concurring.
I agree that a writ should issue to prohibit the Appellee trial judge from enforcing his order requiring Appellant to submit to a competency examination conducted by a mental health professional retained by the Commonwealth, and I thus concur in the majority’s holding. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that it is never proper for a trial court to order an independent competency evaluation by the Commonwealth’s expert. In particular, I fear that today’s majority opinion’s holding that the Commonwealth “does not have the right to an independent competency evaluation,”1 will, in some cases, erroneously limit the Commonwealth’s ability to offer rebuttal expert testimony at competency hearings. In my opinion, CR 35.01, which authorizes a trial court to order a party to submit to a mental examination when the mental condition of the party is in controversy and the moving party demonstrates good cause for the examination, applies to criminal proceedings and will permit a court, in exceptional cases, to order a criminal defendant to submit to a competency evaluation conducted by the Commonwealth’s retained mental health professional. In the case at bar, however, I conclude that the Commonwealth’s request for an independent evaluation did not demonstrate “good cause” for the order requested, and I thus agree that the trial court erred when it ordered Appellant to submit to the competency evaluation. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
In the outset, I wish to emphasize that the hearing at which a trial court “deter-minéis] whether or not the defendant is competent to stand trial” 2 is an adversarial proceeding. This Court has held that “[w]hen a hearing is held, it must be an evidentiary hearing with the right to examine the witnesses.”3 Although the majority opinion correctly observes that the psychologist or psychiatrist who performed a “neutral” 4 competency evaluation pursuant to a KRS 504.100(1) order is subject to cross-examination at this evidentiary hearing,5 the appointed examiner’s report is only part of the evidence the fact-finder must consider. Parties are entitled to— and, in practice, do — introduce additional evidence for the court’s consideration.6 In *166fact, KRS Chapter 504 explicitly recognizes that “[a] psychologist or psychiatrist retained by the defendant shall be permitted to participate in any examination under this chapter.”7 Of course, it goes without saying that a defendant with the financial means to do so can develop additional expert testimony by submitting to an independent competency evaluation by an expert of his or her choice. But, we have held that, in cases where the defendant is indigent: (1) the assistance of a psychological expert is “constitutionally and statutorily required”;8 and (2) the funds necessary to retain such an expert are a “reasonable and necessary” expense authorized under KRS Chapter 31.9
A competency determination has significant consequences for both the defendant and the Commonwealth. If the trial court finds the defendant competent to stand trial, “the court shall continue the proceed-mgs against the defendant,”10 and thus the prosecution goes forward. If the trial court finds that the defendant is not competent to stand trial, but finds “there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future,” the prosecution is interrupted, and the defendant is subject to a sixty (60) day commitment followed by a subsequent hearing to determine competency.11 And, if the trial court finds that “there is no substantial probability [the defendant] will attain competency in the foreseeable future,” the indictment is typically dismissed without prejudice,12 and the defendant is subject to an involuntary hospitalization proceeding.13 An accurate determination as to the defendant’s competency to stand trial is thus important because “the effect of a misclas-sification ... is either that an incompetent defendant is forced to face trial or that a competent defendant is deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his right to a *167trial by jury before being incarcerated.”14 Although the most evident risks associated with a “false positive” incompetence finding are decreased efficiency in the criminal justice system and “possible reduction in accuracy due to the erosion of evidence during the delay,”15 there are opportunity costs for the defendant as well, namely: (1) impairment of the ability to mount a defense as a result of fading memories and absent evidence attributable to the delay; and, in cases where the defendant is mentally ill, but not incompetent, (2) an anti-therapeutic effect caused by the “incompetency label” and a lack of incentive for recovery.16 The majority opinion implicitly recognizes that a fact-finder’s decision is better-informed when adversarial parties introduce evidence on both sides of a question,17 but the majority apparently overlooks the trial court’s fact-finding role with respect to competency determinations when it hamstrings the Commonwealth’s ability to offer expert testimony at competency hearings.
