Dissenting.
¶ 1 The majority dismisses this appeal as interlocutory and thus inappropriate for review. While I agree that it is interlocutory, I would reach the merits. I therefore respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 While it is true that “[ojrdinarily, an order permitting intervention is interlocutory and not appealable,” M.N.C. Corp. v. Mount Lebanon Med. Ctr., 334 Pa.Super. 359, 483 A.2d 490, 492 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 510 Pa. 490, 509 A.2d 1256 (1986); see also In Re Manley, 305 Pa.Super. 332, 451 A.2d 557, 559 n. 5 (1982), I would not strictly apply the rule in this particular case. I recognize the importance of our procedural rules normally, but this case is far from normal. It is a complicated custody dispute that has dragged through the *720courts for years; this appeal alone has taken several months. I refuse to punish the litigants or the child further by strictly adhering to the rule. Because I believe that judicial economy and fairness require us to reach the merits, I now do so.
¶ 3 The court below determined that Beltran is J.P.’s biological father, but stopped short of bestowing parental rights on Beltran. Piersody contends that despite the judicial declaration of J.P.’s biological heritage, Beltran is estopped from being declared J.P.’s “parent.” He argues that Beltran is thus not properly permitted to intervene under Pa.R.C.P.1915.6, which requires the court to join “a parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated.” Pa.R.C.P.1915.6(a)(l). I agree.
¶ 4 Admittedly, DNA testing confirmed that Beltran is J.P.’s biological father. It is Piersody, however, who has served as the actual father of the child. Piersody has consistently accepted paternity, interacted with the child extensively as a father, provided support since 1990, and given the child his last name. In contrast, Beltran’s sole basis for asserting a parental interest is a court declaration that he is biologically linked to the child.
¶ 5 Our Supreme Court has addressed the method of analysis of the presumption of paternity and estoppel.
[T]he essential legal analysis in these cases is twofold: first, one considers whether the presumption of paternity applies to a particular case. If it does, one then considers whether the presumption has been rebutted. Second, if the presumption has been rebutted or is inapplicable, one then questions whether estoppel applies. Estoppel may bar either a plaintiff from making the claim or a defendant from denying paternity. If the presumption has been rebutted or does not apply, and if the facts of the case include estoppel evidence, such evidence must be considered. If the trier of fact finds that one or both of the parties are estopped, no blood tests will be ordered.
Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (1997) (plurality decision). The presumption is that a child born into an intact marriage is presumed to be the husband’s child. See Strauser v. Stahr, 556 Pa. 83, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053 (1999). “[T]he presumption can be rebutted only by proof either that the husband was physically incapable of fathering a child or that he did not have access to his wife during the period of conception.” Id. at 1054. Here, there is no presumption because J.P. was not born into an intact marriage. I therefore turn to estoppel.
¶ 6 Estoppel bars the introduction of medical evidence in instances where a mother “seeks and accepts support of a child from one man who she claims is the father and then seeks to establish that another is the child’s father.” Strayer v. Ryan, 725 A.2d 785, 786 (Pa.Super.1999). In other words:
the conduct of the father (and/or the mother) may operate to estop further inquiry. Under the circumstances where the father has accepted the child and treated him as his own, he may not thereafter, upon separation, reject paternity and demand a blood test to rebut the presumption. The same must be said for the mother. She cannot hold out [one man] to be the father and thereafter, upon separation, charge a different man with paternity.
Christianson v. Ely, 390 Pa.Super. 398, 568 A.2d 961, 963 (1990); see also Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa.1999) (holding that a wife was estopped from asserting that the biological father of her child was indeed the true father of that child after she held out her husband as the child’s father for several years). Here, by his actions, Piersody established himself as the presumptive parent, and Mother acquiesced to this relationship for at least the first four years of J.P.’s life.
¶ 7 Nor does the recent medical proof that Beltran is J.P.’s biological father *721change anything. “[A] blood test [does not] overcome the presumption unless ... the presumptive parent was not estopped from denying paternity.” Christianson, 568 A.2d at 968. In the case at hand, Piersody is the presumptive parent, and he is now estopped from denying paternity. Therefore, J.P.’s biological heritage is irrelevant, and “the presumed father alone [has] the duty of support as well as rights to visitation and/or custody.” Id.
¶ 8 Because Beltran could not assert any parental interests in the first instance, he has not met Rule 1915.6’s requirements. Again, Rule 1915.6 requires the court to join “a parent whose parental rights have been previously terminated.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.6(a)(1). Beltran is not “a parent whose parental rights have been previously terminated,” because he never had parental rights. Moreover, he is unable to prevail in an action to assert parental rights, and therefore has no standing to intervene in an action reserved for those who may legitimately assert those rights. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. 2338, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (stating that a person must have a “substantive right to a parental relationship” in order to have standing to assert that claim). It was therefore improper for the lower court to permit Beltran to intervene in the custody action and interfere with Piersody’s lawful exercise of his parental rights with regard to J.P.3
¶ 9 I therefore would reverse.
. I also note that it is impossible for J.P. to have three parents. While a child may have two mothers or two fathers, see J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 453 Pa.Super. 78, 682 A.2d 1314 (1996) (parties by their conduct created a parent-like relationship between appellee’s homosexual partner and her biological child, thus giving partner standing to seek custody), he cannot have two fathers and one mother. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130-31, 109 S.Ct. 2333 (stating that "multiple fatherhood has no support in the history or traditions of this country"). Until our legislature recognizes a different structure to the basic family unit, J.P. has two parents — Piersody and Mother.