dissenting.
I agree with Justice Connor's dissenting opinion in Flores v. Flores1: (1) the Alaska Legal Services Corporation is a private nonprofit corporation and not an agency of the state or federal government; (2) therefore, a "public agency" in the sense of being an agency of the government did not provide Mr. Flores with counsel; and (8) there is no authoritative precedent, state or federal, to firmly support an extension of due process rights to an indigent parent proceeding pro se in a custody case where the other parent has counsel provided by the Alaska Legal Services Corporation (ALSC). Of course, Flores is precedent with respect to custody cases where one parent is represented by ALSC, and I am bound to follow it.
But given the complete lack of analysis or explanation of how and why the Flores court determined that ALSC is a "public agency," and my sense that the Flores court's use of the phrase "public agency" was a justification unconsidered and derived from whole cloth, I am loath to join in the ANDVSA opinion and expand Flores to include ANDVSA merely because ANDVSA shares certain organizational and funding source similarities with ALSC. I don't think stare decisis compels us to extend one conclusory opinion resting on questionable premises to another case involving a different private, non-profit corporation. I don't see that the due process clause *842of the Alaska Constitution requires us to do so. If as a matter of policy Flores should be extended beyond its facts, that is the legislature's prerogative.
One of the arguments in Flores was that the Public Defender Agency should be required to represent such an indigent parent. (The Office of Public Advocacy had not yet been created at the time Flores was decided.) The court rejected that argument, but suggested that ALSC probably could provide both parties with legal representation if appropriate regulations were developed such that "two attorneys employed by ALSC could represent conflicting positions in litigation, each having undivided loyalty to his client and fully able to exercise that independent professional judgment which is required by the Code of Professional Responsibility." 2 The court "encouraged such an effort."3 But without such regulations in place, and having rejected the argument that the Public Defender Agency was required to provide counsel, the court determined in Flores that counsel for the indigent parent should be appointed from the private bar.4
I agree with the court that it appears likely that the legislature considered the decision in Flores when it enacted AS 44.21410(a)(4) in 1984 as part of the law establishing the Office of Public Advocacy. Alaska Statute 44.21.410(a)(4) provides in part that "[the office of public advocacy shall ... provide legal representation ... to indigent parties in cases involving child custody in which the opposing party is represented by counsel provided by a public agency." 5
I therefore agree with the Office of Public Advocacy that ANDVSA is not a public agency and that its appointment was improper under Flores and AS 44.21.410(a)(4d). I respectfully dissent from today's opinion that decides to the contrary.
. 598 P.2d 893, 897-900 and 900 n. 8 (Alaska 1979) (Connor, Justice, dissenting in part).
. Id. at 897. 2
. Id. at 897 n. 14.
. Id. at 897. 4
. This language mirrors the court's cautionary note in Flores: "We emphasize that our holding in this opinion is limited to cases involving child custody where an indigent party's opponent is represented by counsel provided by a public agency." Id. at 896 n. 12. It is noteworthy that this reference to a "public agency" is only the second instance where that term is used in the majority's opinion. The first instance is the con-clusory and unsupported finding: "Although a private individual initiated the proceeding below, he was represented by counsel provided by a public agency." Id. at 895. The court made this finding with no analysis or explanation.