concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I.
I concur in part and dissent in part from the -principal opinion. I agree that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague when applied to Ms. Self. See Cocktail Fortune, Inc. v. Sup. of Liquor Control, 994 S.W.2d 955, 958-59 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Mo. banc 1998). I also agree -with the majority opinion that when a statute does not provide a culpable mental state, under section 562.021.3, RSMo 2000, the state must establish knowing or purposeful conduct.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion that there was insufficient evidence for an inference of such a mental state. Ms. Self waived her right to a jury trial. On appeal, the trial court’s “findings shall have the force and effect of the verdict of a jury.” Rule 27.01. This Court “will affirm the trial court’s judgment if there is substantial evidence to support its findings.” State v. Shaw, 847 S.W.2d 768, 779 (1993). The statute requires that “A parent ... shall cause the child to attend regularly....” Sec. 167.031.1, RSMo 2000. In this case, Ms. Selfs daughter missed 23 days, which were excused by the school. She also missed another 17 days that were not. The parties stipulated to this and a jury trial was waived in exchange for a lighter sentence. The circuit court accepted the stipulation of facts. Evidence was presented from the school that Ms. Self had notice of the absences. The judge *765found her guilty of one count of failure to cause a child to attend school. This Court has an obligation to affirm the circuit court, even where the results may seem harsh, where there is substantial evidence to support its judgment.