concurring.
I write separately in this case because I would hold that the trial court correctly concluded that the affidavit provided probable cause for a reasonable magistrate to issue a search warrant for the search of defendant’s residence for evidence of the manufacture of marijuana.
Some general rules provide the legal framework for my conclusion. ORS 133.545(4) provides, in part, that an application for a search warrant “shall be supported by one or more affidavits particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that the objects of the search are in the places, or in the possession of the individuals, to be searched.” Probable cause to issue a search warrant “exists when the facts set out in the affidavit would lead a reasonable person to believe that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched.” State v. Castilleja, 345 Or 255, 264, 192 P3d 1283 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“A reviewing court asks whether, based on the facts shown by the affidavit, a neutral and detached magistrate could conclude (1) that there is reason to believe that the facts stated are true; and (2) that the facts and circumstances disclosed by the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the search requested.”
Id. Reviewing courts “are to construe the supporting affidavit in a commonsense and realistic fashion.” State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 408, 657 P2d 1223 (1983). “Thus, to uphold the warrant, the reviewing court need only conclude that the issuing magistrate reasonably could conclude that the facts alleged, together with the reasonable inferences that fairly may be drawn from those facts, establish that seizable things probably will be found at the location to be searched.” Castilleja, 345 Or at 270-71 (emphasis in original).
I would hold in this case that the issuing magistrate reasonably could have concluded that evidence of growing marijuana could be found at defendant’s residence at the *444time of the issuance of the search warrant. Defendant argues that “[t]he information in the affidavit was stale because there was a six week period of time between the sighting of the three marijuana plants and a grow lamp and the preparation of the affidavit.” When a defendant argues that the information in an affidavit is “stale,” that argument is essentially an argument that the affidavit fails to demonstrate that it is probable that the items sought under the warrant are still at the location to be searched at the time that the application for the warrant is made. However, when an affidavit provides a reasonable inference that the location to be searched is a place of drug production or manufacture, it is reasonable to infer from those facts that the operation is ongoing and that evidence of drugs and drug-manufacturing equipment are likely to be found there. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 120 Or App 382, 387, 852 P2d 910, rev den, 317 Or 584 (1993) (affidavit information held not stale when an affiant spoke with an unnamed informant on March 5, 1990, regarding an allegation that a drug operation had occurred during the previous seven to eight months at a residence and an application for a warrant was made on April 23,1990).
In this case, Detective Adams made an application for a search of defendant’s premises on February 8, 2008. In support of that application, Adams submitted an affidavit that contained the following information that is pertinent to the issue of “staleness”:
“On 01-27-08, Lisa Ammann made a computer generated complaint to JACNET regarding a possible marijuana growing operation in an out building at [defendant’s residence],
“Lisa Ammann reported [that, defendant,] the father of her twin son and daughter[,] * * * lives at [the specified] address. Lisa stated that their twelve year old son [E] told her (Lisa) he saw marijuana plants approximately one month ago in the shed belonging to [defendant]. Lisa advised she has told her children if they ever see marijuana at their father’s house, they are to let her know.
“Lisa reported that she was told by [E] that he had seen the marijuana plants and growing lights when she picked him up about one month ago. [E] pointed out the shed in which the marijuana was growing. Lisa’s report indicated *445that she did not come forward sooner due to a fear of [defendant] and that her son asked her not to tell on his dad.”
According to his affidavit, Adams thereafter contacted Ammann, her son, E, and her daughter, M, on January 31, 2008. Adams averred that on that occasion E told him that “he saw what he thinks is at least three plants and a heat lamp.” E was “very sure” that the plants were marijuana plants. Ammann also told Adams that E had pointed out to her the shed in which he had observed the plants and the grow lights.
Adams also interviewed M. According to his affidavit,
“[M] also told me that while at her dad’s house some people will come in and go into his bedroom with her dad. She told me the people would sometimes be in there for a while, and at times would come out in just a short period of time. I asked [M] if she goes into her dad[’]s room, and she said ‘only to brush her teeth.’ [M] said [that] when they do have to go into brush their teeth, their dad goes in first[,] shuts the door, and she can hear what sounds like glasses being put up. Shortly after hearing these sounds, her dad would let them brush their teeth.”
The police executed the search warrant on February 8, 2008, and found four growing marijuana plants, two lights, and other drugs and drug-manufacturing objects. All of the information in the affidavit pertinent to the issue of probable cause occurred within a period that does not exceed 42 days— approximately a month lapsed between when E told Ammann that he had seen marijuana plants and when she made her initial report to the police, and the issuance of the search warrant occurred within 12 days thereafter.