The majority’s conclusion follows, in large part, from its observation that KRS Chapter 504 does not contain explicit authorization for the Commonwealth’s “right to an independent examination ... when only competency to stand trial is at issue.” 18 Although I agree that this lack of explicit statutory authorization supports the conclusion that the Commonwealth is not entitled to an independent competency evaluation as a matter of course, I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the statutory vacuum forecloses the Commonwealth from seeking authorization for an independent examination. After all, although KRS Chapter 504 does not explicitly authorize an independent evaluation by the Commonwealth, “there is also no prohibition,” 19 and KRS 504.100 permits the trial court to order examinations by more than one (1) mental health professional.20 In addition, the need to develop expert evidence for the adversarial hearing contemplated by KRS 504.100 casts doubt upon the majority’s conclusion that the lack of explicit statutory authorization should be interpreted as a prohibition:
Considering that a party that wished to dispute the opinion of a court-appointed expert would be unable to do so *168effectively without the use of its own expert, the absence of an express statutory restriction on the use of such experts renders it highly implausible that the Legislature intended any such restriction .... It is hard to imagine that the Legislature intended ... to permit the defense to deny the prosecution’s experts access to the individual whose competence is at issue, so that they could not credibly dispute the opinions of defense experts given full access to that person. The failure of section 1869 to explicitly authorize equal access cannot easily be construed as reflecting an intention to enable a defendant to deny it, because that would unfairly obstruct the truth-finding process.21
If the psychiatrist or psychologist appointed by the Court determines that the defendant is competent to stand trial, the Commonwealth can, of course, subpoena that expert to rebut defense-retained expert testimony to the contrary.22 However, in cases where the appointed examiner will testify that the defendant is not competent to stand trial, today’s majority opinion restricts, if not practically forecloses, the Commonwealth’s ability to rebut that testimony with its own expert testimony. And, if the defendant introduces additional testimony from a retained expert, the Commonwealth’s ability to perform its adversarial role will be even further compromised.
It is my view that, if the Commonwealth can demonstrate “good cause,”23 it should be permitted to seek an independent competency evaluation under CR 35.01, which provides:
When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician, dentist or appropriate health care expert, or to produce *169for examination the person in his custody or legal control. The order may be mode only on motion for good cause shown and wpon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.24
Although this Court has never held that CR 35.01 applies to criminal proceedings, we have considered whether CR 35.01 permits a criminal defendant to obtain access to prosecution witnesses for the purposes of mental and physical examinations, and have held that CR 35.01 did not authorize the examinations requested because the witnesses in question were not covered by the rule.25 Significantly, in none of those cases did the Court hold that CR 35.01 was inapplicable to criminal proceedings. RCr 13.04 provides that “[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to criminal proceedings to the extent not superseded by or inconsistent with these Rules of Criminal Procedure.”26 Nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits an independent competency evaluation by the Commonwealth, and CR 35.01 is thus complementary to, rather than inconsistent with, the criminal rules. Accordingly, if the Commonwealth can demonstrate “good cause,” it should be permitted to obtain access to the defendant for the purpose of having its retained expert conduct a competency evaluation.
The protections available to a defendant who is ordered to submit to a CR 35.01 examination should allay many of the other concerns expressed in the majority opinion. Specifically, a defendant can seek a protective order if he or she believes that the examiner designated by the Commonwealth constitutes a “stalking horse” whose “examination” will be more akin to a deposition.27 And, if the defendant can demonstrate “good cause”28 the trial court “may impose an external presence at a CR 35.01 examination.”29 Although KRE 507 provides only a limited privilege for statements made by the defendant in the course of such an examination,30 the defendant will already have been interviewed by at least one (1) — and likely more than one (1) — competency examiner prior to the CR 35.01 examination with the Commonwealth’s designee. Thus, any risk that the Commonwealth’s independent examination would yield additional substantive evidence against the defendant is negligible. Final*170ly, I recognize that a compelled competency examination implicates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.31 However, the United States Supreme Court has held that, if a defendant refuses to answer a competency examiner’s questions after being warned of his or her right to remain silent and that any statements made could be used against him or her, “the validly ordered competency evaluation nevertheless could [] proceed[] upon the condition that the results would be applied solely for that purpose. In such circumstances, the proper conduct and use of competency ... examinations are not frustrated.”32 If the Commonwealth’s examiner is unable or unwilling to continue the examination under such limitations, and the defendant subsequently is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial court could accommodate the Commonwealth’s CR 35.01 request by permitting the Commonwealth’s retained expert to participate in any future examination ordered by the Court.
