concurring and dissenting.
I.
Pittsburgh’s General Civil Service Act And Its Police Civil Service Act Are In Pari Materia
This court today has soundly reaffirmed that the Pittsburgh General Civil Service Act, Act of May 23, 1907, P.L. 206, as amended, §§ 1-29, 53 P.S. §§ 23431-23462, and that city’s Police Civil Service Act, Act of August 10, 1951, P.L. 1189, as amended, §§ 1-10, 53 P.S. §§ 23531-23540, are to be read in pari materia, by rightly holding that the Police Act repealer is not to be viewed “as totally negating application of the General Civil Service Act to all police matters, because, where possible, statutes pertaining to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia.” (P. 126.)
*275That view is consistent with this court’s decision in Civil Service Commission of the City of Pittsburgh v. Walsh, 12 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 26, 315 A.2d 326 (1974). The pari materia approach is also consistent with the approach of both sides and the trial judge in this case, all of whom relied on the General Act as being applicable to this police promotion issue, as is indicated by this court’s acknowledgment of “Paieski’s contention as appellee that the certification procedures are governed by Section 14 of the General Civil Service Act____” (P. 124.)
The reason for continued reliance on the General Act with respect to police civil service procedures is clear; the Police Act contains no provisions whatsoever for:
1. The very existence of the Civil Service Commission;
2. The Commission’s powers, composition and support;
3. Competitive examination and application specifics;
4. Protection against political discrimination;
5. Veterans’ preference; and
6. Adoption of civil service regulations.
All those essentials, indispensable if police civil service protection is to exist, must be drawn from the General Act.
In the General Act, sections 2-6, 53 P.S. §§ 23432-23437, create the Commission and provide for its powers (including subpoena power), staff and accommodations. Sections 8-10, 53 P.S. §§ 23440-23442, set the rules for all applications and competitive examinations. Section 23, 53 P.S. § 23457, forbids discrimination for political or religious reasons. Section 1, 53 P.S. § 23431, provides for veterans’ preference in hiring. Section 6 gives the Commission rule-making power, which is essential, under section 8, for the administration of competitive examinations. None of these provisions are contained in the Police Act, in any form.
This court’s reaffirmance of a relationship between the two statutes serves to maintain a sound legal foundation for the police merit system in the Commonwealth’s second largest city.
*276ii.
Removal Of Passed-Over Names From The Promotion List Is An Essential Feature, But It Was Not An Issue Here
Unfortunately, the framing of relief in this case, on the basis of an issue not raised by the parties, will cause substantial problems for that same merit system. This court’s opinion (p. 124, n. 6) forthrightly states that:
The narrow question of the authority to remove names from an eligible list has not been directly presented to us for review.
That being the case, this court should not get into a non-jurisdictional issue which was not presented.
Paieski’s counsel stated for the record that the “only point ... we are talking about is ‘one of your rules, Rule 6, Section 2,’ ” which is the mass-certification rule, not the name-removal rule (RR. 5a).
The accepted appellate principle, that we may affirm the decision of a trial court upon grounds different from that used by the trial court, does not justify the approach taken, because the equally sound coordinate principle is that an appellate court should never pursue non-jurisdictional issues not raised by the parties.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has specifically enjoined the Superior Court—and therefore this court also— from deciding cases on the basis of an issue raised sua sponte by the court, even a constitutional issue. In Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 484, 337 A.2d 256, 257-58 (1975), the Supreme Court said:
The Superior Court by sua sponte deciding the constitutional issue exceeded its proper function of deciding controversies presented to it. The court thereby unnecessarily disturbed the processes of orderly judicial decision-making. Sua sponte consideration of issues deprives counsel of the opportunity to brief and argue the issues and the court of the benefit of counsel’s advocacy____ *277Furthermore, sua sponte determinations raise many of the considerations that led this Court to require without exception that issues on appeal be properly preserved for appellate review by timely objection in the trial court. See Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974)....