Consequently, the proper focus is on the totality of the circumstances that occur within the time period in light of the information contained within the four corners of the affidavit. It may be that a single fact in the affidavit, by itself, is insufficient to afford probable cause. However, the proper test requires us to assess the cumulative effect of all relative facts. Those facts include E’s observation of growing marijuana plants and growing lights, the information that M gave to the police, and the affiant’s experience and training *446regarding seizure of marijuana-growing operations. In addition, the state is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference that flows from those facts.
For the reasons that follow, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that a reasonable magistrate could not infer that it was more likely than not that evidence of growing marijuana plants could be in defendant’s possession on February 8, 2008.1 further disagree with the majority’s conclusion with regard to whether defendant was involved in a continuing cultivation operation. To begin with, this case is, for purposes of reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the core facts, a cultivation case and not a possession case. In light of the fact that E observed growing marijuana plants and grow lights, a maximum of 42 days between E’s observation and the execution of the warrant is a relatively short period of time when the illegal cultivation of plants is the subject of the investigation. Also, cultivation cases, by their nature, give rise to an inference of ongoing activity over a period of time because it is ordinarily expected that the process of growing plants requires preparation of plant beds, planting, cultivating, and harvesting. Indeed, it is reasonably inferable from the nature of the cultivation process itself that some evidence of the cultivation process may remain in the place of cultivation for a significant period of time after harvest occurs. Adams’s affidavit supports those inferences. He averred in his affidavit that, in his experience, “illegal cultivation and distribution of controlled substances, such as marijuana, is frequently a continuing activity over months and years.” This combination of facts and inferences is all part of the legal equation for probable cause in this case.
Additionally, Adams stated in his affidavit, “With respect to marijuana cultivation, I am aware that an outdoor marijuana grow takes approximately three months (ninety-days) from the time the marijuana plant is planted in the soil until it is cultivated at the end of its season.” The majority is not persuaded by that averment because this growing operation occurred indoors. One would ordinarily expect that plants grown under grow lights could mature more quickly if they are subject to a more continual light and heat source than plants grown outdoors, but the growth rate of particular plants depends necessarily on the extent to which the grow *447lights are actually used. Adams’s averment is not without relevance. It defines for purposes of the affidavit an inferential timeline for the ordinary growth cycle of a marijuana plant. Its importance to the issue in this case is that it demonstrates by comparison, albeit inexact, the relatively short 42-day time period within which E’s observation and the execution of the search warrant occurred.1 Finally, the inference from M’s observations of the activities connected with her father’s bedroom is a relevant consideration. First, M’s report does not suggest that the activities she described happened only on one occasion. Rather, they imply reoccurring activities, i.e., “people would sometimes be in there for a while, and at times would come out in just a short period of time.” Moreover, statements regarding her father’s practice of not permitting her to brush her teeth without first entering the room and shutting the door farther reinforce the inference that his actions to hide certain contents in the room occurred on more than one occasion. It is correct that nothing in the affidavit expressly ties these observations to the 42-day time period, but nothing in their nature excludes them from that time period either. Because those activities appear to be in the nature of habitual practices, they are inferentially further evidence of ongoing drug activity on the part of defendant.
In sima, the assessment of the sufficiency of an affidavit to determine whether it provides probable cause to search is a “four corners” analysis that must take into account the totality of the circumstances found by the magistrate to be true. Here, defendant does not contravene any of Adams’s averments. The remaining question is whether those facts and the reasonable inferences available from them, when considered in combination with each other, make it more likely than not that evidence of marijuana cultivation would be found on defendant’s premises on the date of the issuance of the search warrant. The issuing magistrate may or may not have drawn the above inferences or other inferences in support of his determination of probable cause. The *448point is that he reasonably could have drawn the above inferences, and that conclusion suffices to satisfy the standard of review imposed by Castillejo,.2
For these reasons, I would reach the same result as the majority but based on different reasoning.
Again, in assessing the weight to be given that inference along with other available inferences, it is important to be mindful that the standard of review is not what weight I or the majority would give to a particular inference if we were the issuing magistrate, but what weight a magistrate would be legally entitled to give to it.
The majority reaches the same conclusion based solely on the observation of the grow light. My quarrel with the majority is not its lack of reliance on that fact but on its failure to rely on the other facts in the affidavit in combination with that fact.