In the case at bar, the Commonwealth’s request for an independent competency evaluation simply referenced the trial court’s earlier ruling “which gave the Commonwealth 10 days to make an indication of whether or not the Commonwealth wished to have their own independent evaluation performed on the Defendant for competency purposes.” This did not demonstrate “good cause” for an independent evaluation, and the trial court erred when it ordered Appellant to submit to the examination. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
. Bishop v. Caudill, Ky., 118 S.W.3d 159, 165 (2003).
. KRS 504.100(3).
. Gabbard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 887 S.W.2d 547, 551 (1994). See also Gardner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 642 S.W.2d 584, 586 (1982).
. Binion v. Commonwealth, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 383 (1995).
. KRS 504.080(4) ("The examining psychologist or psychiatrist shall appear at any hearing on the defendant’s mental condition unless the defendant waives his right to have him appear”).
. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 103 S.W.3d 687 (2003) (testimony from KCPC psychiatrist and DPA psychologist); Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 62 S.W.3d 15 (2001) (testimony from appointed psychologist, de*166fendant’s retained expert, defendant’s sister, and employees of nursing home where defendant lived); Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d 435 (2001) (testimony from KCPC evaluator, defense expert, present and former defense counsel (through ex parte affidavits), and law enforcement and corrections personnel); Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112 (1990) (testimony from defendant's expert, a registered nurse, a psychiatrist, and a psychologist); Moee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 769 S.W.2d 757 (1989) (testimony from defendant’s "psychiatrists and psychologists,” apparently at least one additional psychiatrist and one additional psychologist, a Corrections Department hearing officer, and the police detectives who took the defendant’s statement); Hopewell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 641 S.W.2d 744 (1982) (testimony from appointed psychologist (through his report, which was admitted into evidence by stipulation) and defendant himself); Harston v. Commonwealth, Ky., 638 S.W.2d 700 (1982) ("contradictory testimony” in the form of dueling experts in addition to police officers, the jailer, and inmates who interacted with defendant); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, Ky., 586 S.W.2d 24 (1979) (testimony from defendant’s expert and the psychiatrist appointed by the trial court).
. KRS 504.080(5).
. Crawford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 847, 850 (1992).
. See McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 307, 312 (1994).
. KRS 504.110(3).
. KRS 504.110(1).
. See Kirk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 6 S.W.3d 823, 825 (1999) ("The trial judge found Appellant to be incompetent to stand trial and dismissed the indictment.”); Tolley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 580, 581 (1995); Commonwealth v. Todd, Ky.App., 12 S.W.3d 695, 696 (2000).
. KRS 504.110(2). See also Schuttemeyer v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 793 S.W.2d 124 (1990) (holding that the involuntary commitment proceeding occurs in circuit court).
. Claudine Walker Ausness, Note: The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Unfit for Adversary Combat from Those Who Are Fit, 66 KY. L.J. 666, 679 (1977-78).
. Id.
. Id. at 679-680.
. Bishop v. Caudill, supra at 164 (“The issue of whether a defendant is criminally responsible for the offense with which he is charged is an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Accordingly, the Commonwealth must have the right to rebut this position, a right which necessarily includes obtaining its own independent examination of the defendant.”).
. Id. at 164.
