence from mid-April to *1205December 20, 1981, and from April 18 to June 5, 1982. On June 23, 1982, while hospitalized with a terminal illness, Mrs. Lawrence executed the deed to Varney. The Superior Court found that “[t]he Deed was prepared, a description provided, executed and filed at the initiative of Shirley Varney.” Mrs. Lawrence died one week later.
Edith Philoon1 brought suit, seeking a rescission of the deed on the ground that the conveyance was without consideration and not required for Mrs. Lawrence’s “comfortable support and care,” and was therefore fraudulent. The Superior court did not find fraud, but found that Varney had indeed provided services to Mrs. Lawrence. The court further found that Mrs. Lawrence had sufficient assets and means other than the homestead to provide for her support and care, and therefore that it was not necessary for her to alienate any part of the life estate. The court ruled that the conveyance violated the provisions of the will and was therefore void. The instant appeal ensued.
II
To determine the scope of the authority granted to Mrs. Lawrence under the terms of the will, we examine the language of the will in light of the fundamental principle that “[t]he intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions.” 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-603 (1981). See also In re Estate of Thompson, 414 A.2d 881, 887 (Me.1980).
The first sentence of the sixth paragraph devised a life estate in the homestead to Mrs. Lawrence. In addition, by means of the second sentence the testator specifically authorized Mrs. Lawrence to trade or sell any part or the whole of the property or to consume it for a stated purpose: “her comfortable support and care.” Whereas some testators have limited the power granted a life tenant to consume or dispose of the life estate to what is necessary for that life tenant’s support,2 the will in question here has no such limitation. The Superior Court erred in reading a requirement of necessity into the will. In the instant case, as in Richardson v. Richardson, 80 Me. 585, 16 A. 250 (1888), “the widow literally followed the mandate of the will.” Id. at 589-90, 16 A. at 251. Mrs. Lawrence “trade[d] [or] s[old] ... part ... of said property ... for her comfortable support and care.” Any objection that her power of disposition should be limited to what was necessary for her support is an objection against the power itself, not against her exercise of it. Almon Lawrence as testator presumably considered and overruled that objection. See Richardson, 80 Me. at 590, 16 A. at 251. Thus the Superior Court read into the life tenant’s power of disposition a requirement of necessity that was at odds with the clearly expressed intention of the testator. See Loud v. Poland, 126 Me. 45, 136 A. 119 (1927); Young v. Hillier, 103 Me. 17, 67 A. 571 (1907); Small v. Thompson, 92 Me. 539, 544-45, 43 A. 509, 511 (1899); Hall v. Preble, 68 Me. 100 (1878).
Indeed, even if the will limited the life tenant’s power of disposition to what was necessary for her support, her judgment as to the necessity governs unless the party challenging the exercise of the power proves fraud. Compare Loud, 126 Me. at 46, 48, 136 A. at 119-20 (will requires life tenant “not to make unnecessary waste or use” of estate, but she is “the judge of the necessity”) with Richardson, 80 Me. at 589-90, 16 A. at 251 (no limitation in will; the court holds that the life tenant’s “judgment governs, even though she exercises *1206poor judgment”). Since the plaintiff in the instant case failed to prove fraud, the Superior Court could not substitute its judgment for that of the life tenant in the exercise of the power granted her by the will. See Loud, 126 Me. at 48, 136 A. at 120.
These conclusions are underscored by an examination of the third sentence of the sixth paragraph. Any claim that the plaintiff has to the homestead rests on this sentence. While it grants a remainder interest to Edith Philoon, the sentence also grants to the life tenant a power to dispose of the property. Under the settled law of this state the words — “whatever remains” —or other words of similar import, when added to a devise of a life estate, implies a power in the life tenant to dispose of the property unless such power is limited or negated by other language in the will or unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of the testator. Stewart v. Estate of Stewart, 148 Me. 421, 426-29, 94 A.2d 912, 914-16 (1953); Loud, 126 Me. at 47, 136 A. at 120; Young, 103 Me. at 20-21, 67 A. at 572; Warren v. Webb, 68 Me. 133, 136-37 (1878); Shaw v. Hussey, 41 Me. 495, 499-503 (1856); Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 21 Me. 288, 296 (1842). Here the will does not limit the implied power of disposition except for the limitation provided under the second sentence that any disposition of the homestead be for Mrs. Lawrence’s “comfortable support and care.” Under the third sentence alone Mrs. Lawrence had the power to dispose of the entire homestead and to divest or cut off the remainder. See Loud, 126 Me. at 45-48, 136 A. at 119-20; Young, 103 Me. at 21, 67 A. at 572 (the words “whatever may remain” gives the life tenant the power to sell the estate “if she wished or needed”); Shaw, 41 Me. at 501-503. Thus the third sentence of the sixth paragraph, itself the sole basis for the plaintiffs claim, does not limit the second sentence, but simply reemphasizes Mrs. Lawrence’s power to dispose of the homestead according to her own judgment.
The plaintiff contends, however, that by her conveyance to Varney Mrs. Lawrence violated a fiduciary obligation to the re-mainderman. We have recognized that a life tenant is a quasi-trustee for the remainder interests. Wiktorowicz v. Haley, 251 A.2d 794, 796-97 (Me.1969); Mallett v. Hall, 129 Me. 148, 153-54, 150 A. 531, 534 (1930). Even under a pure trust, however, a trustee cannot be faulted for administering the trust in accord with its exact terms. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 169 (1959) (duty to administer trust), § 186 (trustee to exercise the powers specifically conferred on him by the terms of the trust, or necessary or appropriate to carry out its purposes); G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 541 at 154-55 (1978) (“A fundamental duty of the trustee is to carry out the directions of the testator or settlor as expressed in the terms of the trust.”). In the instant case Mrs. Lawrence cannot be faulted for exercising the power of disposition in accord with the exact terms of the will. The will granted her the power to dispose of all or part of the homestead so long as she acted for “her comfortable support and care.” She chose to convey a portion of the property in exchange for personal services. The court has no power to undo this transaction by rewriting the will.3
Because the plaintiff failed to establish any basis for the court to set aside the conveyance, we vacate the judgment and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Varney.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for entry of judgment for the defendant.
McKUSICK, C.J., ROBERTS, WATHEN, SCOLNIK, JJ., and VIOLETTE, A.R.J., concurring.
. Edith O. Philoon died on June 7, 1984, and Jay Philoon, Personal Representative of Edith's estate, is substituted as party plaintiff.
. See, e.g., Loud v. Poland, 126 Me. 45, 46, 136 A. 119 (1927) (“have the use and custody of [the estate] but not to make unnecessary waste or use thereof’); Haseltine v. Shepherd, 99 Me. 495, 496, 59 A. 1025, 1026 (1905) ("if needed for her support and benefit”); Hall v. Preble, 68 Me. 100, 101 (1878) (may expend entire estate “if necessary, for her care, comfort and support”).
. Cf. Babb v. Rand, 345 A.2d 496, 498 (Me.1975) ('The Court must not rewrite the will to conform to its own notions as to the suitability of the bequest.”).