with whom CALKINS, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 31] In prosecutions where the State pleads and proves that a crime was com*1071mitted with the use of a dangerous weapon, the sentencing classification of that offense is increased by one sentencing class. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4) (2006). The statute thus makes the existence of an actual dangerous weapon an element of the enhanced criminal charge that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. By affirming the judgments of conviction, the Court concludes that the unadorned testimony of the victim stating that Rice displayed what she thought to be a gun was sufficient to sustain the State’s burden of proof.4 I cannot agree, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 32] Citizens of this State are well served by laws that deter the use of firearms in the commission of crimes. The fact that a perpetrator of a crime employs a firearm in the course of the offense immediately and substantially increases the danger of his actions. The enhanced sentencing classifications appropriately reflect the increased danger presented by those who use a firearm in the commission of an unlawful act.5
[¶ 33] Pursuant to Maine law, a dangerous weapon includes “a firearm or any other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance ... capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(9)(A) (2006). A firearm is “any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded, which is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive and includes any such weapon commonly referred to as a pistol, revolver, rifle, gun, machine gun or shotgun.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(12-A) (2006). The statutory definition of a “firearm” does not include toy guns, or paintball or pellet guns (which expel paint or metal pellets by use of compressed air).
[II34] It may be compellingly argued that the use of a toy gun or other similar device, having the appearance of a firearm, also enhances the danger created by the commission of a crime. A particularly dangerous situation is created when the use of a toy firearm occasions the defensive use of deadly force, including actual firearms, by law enforcement officers or armed civilian bystanders. However, the Legislature has expressly not addressed this situation. By limiting the enhancement provisions to the use of dangerous weapons (which includes only authentic firearms by statutory definition), the Legislature has not brought toy or imitation firearms within the scope of the statute.6 An amendment to the Maine Criminal Code bringing the threatening display of realistic firearm toys within the scope of the dangerous weapons statute would resolve the issue.
*1072[¶35] It is apparent from the victim’s testimony that she had but a brief opportunity to observe the gun under stressful circumstances:
Q. And is it also fair to say that was probably the most scared you have ever been?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Do you remember where the man pulled the gun out of?
A. His jacket.
Q. Okay. And I think you testified and told [the prosecutor] that when the gun was pointed at you, it was pretty close to your face, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you describe the gun at all for us?
A. I don’t know much about guns. I just know that it was black.
Q. Okay. And in comparison to the size of the hand it was in, was it bigger than the man’s hand or was it smaller than the man’s hand?
A. I honestly don’t remember.
Q. Can you describe at all the hands of the man that was holding it?
A. No.
Q. Fair to say that you were pretty much just kind of looking at the end of the gun pointed at you?
A. Yeah, I mean I was trying to focus on something else. I wasn’t staring— you know, I was shaking and stuff.
Q. Were you crying at that point?
A. Yes.
Q. How long after this incident started did you start crying?
A. I started crying when he came over to me at first and I was still crying after.
[¶ 36] The victim further testified the total length of the incident, including the period when the perpetrator put down the gun and emptied the shop’s cash tills, was “probably like two [minutes]. I don’t really know.” The police never recovered any firearm of any kind. As a result, the State’s evidence of whether the instrument brandished by the perpetrator was, in fact, a firearm as defined by law is limited to the four corners of the victim’s testimony as noted above.
[¶ 37] The visual identification of an actual firearm, as opposed to a realistic toy, is complicated by the fact that numerous identical copies are available in the consumer market. Paintball, pellet and BB guns, as well as other similar “toys” are manufactured to resemble actual, specific firearms. Critics have decried this practice.
Paramilitary enthusiasm has not been limited to the firearms market. America’s manufacturers of non-powder firearms (such as BB guns and pellet guns) and toy guns have been quick to realize that assault weaponry is in. These manufacturers’ role models are no longer hunting rifles and Western-style six-shooters, but machine guns and large-caliber handguns. This shift has been accompanied by a keener eye to detail and advances in plastic molding. The result: non-powder firearms and toy guns that are virtually indistinguishable from their more lethal counterparts.
Josh Sugarmann, Assault Weapons and Accessories in America, Violence Policy Center, 1988, http://www.vpc.org/studies/ awalook.htm. Non-experts face a nearly impossible task in distinguishing actual, lethal firearms from virtually identical toy knock-offs. See Joe Wojtas, Real Crimes, Unreal Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at 14NJ3.