. State v. Garcia, 128 N.M. 721, 998 P.2d 186, 191 (Ct.App.2000). Although the majority opinion cites this case in support of its statement that “other jurisdictions addressing this issue have similarly held that an independent competency examination of the defendant is not available to the prosecution in the absence of statutory authority,” Bishop v. Caudill, supra at 164, the New Mexico Court of Appeals actually held that, despite the lack of statutory authority for an independent examination, trial courts have the authority to do so “for good cause shown,” and trial courts’ decisions in this regard are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, supra at 192.
.See KRS 504.100(1) ("[T]he court shall appoint at least one (1) psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant’s mental condition.” (emphasis added)); KRS 504.100(4) ("After the filing of the report (or reports')_” (emphasis added)).
. Baqleh v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673, 682 (2002) (hereinafter "Baqleh v. Superior Court ”).
. See Jacobs v. Commonwealth, supra note 6 at 439.
. Cf. Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I, § 4.05, cmt. 2, n. 1 (A.L.I.1985) (“Because of the possibility that [the] defendant might reveal damaging information other than that directly relevant to his mental condition, it has been suggested that there should be a requirement of a showing of good cause where the prosecution seeks to have defendant examined.”). By way of example, "good cause” might consist of evidence that the court-appointed examiner: (1) is incompetent or biased, see Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra note 21 at 677 (in which the state's motion requesting an independent evaluation argued that expert testimony from a psychiatrist was necessary because the defendant allegedly suffered from both developmental disabilities and mental illness); State v. Zapetis, 629 So.2d 861 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1993) ("The State’s motion for access to the respondent to permit examination by its own expert was denied without prejudice to renew it if it later appeared that one of the [appointed] experts had relied upon the findings of another expert instead of conducting an independent examination, or if the defense expert acted as an advocate rather than as an independent examiner.”); (2) performed insufficient or incomplete testing of the defendant; (3) overlooked relevant evidence, see United States v. Weston, 36 F.Supp.2d 7, 13 (D.D.C.1999) ("[r]he government stated that it was dissatisfied with Dr. Johnson’s report because, inter alia, she failed to discuss that the defendant filed over half a dozen civil lawsuits in Montana and Illinois between 1984 and 1986”); or (4) misapplied the statutory standard, see State v. Garcia, supra note 19 at 724, 998 P.2d 186. The Commonwealth could supply such evidence in the form of an affidavit from an expert retained by the Commonwealth to review the findings of the psychiatrist or psychologist appointed by the Court.
. CR 35.01 (underlining added).
. Bart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 576, 578 (1997); Mack v. Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1993); Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1989) ("CR 35.01 provides that when the mental or physical condition of a party or person in the control of a party, is in controversy, the court may order a physical examination. The Commonwealth points out that this rule is not expressly applicable to this case because the four-year-old child is not a party nor is she under the control of a party.”).
. RCr 13.04.
. See Sexton v. Bates, Ky.App., 41 S.W.3d 452, 457 (2001) ("[W]hile a trial court has the authority under CR 35.01 to appoint a physician to perform an IME, and even to appoint one other than selected by [the opposing party], it may do so only upon a valid and substantiated objection regarding the physician’s qualifications or record, not upon a mere conclusory assertion discrediting the selection.”).
. In cases involving an independent competency evaluation ordered under CR 35.01, however, KRS 504.080(5) may make the “good cause” showing superfluous.
. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Overstreet, Ky., 103 S.W.3d 31, 38 (2003).
. See Myers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 87 S.W.3d 243 (2002).
. U.S. CONST, amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.] "). See also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981).
. Estelle v. Smith, supra note 31 at 451 U.S. 454, 468, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1876, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 372. See also Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra note 21 at 690 ("Stating the proposition differently, the [.Estelle ] court made it clear that if the information obtained by the psychiatrist during the inquiry into competency 'had been confined to serving that function, no Fifth Amendment issue would have arisen.’ ”).