It must therefore be concluded that the Superior Court should not have considered an unpresented issue, but instead resolved the appeal in the basis of the issues raised by the parties. (Emphasis added.)
The Commonwealth Court has also stated:
It is axiomatic that we will not pass upon issues which were not raised or considered below. Snyder v. Department of Highways, 19 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 96, 338 A.2d 764 (1975).
Clifford Township v. Ransom, 41 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 211, 398 A.2d 768 (1979).
The two rules work together consistently. An appellate court may affirm the decision of a trial court on a different ground, without regard to the ground the trial court relied upon, but only if the parties have raised that different ground in the case.
Very commonly, parties will present a trial court with alternative grounds for decision. If the trial court errs in selecting one of those alternatives as its basis, the first-stated principle above allows the appellate court to select a different one, but it does not allow the appellate court to select a non-jurisdictional issue which has not existed in the case before.
Pennsylvania courts have long understood how the two rules work together. In Estate of King, 183 Pa.Superior Ct. 190, 198, 130 A.2d 245, 249 (1957), the Superior Court stated:
Although we may affirm a decree for reasons other than those given by the court below, a decree will not be *278reversed for reasons which were not raised before, or as in this case not even on appeal.
Although the Superior Court referred to reversal, the principle is equally applicable to affirmance.1
Moreover, application of the name removal power, in the General Act, is essential if the Police Act is to function with respect to promotions as the legislature intended. The Police Act gives the appointing authority the power to select among the first four names for promotion. Obviously, if we fail to incorporate the general rule providing for the deletion of names passed over thrice, promotions ultimately would have to be given to all persons on the list. That result cannot be intended because the Act of June 10, 1955, P.L. 147, § 3, deleted the former provision which had prohibited passing over names and had thus formerly required promotions in the order in which the names appear on the list. (Historical Note to 53 P.S. § 23535).
III.
Mass Certification Is Lawful and Reasonable
After reaching a decision to grant relief on the basis of an issue admittedly not presented, this court’s opinion declines to decide squarely the mass or group certification issue which was presented. The opinion acknowledges the presentation of the issue by stating:
The other question which presents itself for consideration is whether the mass certification of names employed by the Commission is statutorily permissible.
P. 126. But then it adds: “We do not believe, however, that it is necessary to squarely decide this question today in *279light of our disposition of the appeal on other grounds.” (P. 126.)
The group certification procedure, designed for efficiency, is embodied in a regulation of the Commission, its Rule V. The Commission’s power to make regulations is in the General Act, § 6, not in the Police Act, and therefore suggests another reason for reading the two acts in pari materia. Paieski counsel agreed on the record, saying:
The law is clear, you have the right to make rules and regulations, you can’t make them if in conflict with the general statute____
Paieski’s only objection to certifying more than four names was the unpersuasive idea that the appointing authority can look at which individuals’ names appear farther down the list. But the entire list is always publicly posted by law. The appointing authority has a copy of the entire list and does not need the official certification in order to learn what names are farther down upon it.
The group certification regulation is mathematically constructed to facilitate the process when a large number of promotions are to be made (fourteen in this case). If the Commission certified only four names at a time, it obviously would have to make a fresh certification, pursuant to formal action at a meeting, after each and every promotion. The group certification permits the one-out-of-four selection process to be reiterated a number of times without a new certification each time, but the appointing authority must nevertheless follow the statute and stay within the top four names which remain after strike-offs have winnowed the list.
Therefore, although this court does well to read the two statutes in pari materia, the other aspects of the decision will unnecessarily cripple the civil service process for merit promotions of the Pittsburgh police which has been lawfully followed for decades.
. This principle that a court will not surprise the parties with new issues is independent of the waiver rule holding that only appellants, not appellees, are confined to matters raised below. Township of Ridley v. Pronesti, 431 Pa. 34, 244 A.2d 719 (1968). Introduction here of the issue of authority for name removal, after three passes, is not authorized because it is a new non-jurisdictional question, rather than because the appellee did not pursue it below.