with whom CLIFFORD and DANA, JJ., join, dissenting.
[¶ 10] I respectfully dissent. The Board concluded that Moreau’s visit to the in-house medical department in 1988 was a payment pursuant to section 52,8 and, therefore, the ten-year statute of repose began to run on that date. The Board explained the rationale for the decision as follows:
I can find no persuasive reason to treat the provision of such services differently simply because they are provided by the employer’s own first aid department. That department’s primary purpose is to treat work-place injuries. If the employer disputes the work-relatedness of the treatment or evaluation requested it can file a notice of controversy. If it does not, its treatment or evaluation tolls the statute.
I would affirm the decision of the Board.9
[¶ 11] As the Court’s opinion states, the present case is distinguishable from Wal*1005lace v. S.D. Warren, 640 A.2d 203, 204-05 (Me.1994), in which we held that in-house treatment was not a payment pursuant to section 51-B. The issue in this case is the issue we expressly declined to address in Wallace, id., at 204, n. 2, i.e., whether the provision of in-house medical services is a “payment under the Act” for the purpose of extending the ten-year statute of repose.10 In Wallace, we interpreted section 95 as that statute appeared prior to the legislative amendments of 1989. Id. at 203, n. 1. The 1989 legislation amended the last sentence of section 95 and added the requirement that “payments of benefits made by an employer or insurer pursuant to section 51-B or 52 are considered payments under a decision pursuant to a petition, unless a timely notice of controversy has been filed.” P.L.1989, ch. 256, § 4, repealed by P.L.1991, ch. 885, § A-7 (emphasis added).
[¶ 12] When the Legislature amended the last sentence of section 95 to include a “payment” under section 52, it clarified what it meant by a “payment.” Section 52 describes what an injured employee is entitled to and it is services “paid for by the employer.” Former section 52 provided, in pertinent part:
§ 52. Duties and rights of parties as to medical and other services; cost
An employee sustaining a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment or is disabled by occupational disease shall be entitled to reasonable and proper medical, surgical and hospital services, nursing, medicines, and mechanical, surgical aids, as needed, paid for by the employer ....
After the 1989 amendment, payments by employers were understood to include “medical ... services ... paid for by the employer_” Medical services paid for by the employer must include the provision of medical services provided by a nurse or a doctor employed by the employer. Although the method of payment by the employer might be different in cases involving in-house medical treatment, the difference, as a practical matter, is of little consequence.
[¶ 13] Pursuant to the Court’s interpretation, the availability of in-house medical treatment may become a trap for lulling employees into failing to timely protect their position regarding valid workers’ compensation claims. Employees of large employers with in-house medical depart-*1006merits, unlike those of small employers, may find it necessary to file petitions for award with the Board within two years of their injuries or be later barred under the statute of limitations. Small employers without in-house medical facilities will not have the same advantage as large employers in foreclosing employees’ claims. The Court’s decision will result in disparate treatment for large and small employers and their employees, and could greatly increase litigation and the formal processing of claims before the Board. There is nothing in the policy of the Workers’ Compensation Law to support such a result. Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s conclusion that the provision of in-house medical treatment is a “payment under this Act.”
. See the Court’s opinion, ¶ 4, n. 1.
. The Board's decision is consistent with two decisions of the former Workers’ Compensation Commission Appellate Division, Pottle v. *1005Bath Iron Works Corp., WCC App. Div. 2582, 2583-84 (Me.1988); Ventry v. Bath Iron Works Corp., WCC App. Div. 2869, 2870-71 (Me.1988), both of which were vacated on other grounds, see Pottle v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 551 A.2d 112, 114-15 (Me.1988); Harvie v.. Bath Iron Works Corp., 561 A.2d 1023, 1024-25 (Me.1989). In Pottle, the Appellate Division stated:
The employer argues provision of first aid treatment is, in essence, a charitable contribution and can never be a basis for tolling the statute of limitations. In the cases of work-related injuries provision of treatment is the discharge of a statutory obligation and not merely a charitable act. Under the employer’s analysis, small employers who send their employees to outside clinics for minor treatment would have the statute of limitations tolled for claims against them, while large, sophisticated employers with industrial medicine departments staffed by physicians could render even more significant and substantial treatment, including the prescription of medicines, without incurring the same risk. There is no logical rationale for such a distinction.
Pottle, WCC App. Div. at 2584.
. Wallace states:
That the period of limitations could begin on the date of the provision of medical services is based upon Wallace's argument that the provision of medical services at the in-house medical department constitute a "payment under the Act" as paraphrased in the first and penultimate sentence of section 95. However, we wish to make clear that we do not decide whether the provision of services at an in-house medical department constitute "payments under the Act” for purposes of invoking the 2 year statute of limitations or the 10 year repose period. Instead, we limit our holding to finding only that the provision of medical services at S.D. Warren’s in-house medical department in this instance did not constitute a payment pursuant to section 51-B.
Wallace, 640 A.2d at 204, n. 2.