dissenting. I believe that the decision of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to set aside the default judgment should be affirmed, and therefore, I dissent. The return receipt/green card from the postal service contains two signatures — L. Danley and J.F. Valley. Although the majority reasons that service was complete, and defective, when Ms. Danley signed the green card, I do not believe that we can ignore Mr. Valley’s signature.
I have found no cases from any jurisdiction in which service was challenged where the evidence contained a green card with two signatures; one of which was the party to be served. No case cited by the majority involves a finding of defective service when the addressee actually signed the green card. In Wilburn v. Keenan Cos., 298 Ark. 461, 768 S.W.2d 531 (1989), an unknown person signed on the line of an “agent.” In Green v. Yarbrough, 299 Ark. 175, 771 S.W.2d 760 (1989), the addressee’s sister signed the receipt “Richard Green by SG.”
Rule 4(d) (8) (A) (i) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:
Service of a summons and complaint. . . may be made ... by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served with a return receipt requested and delivery restricted to the addressee or agent of the addressee. The addressee must be a natural person specified by name, and the agent of the addressee must be authorized in accordance with U.S. Postal Service regulations. . .
Therefore, the service, as attempted, was proper, and the rule was complied with by the appellee. Mr. Valley’s signature, albeit dated after Ms. Danley’s, completes the requirements of Rule 4 and presents evidence of service. The signature of Mr. Valley means something. It does not take a lawyer (which Mr. Valley is) to know that if you sign a green card you are acknowledging receipt of something — even if someone else has also signed the green card. The majority asserts that the postal service delivered the package to Ms. Danley. This blatant finding of fact is not established by any evidence in the record. Neither the postal worker nor Ms. Danley testified. The only evidence arguably in support of delivery is her signature on the green card, and the signature of someone- other than the addressee is of no value when the addressee himself has signed the card. Whatever significance you may give to Ms. Danley’s signature, when Mr. Valley signed the green card there was compliance with Rule 4. The court correctly found that the Rule was satisfied and that Mr. Valley had been served.
Rule 4(d) (8)(A) (ii) provides:
Service pursuant to this paragraph (A) shall not be the basis for the entry of a default or judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt signed by the addressee or the agent of the addressee
The return receipt was signed by the addressee, Mr. Valley, therefore, a default judgment was appropriate. Rule 4(d) (8) (A) (ii) further provides:
Any such default or judgment by default may be set aside pursuant to Rule 55(c) if the addressee demonstrates to the court that the return receipt was signed or delivery was refused by someone other than the addressee or the agent of the addressee.
I interpret this subsection of the rule to be applicable only when the addressee’s signature does not appear on the green card. In this case, the signature was there, and no further inquiry was necessary. However, if this subsection is to be considered, it merely sets up a question of fact, which the trial court resolved against Mr. Valley. We do not reverse the trial court on a question of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Certainly in this case, I am not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See Hodge v. Hodge, 97 Ark. App. 217, 245 S.W.3d 695 (2006). Because I would affirm the trial court, I dissent. I am joined in this opinion by Judges Gladwin and Robbins.