[¶ 38] The law in Maine provides that it is not necessary for the State to offer the firearm at trial to prove that an actual firearm was used in the commission of the *1073crime. State v. Nile, 557 A.2d 950, 952 (Me.1989); State v. Millett, 892 A.2d 521, 527 (Me.1978); United States v. Dobbs, 449 F.3d 904, 910-11 (8th Cir.2006). If the evidence is sufficient for the jury to reasonably draw an inference, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the weapon was a firearm, that finding will be upheld on appeal. Nile, 557 A.2d at 952; Millett, 892 A.2d at 528. However, in every instance cited by the Court in which an appellate court upheld such an inferred finding, the prosecution offered a significantly greater quantum of evidence than the unadorned testimony of a single victim, lacking any familiarity with firearms, as found in this case.
[¶ 39] In Millett, the State’s principal witness, who had significant experience with firearms due to his past ownership of rifles and pistols, testified that he believed the weapon in dispute was an authentic firearm. 392 A.2d at 527. The State also provided a second witness who testified that the weapon could have been a .357 magnum handgun. Id. In Nile, the defendant took a gun from his own gun case located in his home, loaded it in the presence of his wife, and used it in the commission of the various crimes against her. 557 A.2d at 951-52. In Dobbs, the First Circuit provided:
Here, the store clerk testified that she was very certain that the object was a firearm. The tape showed an object consistent with a firearm. The clerk heard the gun click when Wilson chambered a round, and the click is audible on the tape. An officer testified that the sound on the tape is the sound of a round being chambered. Wilson handled the object as though it were a firearm, and Kristiana Roth testified that Dobbs had bragged about a gun prior to the robbery. In short, notwithstanding the fact that the ATF expert could not conclude that the object was a firearm based on the videotape, the record as a whole is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendants used a firearm.
Dobbs, 449 F.3d at 911. The Dobbs decision cites United States v. Kirvan, 997 F.2d 963, 966 (1st Cir.1993) as collecting citations to cases which hold that lay witness testimony can rationally support a finding that a brandished weapon was a firearm. Dobbs, 449 F.3d at 911.
[¶ 40] Kirvan involved the corroborating testimony of two witnesses who identified the object brandished as a gun with a five-inch barrel. 997 F.2d at 966. The surface was metallic, and when the object was dropped, it made a loud noise. Id. The First Circuit affirmed the jury’s finding and vacated the trial court’s judgment of acquittal, finding that the weight of the object, as exhibited when it was dropped to the floor, confirmed that it was unlikely to be a toy. Id. at 966-67. The First Circuit cited other cases where non-expert testimony supported a similar finding of a firearm. Id. at 966 (citing Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1990)). However, none of these cases rested upon the lay testimony of a single, inexperienced witness expressing an opinion that the weapon was a firearm. Parker, 801 F.2d at 1385 (testimony of two witnesses sufficient for a jury to reasonably find that object used in the commission of a crime was a firearm); Jones, 907 F.2d at 460 (testimony of five witnesses sufficient for a jury to reasonably find that object used in commission of a crime was a firearm). In fact, the First Circuit expressly declined to decide such a question, providing “[w]e need not decide here whether the government’s burden could be met merely by unembellished lay testimony that ‘the robber carried a gun.’ ” Kirvan, 997 F.2d at 966 (emphasis added). The First Circuit sustained the factual finding of a firearm, but expressly re*1074served comment of “whether less [evidence] would do.” Id.
[¶ 41] By its ruling today, the Court sits alone at the very outskirts of this jurisprudence. Given the widespread proliferation of visually indistinguishable toy weaponry, I cannot conclude that the testimony of this single lay witness, based upon a brief and harrowing encounter, is sufficient to meet the State’s burden that the object brandished was in fact a firearm as defined by law. Maine law requires more. Accordingly, I dissent and would vacate the judgment of the trial court to the extent that the sentencing classifications have been enhanced and remand for entry of judgment and sentencing upon unen-hanced convictions.
.Rice was convicted of three offenses that were subject to sentence enhancements based upon the use of a firearm. The statutes defining the offenses invoke the firearm enhancement in different manners. The robbery statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 651(1)(B), (E) (2006), enhances the sentencing class if ‘‘[t]he actor is armed with a dangerous weapon in the course of a robbery .... ” The burglary statute, 17-A § 401(1)(B)(1) (2006), enhances the sentencing class if "[t]he person is armed with a firearm_” The criminal threatening statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 209(1) (2006), contains no internal references to firearms, but is enhanced by the "use of a dangerous weapon” provisions of 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4) (2006).
. Mandatory minimum sentences are also imposed where a firearm is used against a person in the commission of certain crimes. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(5) (2006).
. In contrast, the use of a toy gun satisfies, in certain federal offenses, the element of a crime that requires the use of a dangerous weapon. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 2113(d) (2005); United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 864 F.2d 664, 667 (9th Cir.1989). However, the definition of a firearm under federal law does not include a toy gun. 18 U.S.C.S. § 921(a)(3)(A) (2005); see also United States v. Dobbs, 449 F.3d 904, 910 (8th Cir.2006).